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ABSTRACT 
 
To understand the technology that helped create the British Atlantic in the early 1600s 
and expand it to the end of the next century, this study investigates Atlantic World 
history, maritime economic history, nautical archaeology, material culture studies, the 
history of technology, and the technical history of the ship. In addition to archival 
research in merchants’ and shipbuilders’ papers, the study relies on the technical analysis 
and modeling of extant vessel remains by ship archaeologists, and incorporates the study 
of replica vessels and the experiences of those who operate them, with an experimental-
archaeology approach. The insights gained make it difficult to remain comfortable with 
inherited assumptions without further investigation, while making it easier to understand 
how a technology traditionally considered static served a new and rapidly expanding 
colonial-imperial enterprise so well. Experiments suggested by the processing and 
analysis of the source material present opportunities for the study of the period merchant 
ship to make a more significant contribution to Atlantic, maritime, and technological 
history. 
 The approach presented here can help free Atlantic World historians with no 
technical background from having to take the received wisdom of ship history at face 
value, and offer new avenues of inquiry into problems in maritime economic history 
going back to Ralph Davis’s work in the 1960s. It demonstrates that strong elements of 
continuity and important changes were both responses to the evolving needs and high 
risks of the British Atlantic. Understanding those needs and risks is the goal; asking 
questions about ships is asking questions about people, and how they were similar to and 
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different from us, and in what ways, and why, so that we can better understand ourselves 
and our own world.  
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Introduction 
 
The sailing ship allowed Europeans to move themselves and what they needed to sustain 
themselves across oceans. It allowed European states and companies to supply weak new 
colonies, vulnerable to established indigenous power, with more people and supplies 
from home, some of which the settlers needed to establish commercial intercourse with 
indigenous peoples. It carried away whatever the settlers and natives produced and hoped 
to sell or trade beyond the sea. In a best-case scenario, for the settlers, at least, the 
services of sailing ships allowed settlements to become self-sustaining and then to 
expand—sometimes dramatically and with world-altering consequences. For some native 
peoples, the ships facilitated new economic opportunities, though of course those could 
not offset devastating losses to foreign disease and incursion, which the sailing ship also 
brought. 
 That is, of course, how and why those of European origin came to assert 
themselves in what they called the Americas, where we still live today in societies whose 
economies have generated a historically unprecedented amount of wealth over the past 
four hundred years or so. It is also how and why these same societies have such large 
populations of African descent. The ships carried the white people and their goods, 
including the black people. One sort of ship brought the explorer and then the 
conquistador, and a later one carried tobacco from the Chesapeake or codfish from 
Newfoundland while another brought stacked and chained West African prisoners of war 
and other slaves to the Chesapeake. Later still, another type of ship brought, 
manufactures and passengers from London to New York and returned with valuable 
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colonial produce and colonial passengers in a complex transaction that usually worked 
out to London’s advantage.  
 These ships turned oceans from dangerous chasms to dangerous highways, 
allowing their owners and passengers, clients and human cargoes to create empires. Their 
cousins—the warships—chased them—and each other—around the Atlantic basin in war 
after war as their imperial masters transferred their age-old rivalries to the new frontier.  
 Whether merchant or military or both, the ship was the most complex and 
expensive machine of the age. It demanded hard labor, financial outlay, and assumption 
of risk on a scale too great for individuals. Only some form of corporate enterprise could 
build and operate one. It is more than symbolic to say that the networks of interests that 
made up the Atlantic World intersected in the seemingly byzantine maze of the ship’s 
rigging. Neither, however, is inscrutable. By making sense of the miles of rope running 
hither and thither above the deck of the ship, we can make more sense of the less-tangible 
but just as real networks of people and money and power running the world of that ship.  
 This project starts from the assumption that understanding a society’s apex 
technology is a useful way to understand that society better. In order to understand that 
technology, we need to acquire first as much of an understanding of the society that used 
it as possible, in order to recognize, as we come across them, places in which the 
technology connects to its context. We historians teach our students that every individual, 
no matter how unusual or intelligent or visionary, is an inextricable part of her own time 
and place, and that there is no understanding that person without understanding that time 
and place. The same is true of any machine. A contextualized study of a technology 
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allows us to avoid the traps of facile determinism, teleology, unwitting anachronism, and 
plain befuddlement. The sailing ship as an icon is as familiar to our Eurocentric world as 
the face of Lincoln or Elizabeth II. Despite the fact that we still have wind and water, so 
the thing still works and we still have some, the sailing ship as a machine is however 
quite alien to our world. It is a machine from another time, built and used by people with 
starkly different experiences and expectations from ours. We employ it for recreation and 
education. They employed it for their very livelihood and as their ultimate weapon. To 
understand it, we need to understand when, where, how and why they built it and used it 
the way they did.  
 Given that a machine is a product of its time and place and particular group of 
people, some specific chronological, geographic, and demographic parameters are 
required to make the proposed task manageable. This thesis examines the ocean-going 
merchant ship of the British Atlantic from the early years of American settlement through 
the crisis years, when the empire partially collapsed under the weight of its own 
success—a weight whose gravity kept the disputants in a tenuous and uncomfortable 
orbit around each other even after formal separation. This empire grew up intermingled 
with those of its chief rivals from Spain, France, and the Netherlands. Ship technology 
diffused easily across the political boundaries imposed by imperial authorities along with 
the people who did the same. Exploring that diffusion means exploring those inter-
imperial relationships.  
 A specific temporal and spatial context provides the key to the code of a particular 
technology. It is not a limitation. Studying a particular technology teaches us how people 
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use technology and why. If we find different technology in a different time and place, we 
can ask what it is about those people in that time and place that makes their technology 
different. We can ask better questions about other peoples’ ships, and be better prepared 
to recognize the answers. 
 The history of technology tends to sit on the shelf alongside economic history. 
The two are closely related, but the questions economic historians ask and the methods 
they use to go about answering them do not provide a comprehensive understanding of 
technology. Taken alone, they can lead to an overly economically deterministic 
assessment of a technology, or to puzzlement as to why we find the technology where we 
do, doing what it was doing. We have to add the perspectives of political, cultural, and 
social history to end up with a robust technological history. Even then, we do not have 
enough—at least in the case of the sailing ship. Academic history has not yet digested 
enough evidence from outside our own discipline to give us the understanding we could 
hope for. Archaeology and material culture studies—a field drawing on archaeology, 
anthropology, and folklore—ask questions and suggest approaches we need if we are to 
understand any tangible object in its fullest historical context. As for the technical 
historiography of the ship, meticulously and expertly researched: it was mostly written by 
curators, antiquarians, and naval architects.  
 None of these approaches and efforts from outside the academic discipline of 
history will suffice on their own. They do not ask the same question we do, so we cannot 
look to them for the answers. Nevertheless, by combining their insights with our own 
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questions and the insights our discipline has provided, we can advance our understanding 
of the technology in question well beyond where it stands now.  
 That advance will require some original work. Questions remain even after we 
consider what all the extant literature from across disciplines has to tell us. It may not 
require original techniques, but it may well require somewhat novel modifications of 
existing ones.  
 Economic, business, and social historians have drawn much from the papers of 
merchants and officials involved in the shipping business in this period. Reading the 
literature they have based on those sources left the strong suspicion that, while those 
historians omit mention of it because they are interested in other things, some of these 
original materials must contain commentary on technological matters. Owners and 
masters and builders had opinions about what specific technology to risk their money on, 
and had to make decisions based on those opinions. Much was at stake based on those 
decisions. Officials charged with policing maritime commerce expressed opinions on 
specific types of vessels operating in specific trades—especially if they felt those vessels 
posed a challenge to the state’s right to collect revenue.1 This study requires examining 
old sources with new questions. 
 Most historians writing maritime economic history do not have the technical 
understanding of the machine in question to ask technological questions of their sources, 
much less answer them. An important mandate for a study such as this is to translate what 
                                   
1
 British officials banned certain vessel types and rigs in home waters in the “Smuggling Act” of 1795, 
primarily to help ensure that their own interceptors held the performance advantage over would-be 
smugglers. The colonial-built merchant schooner Sultana was deemed worthy to serve as one of those 
interceptors in American waters just before the American Revolution-see Chapter Six. 
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technical sources have to say into terms accessible to the non-technical maritime 
historian. 
 That is something that the technical historians of the ship have not done, on the 
whole. Most well-researched, authoritative histories of ships as machines were written by 
specialists and enthusiasts for their fellows. Some of these leave behind even those of us 
with solid technical backgrounds, particularly those written by naval architects and 
relying on that level of expertise to make important points. A project like this would be 
seriously hampered without access to the technical advice of a naval architect, so that was 
procured.
2
 Today’s best ship archaeologists have technical expertise akin to that of the 
naval architect, and the study has drawn on substantial input from that quarter as well. 
 Today’s naval architects and marine engineers have tools at their disposal that 
those working in the 1960s, when Howard Chapelle was writing his well-respected 
technical histories, would have envied. Taking our cues from the type of analysis 
Chapelle pioneered, we can use those new tools to augment his methods and apply them 
to vessels Chapelle was not particularly interested in—typical merchantmen. That is 
currently being done, and needs to be done more. 
 Analyzing plans in a computer, though, is not the same as sailing an actual vessel 
in wind and water. No intact merchant ship of this time and place still exists, but a few 
replicas do. Once we establish to what extent a given replica was built and is operated as 
it would have been at the time, we can learn much about the originals by processing and 
                                   
2
 Prof. Dan Walker, Department of Ocean and Naval Architectural Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and 
Applied Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland. Dr. Walker answered technical questions during 
the research phase of this study.  
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analyzing the experiences of the experts involved with these vessels, taking our cue from 
the established methodology of experimental archaeology.  
 The insights we gather from this analysis will supplement the existing written and 
archaeological record—a record that needs supplementing. Both contemporary and 
modern commentators have shown much more interest in particularly fast vessels and in 
warships than they have in the ordinary merchantmen carrying the bulk of the people and 
goods that made the British Atlantic, and much of the Atlantic archaeological record is in 
the condition we would expect of wood decaying under warm water for centuries. It will 
take all of the evidence from all of these sources to give us a satisfactory understanding 
of the vessels most people took for granted at the time and have not paid much attention 
to since.  
 This introduction has posed no specific questions. Those questions belong in the 
context of the review of the literature that produced those questions, to which we now 
turn. 
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Chapter One: The Historical and Extra-Historical Literature: What We Think We 
Know 
 
This literature review will explain why a comprehensive study of this subject requires 
more than passing familiarity with Atlantic World history, maritime economic history, 
the history of technology, the technical history of the ship, nautical archaeology, and 
material culture. These are the fields in which the ordinary British Atlantic merchant ship 
is situated. The objective of this review is to show that none of these fields alone can 
provide a full understanding of this subject, and that we can study the ordinary merchant 
ship as an intersection of all six areas of inquiry. 
Part One: Atlantic World history 
What we now call Atlantic World history grew out of colonial American and British 
imperial history of the early 20
th
 century, and more specifically, from those works that 
emphasized the connections between the two.
1
 Connections, webs, networks, the porosity 
of boundaries, cosmopolitanism, the confluence and conflict of disparate groups of 
people colliding to form new civilizations whether they wanted to or not—these are the 
emphases of the approach. Perhaps the first great accomplishment of the field, even 
before it acquired its current moniker—was to call attention to the inadequacy and 
anachronism of histories that were nationalist, whether intentionally so or not. Such 
histories divided people and lands with different lines than those conceived by the people 
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Transnational Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue (December 1999): 1093-1114. 
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occupying those lands at the time.
2
 For maritime historians, the Atlantic World 
perspective is naturally attractive, as it has mapped the European American empires as 
lands at the periphery of an ocean basin, with the ocean serving as a means of connection. 
That geographic point of view serves as an especially important corrective to the long-
standing U.S. westward-looking continental perspective. 
 History rarely serves us better than when it shifts our perspective from our own to 
that of a past people, so that we can understand their world in a way otherwise 
impossible. Ian Steele’s The English Atlantic: An Exploration of Communication and 
Community did that in 1986.
3
 Steele pointed out that, while to us in the jet age, the 
transportation of people, goods, and information across the Atlantic Basin in sailing ships 
seems inconceivably slow, miserable, risky, and unpredictable, it did not necessarily 
seem that way to people in the British Atlantic at the time. They had developed a 
sophisticated and dependable system of maritime communication that sustained the far-
flung imperial community and knit it more closely together. Since their expectations of 
speed, risk, and comfort were vastly different from ours, we cannot appreciate what they 
were doing from their perspective unless we step out of our own.  
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 For as convincing an example as one is likely to find on how contemporary prejudices can carry over into 
the modern thinking person’s subconscious, see John Elliott’s accessible but eloquent comparative history 
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America, 1492-1830 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). That our assumptions about Britain 
and Spain are still colored by the Black Legend is not the sort of anachronism we generally guard against. 
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 Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). A 2007 festschrift to Steele provides a recent sampling of work 
inspired by him and a summation of his influence. Nancy Rhoden, ed., English Atlantics Revisited 
(Kingston ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007).   
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 Because Steele focused his book on what ships were used for, if not on ships 
themselves, The English Atlantic remains as directly relevant to this project, if not more 
so, than any book in the field. Other historians focused on the Eastern Seaboard colonies, 
French and Dutch colonies, slavery and the slave trade, the social history of sailors, the 
West Indian plantation, smuggling, piracy, and even naval operations wrote much of the 
context we need to understand ship technology. Studies like David Hancock’s, of specific 
trades, flesh out the reality of what merchant ships were for,
4
 and draw detailed insets on 
Steele’s small-scale chart of the Atlantic. 
 When it comes to ship technology, though, Atlantic World history tends to cite 
either earlier maritime economic history
5
 or, in a few cases, the technical ship histories. 
At some point in reading this literature, one begins to pick up on some amount of 
circularity in the treatment of the topic. Atlantic World historians depend on others with 
technical expertise to explain ships to them, though they are quite adept at explaining to 
us how those ships were employed.
6
 The problem with this state of affairs is that Atlantic 
World historians have to take what technical historians have to say at face value, and we 
can do better than that. 
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 David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); and Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the 
Integration of the British Atlantic Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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 Most commonly, Ralph Davis (see note 7), though also close to ubiquitous in the footnotes is James F. 
Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial 
North America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
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 For example, Steele cites ship historians John Harland and Alan McGowan for his brief discussion of the 
steering wheel (as he should). Steele, The English Atlantic, 50, note 39. 
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 What is the significance of technological continuity and change in sea-going ships 
to the developments that preoccupy land-focused Atlantic World history? Does it matter 
that the ships moving everyone and everything around this world were so different from 
each other and changed over time? If so, how? Why? Does it matter that they did not 
change in the ways that they did not? How? Why? 
 What follows will demonstrate that yes, these questions do matter, if we want the 
fullest possible understanding of how this world worked, and why maritime interests 
made the decisions and investments they did, when they did. By exploring the priorities 
and realities of merchants, shipwrights, and the sailors whose skills and labor animated 
vessels powered by both wind and muscle, subsequent chapters will identify specific 
continuities and changes in hull design, rig, and the employment and operating 
environment of merchant ships, raising questions that, though further work will be 
necessary to answer, make a strong case that doing such work will ultimately yield 
insights useful to both maritime economic and technological historians. This project will 
make a contribution to Atlantic World history by accepting the general approach and 
objective of the field as its own, and by arguing for the importance, to others who are also 
sympathetic to the approach, of what the Atlantic World’s ship technology can teach us 
about that world. With the goal of accessibility to the Atlantic World academic 
community, it will avoid technical terms wherever possible, and where impossible, 
explain them as clearly as possible. It will illustrate technical concepts  simply and 
clearly and avoid digressions into technical matters that stray too far from their context.  
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Part Two: Maritime economic history 
In the existing Atlantic World-related literature, we find the most discussion of merchant 
ships as we approach where the field meets maritime economic history. The most 
prominent marker of that place is Ralph Davis’s The Rise of the English Shipping 
Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, first published in 1962.
7
 Atlantic 
World and maritime economic historians rely on him for his unprecedented and 
unduplicated analysis of shipping data, and for his unusual attention to ships themselves 
in his sweeping treatment of the industry that made the British Empire. Davis called 
clearly for attention to ship technology by maritime economic historians. He suspected 
that the state of our understanding of ordinary merchant ships impeded our understanding 
of his subject, and he asked those with more technical comprehension than his own to 
address that. The most important attempts to do so are only now happening. What did 
happen in maritime economic history after Davis, and the discussion and debate about the 
role of merchant ship technology in this period, make up one of the key springboards for 
this study.  
 Davis was actually making two claims that were easy to confuse as one, and to 
dismiss as one. The first claim was that we could learn more about what Davis was 
working on by studying the technology of the ordinary merchant ship. The second was 
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that technological change in the merchant ship was significant, though we did not as yet 
know how, and played a significant role in the growth of productivity in the English 
shipping industry in the period. Most maritime economic historians, both at the time and 
since, have muddled those together, and in rejecting the second claim, felt comfortable 
ignoring the first.  
 Even ship historian Alan McGowan, though, with his technical understanding far 
surpassing that of almost any maritime economic historian,
8
 dismisses any suggestion 
that some still-unknown change in basic ship design played a role in increased merchant 
ship productivity in the period, writing that it was “inconceivable that any 
such development could have occurred without its having left a single trace. Hull design 
per se is not a factor in this evidence of greater economic efficiency, although hull size is 
contributory.” He adds that the only technical innovations that could have contributed to 
an increase in ton-per-man ratios in this period were the adoption of wheel steering and 
an increasing emphasis on using fore-and-aft sails on larger ships.
9
 These last are the two 
technical innovations Steele accepted in The English Atlantic. We will investigate them 
rather than accept them as given. 
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 A bulky literature wrestles with how to measure productivity in the economy of 
the early British Atlantic, what the trends in productivity were, and what factors 
contributed what to it. The consensus is that productivity increased through the period—
that in spite of the wars and their disruptions, the overall trend was for growth in the 
British Atlantic economy. The debate is more about what weight to assign each of the 
contributing factors. Another consensus within that debate is that technological change in 
merchant ships—changes in their design and construction—was not a primary factor. 
That leaves the question: Was it a factor at all? On that one, there is no consensus, but 
general scholarly opinion falls within a fairly narrow range, with perhaps Steele’s 
“[t]echnology helped a little” in the middle.10 
 The seminal economic history on the productivity of early modern British 
merchant shipping started with Nobel laureate Douglass North and continued with his 
students Gary Walton and James Shepherd, in the heyday of econometric history.
11
 While 
North comes across as more broad-minded on the subject than Walton and Shepherd, the 
thrust of all their work is that the security of the seas and more efficient business 
organization predominate as the factors bringing about productivity growth in shipping, 
and that technical change in merchant ship design and construction was somewhere 
between insignificant and a non-factor. Some heavyweights in the field, however, let no 
time pass before raising objections. John McCusker, Russell Menard, and the late 
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Political Economy 76:5 (September-October 1968): 953-970; Gary M. Walton, “Obstacles to technical 
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Frederic Lane criticized the methodology of data analysis from more than one angle,
12
 
and while none of them came close to rejecting outright the work of the North school, 
none was willing to go along with characterizing the role of ship technology as obviously 
insignificant. Neither was Richard Unger, but to mention him is to flag another potential 
muddle. We read much more consensus about the importance of technical improvements 
in ships to productivity growth in the two centuries preceding the period of this study. 
Unger’s work centers on the late Middle Ages and the Age of Discovery, as does Lane’s. 
Their comments on this issue take a much broader chronological and geographic 
perspective than those of McCusker and Shepherd and Walton who specialize in British 
America. So, when Unger writes “[t]echnology mattered,”13 we cannot take that as a 
refutation of what the North school was arguing.  
 In fact, the literature provides no such refutation. The most we can say is that it 
leaves the door ajar for exploring what role merchant ship technology may have played in 
the dynamic expansion and rapid development of the British Atlantic Empire in the 
Americas—a door Shepherd and Walton seemed too eager to close. We are left 
somewhere between those two scholars and Ralph Davis. That, though, is enough space 
to work in, and we should set out a distillation of this discussion to be clear about what 
space we are talking about. 
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 Economists measure productivity in terms of input and output. The more output 
per unit of input, the greater the productivity. This is a straightforward concept with a 
steam engine. If one engine produces 20 horsepower per pound of fuel burned and the 
other only 15, the first engine is more efficient—more productive—by an exact amount. 
It is of course vastly more complicated when scholars are attempting to measure overall 
productivity in a complex economy over a period of decades or centuries. As a recent 
collection of conference papers edited by Richard Unger makes clear, while economic 
historians are still working on shipping productivity, they largely agree on how to 
measure that productivity, and they agree that there was slow but steady growth in overall 
shipping productivity before, during, and after our period. They also agree that technical 
change was much more incremental in our period than it had been in the preceding one or 
would be in the succeeding one. They do not, however, write off those incremental 
changes as irrelevant to productivity growth in the period.
14
 
 The productivity measure most central to our purpose here is the ton-per-man 
ratio. Economic historians have scrutinized the idea closely, and debated how best to 
employ and interpret it, but it remains their favorite index. The basic idea is that the fewer 
humans it took to move a ship of a given capacity, the more efficient a cargo-moving 
machine it was, since wages, the cost of feeding and watering the crew, and the space 
taken up by the stores needed to do so all militated against the profit of the shippers—and 
those shippers saw this significant cost as one over which they had more control than 
they did over others. Davis was the first to argue convincingly that ton-per-man ratios in 
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our period increased over time, a trend interrupted, but never reversed, by war. 
Subsequent scholarship has reinforced his conclusion, but why did this happen?  
 To some extent, the size of the crew was dictated by the defensive capability of 
the ship. The more guns she carried, the more men she needed to man them in action, 
should that be called for. The installation of cannon penalized the ship as a profit-making 
commercial tool in several ways. The ship was more expensive to build if she were 
stoutly constructed enough to carry the weight of cannon and absorb the violence of their 
recoil. She was also heavier as a result of that stout construction, and thus either slower or 
in need of a more powerful, and thus more expensive and more labor-intensive, rig to 
move her as fast as a lighter ship of the same size, especially in light air. The guns took 
up cargo space, as did their heavy and bulky ammunition and gunpowder.  
 Owners, however, had good reason not to trust cargoes to unarmed vessels in the 
Atlantic World during much of our period. In the 17
th
 century, European naval power in 
the western Atlantic and Caribbean was weak. Navies had not developed the bureaucratic 
structures or the physical infrastructure to maintain warships and their crews so far from 
home in good enough condition to police American waters,
15
 so merchant ships were 
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vulnerable to pirates and privateers. The nascent marine insurance industry was 
inadequate and expensive. Risks being what they were, shippers felt compelled to bear 
the costs of armed freighters, just as those sending ships into the Mediterranean had done 
for a long time, since North African state-sponsored commerce raiding was endemic and 
effective there. So the merchant ships plying the Atlantic trade routes were a pragmatic 
compromise between cargo capacity and the ability to defend that cargo—galleons, or 
their direct descendents. The galleon was the stout, seaworthy, high-payload hybrid that 
carried the plunder of the New World back to Spain and—in the hands of her enemies—
challenged her Armada in the English Channel.
16
 Writing about the wreck of a famous 
English galleon at Bermuda—the Sea Venture—archaeologist Jonathan Adams summed 
up the type: "...[W]hile not ideal for any one task, [they] were brilliant general purpose 
ships."
17
 They were certainly suited to a time and place where markets and colonial 
populations were still small, seas risky, navies short of specialized warships, and Spain 
still convinced it should and could keep its rivals out of the Americas altogether. The 
galleon was not a specialized ship, and it served a world that did not have the luxury of 
building and operating specialized ships.  
 In the Baltic, the Dutch had that luxury. Non-technical maritime economic history 
pays unusual attention to the fluit or fluyt, both as a specific type of specialized cargo 
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vessel and as an archetype for the economical pure cargo vessel in general.
18
 Like any 
other ship, the fluit was the product of a specific and temporary set of conditions, but as 
an archetype, it does provide an illustrative counterpoint to the galleon. Capacious, 
lightly and thus cheaply built, simply rigged for ease of handling, and produced by a 
shipbuilding industry already experimenting with semi-standardized components and 
construction techniques, the type maximized efficiency for owners and shippers working 
in the secure Baltic bulk commodity trades. Economic historians consider the Atlantic’s 
inhospitable conditions for such a vessel a primary barrier to the growth of Atlantic 
shipping productivity before about 1750.  
 Splitting a hybrid into its component specialties, though, cuts two ways. There 
would be no fluit-type pure cargo ships on Atlantic trade routes without the 
corresponding specialized warships to protect them. While the lumping-together of the 
“decline in piracy and privateering” we find in Shepherd and Walton is confusing, 
Christopher French attempts to clarify it for us—piracy ceased to be the threat it had been 
to Atlantic Basin commerce after the 1720s, as the bulk of recent work on the topic has 
shown, he argues, but privateering was a major component of naval warfare throughout 
the period. The difference, to French, is the increased effectiveness of wartime convoys 
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after the middle of the 18
th
 century.
19
 Convoys were the bane of the merchant shipper 
when they were first tried, but by the Seven Years War, the Royal Navy had the system 
worked out, with adequate numbers and types of naval vessels to provide proper escort 
and move shipping reasonably efficiently. This meant that more merchantmen, if they so 
chose, could sail unarmed or lightly armed, and thus approach the efficiency advantages 
of the fluit even in an otherwise-dangerous operating environment. Of course, in 
peacetime, with predation considered less of a threat, pure cargo ships were freer to sail 
with only nature and navigational mishap to worry about. North, Shepherd and Walton 
attribute the bulk of the increase in Atlantic shipping productivity to the increased 
security of the seas, and the concomitant decrease in merchant ship armament and 
accompanying increase in ton-per-man ratio. The lion’s share of the rest of the credit 
goes, in their view, to the increased organizational and logistical efficiency of Atlantic 
business networks. In this sense, they certainly take an Atlantic World perspective, and it 
is one that subsequent Atlantic World scholarship has reinforced time and again. With 
established commercial relationships, well-traveled shipping routes, better cargo-loading 
logistics and shorter turn-around times, cargoes were loaded and shipped faster, even if 
the ships carrying those cargoes did not change at all—except to lose those guns and 
extra men and stores.  
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 Guy Chet argues in a much more recent book, though, that we have put too much 
stock in this interpretation. Privateers did not always adhere to the terms of their letters of 
marque, and in a world where illicit trade was widely practiced and widely accepted, the 
gains of their ventures were likely to find markets. The distinction between “pirate” and 
“privateer” is clear to us, but Chet argues that the distinction is anachronistic if we project 
it back into the early modern Atlantic World, that our understanding of the distinction 
relies too much on official imperial sources (and wishful official thinking); and that 
Atlantic piracy, as distinct from sanctioned privateering, was not as completely 
suppressed after 1726 as the current historical consensus assumes. Regardless of the 
extent to which outright piracy as we think of it survived to a significant extent in the 
Atlantic World after the 1720s, his argument only adds to the skepticism toward any view 
that maritime predation—whatever they called it or we want to call it—continued to be a 
serious threat to shipping. So, if merchant ships were less frequently armed after the 
1720s, is that due to the increased availability and effectiveness of convoys and the 
increased availability and affordability of marine insurance? Chet takes a less sanguine 
view of 18
th
-century convoying than French, and a main thrust of his argument is that 
merchants increasingly used insurance policies rather than defensive measures to protect 
their interests. His critics, however, question his interpretation of the marine insurance 
business. He does present both anecdotal and legal evidence for the continuation of 
outright piracy in the British Atlantic into the mid-19
th
 century, but provides no sense of 
the scale of that. Still, he makes a convincing case for skepticism toward any argument 
22 
 
on the subject that resembles Shepherd and Walton’s.20 We are still tasked with studying 
the arming of merchant ships in this period, and the ramifications of that.  
 We are also tasked with understanding the technology of speed. Shepherd and 
Walton were convinced that ship speed did not increase at all over the period. They 
attributed all the observed decrease in voyage times to faster turn-around in port. While 
other scholars concur that passage times did not fall dramatically during our period on 
most routes, Shepherd and Walton use a small set of data to make such a claim—voyages 
from New York and New England to Jamaica and Barbados, 1686-1765.
21
 What they do 
not mention is that, all other things being equal, bigger ships are faster ships—that is a 
principle of physics.
22
 We know from Davis that Atlantic merchant ships were getting 
bigger, so if that was the case, how could they not have also gotten faster? That will not 
prove to be a simple question, but it will be another driving question of the study. Speed 
is probably the most productive concept with which to begin an attempt to understand 
ships, for a host of reasons to be introduced at the end of the chapter.   
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 Russell Menard comes down in a quite different place in his weighing of safer 
seas versus better ships—at least for a forty-year period in the 18th century (1725-1765) 
in the Atlantic tobacco trade, for which he argues we have better data to work with than 
for other trades in much of the rest of our period. He is confident enough in his 
methodology to attribute 40% of productivity growth to safer seas and 60% to better 
ships.
23
 That is a far cry from North or Shepherd and Walton. Discussing specifically the 
tobacco trade, Menard says Walton is "too quick to dismiss technical changes in ship 
design and navigation. The difficulty stems from a reliance on evidence that does not 
measure directly the performance of ships in the Chesapeake tobacco trade." Menard says 
that Walton did not restrict his data set exclusively to ships making the London-
Chesapeake run, so he included coastal and inter-island vessels which were quite 
different in terms of ton-per-man ratios, operating costs, and transit times. He also says 
that Walton overestimates the decline in port times, which thus exaggerates the 
contribution of that factor at the expense of others, and that he "missed a decline in 
running time by relying on evidence from American coastal voyages.
 24
 Christopher 
French throws more cold water on the idea of a general decline in port turn-around times 
and further complicates the matter by claiming that there was no general decline in time 
spent in colonial ports in the first three-quarters of the 18
th
 century, at least for ships 
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trading from London to New York, Jamaica, and Virginia, and that Walton’s 
demonstration of a decline in port times in the Chesapeake hinges on data from the 
Scottish trade which grew to be more efficient than the London-based trade.
25
 Menard 
continues: “It was not that ships improved their speed under constant conditions but 
rather that they shifted their routes and thus encountered different conditions."
26
 This was 
made possible, he believes, by the introduction of more weatherly and maneuverable 
ships, largely thanks to the adoption of jib sails and the steering wheel—here he relies on 
Steele’s English Atlantic, which reinforces the impression that to some extent this 
literature is caught in a self-referential loop—and this allowed masters to tighten the 
circle of sailing. He then faults Walton’s evidence for being “particularly misleading on 
the characteristics of ships, the key to his argument that technical improvements were not 
important in the tobacco trade." Menard is not arguing that Walton is totally wrong, just 
that he has overly downgraded the ship-technology factor.
27
  
 Menard, though, does accept Walton’s conclusion that ships did not get inherently 
faster—“[it] was not that ships improved their speed under constant conditions…”—
though we will not be leaving it at that, because if it is true, we need to know why, and a 
fresh examination may bring us closer to knowing how true it really is. 
                                   
25
 French, “Productivity,” 623-624.  
 
26
 Menard in Tracy, ed., 259. 
 
27
 Menard in Tracy, ed., 260-261. 
 
25 
 
 John McCusker, Menard’s co-author on the landmark The Economy of British 
North America, 1607-1789,
28
 the best compendium of work on the subject up to 1985, 
entered this debate as early as his 1968 doctoral dissertation, by objecting to Walton’s 
claim that ships did not grow in the century prior to the American Revolution. McCusker 
has spent the last half-century doing work most historians would avoid but for which we 
are greatly in his debt, and a major outcome of that is clarity on the issue of tonnage. 
Since some sort of tonnage figure is frequently all the description of a particular vessel 
we can find in the official records besides her name, it is more than important to know 
what the term meant—and it meant several different things at the same time, and those 
meanings changed over time. They are anything but interchangeable.
29
 McCusker faults 
Walton for assuming that registered tonnage and actual tonnage were the same and for 
basing his conclusions on that, when in fact, McCusker says, those two measurements 
were quite different, and ships did indeed grow during this period.
30
 
 What are we to make of this discussion, standing on the sidelines of quantitative 
economic history and trying to figure out what it has to tell us about ships? The first 
caution flag to throw up reminds us to make apples-to-apples comparisons. The apparent 
contradictions here arise from the fact that different authors treat different trades at 
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different times, constrained by the surviving records and the large gaps in those. To treat 
the entire period under consideration here means to avoid extrapolating scholars’ claims 
outside their more-specific contexts. For example, Steele writes: “Innovations in ship 
design were minimal between 1675 and 1740 and had little effect on the speed, 
frequency, or safety of Atlantic crossings.”31 We have two tasks, not one, in evaluating 
this claim—to decide if Steele was right for the period he specifies, and to decide if his 
statement applies to the periods before and after without presupposing that it does or does 
not.  
 Pointing out that different trades had different productivities at different times is 
valuable insurance against over-generalization, but it does not upset the general 
consensus that Atlantic shipping productivity in the period generally improved over time, 
even as demands on that shipping—from expanding populations, trade volumes, and 
rising costs—increased. In that sense, what Davis concluded fifty years ago stands.  
 The debate also leaves room for an investigation of ship technology and an 
attempt to assess where it fits in this discussion—how it might have been affected by the 
other productivity factors, and how it might have affected them. There is much more to 
understanding a technology than those aspects encompassed by a discussion of 
productivity. We cannot grasp all the reasons people make and use a technology the way 
they do by limiting ourselves to the questions that frame this discussion and leave no 
room for those from a cultural, technical, or political perspective. To move beyond that, 
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we need to look on the shelf where maritime economic history sits next to the history of 
technology. 
Part Three: History of Technology 
Frederic C. Lane and Nathan Rosenberg, already mentioned, both weigh in on the 
productivity discussion, with a focus on technological innovation—what it means, to 
whom, and when. Lane faults what he considers the traditional definition of technological 
innovation—which he attributes to Shepherd and Walton, specifically. For Lane, 
Shepherd and Walton’s definition—“an advance in knowledge that allows fewer inputs to 
produce a given output”—does not take into account a technique already known but not 
previously utilized, then employed as conditions change in such a way that its 
employment becomes practical or desirable. So, the adoption of the fluit-like economical 
pure cargo carrier in the Atlantic would not be a technological innovation or change by 
the Shepherd and Walton definition, but would be to Lane.
32
  
 Lane criticizes North and Walton for failing to give adequate credit to innovation 
in their assessments of shipping productivity. After presenting examples of technological 
discoveries that could not, at the time of their discovery, overcome political or economic 
barriers to their employment, he suggests that historians should reverse what North and 
Shepherd and Walton did, by looking first for the technological innovation, and then 
examining the factors hostile to it—insecure seas, high costs—to explain its absence in a 
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given subsequent time and place—a methodology that goes hand-in-hand with his call for 
including the adoption of previously known technology in the definition of innovation.
33
 
 Another way to express Lane’s objection to the North-Walton approach is as a 
failure to distinguish between the discovery of a technology and its diffusion.
34
 
Technologies are just footnotes of curiosities if they are not adopted, so the study of 
diffusion is just as central to the history of technology as that of invention. Nathan 
Rosenberg examines diffusion as much more than the adoption of a technology, though. 
He argues that what we tend to consider diffusion—the dissemination of an innovation—
is actually a process of “‘secondary inventions’” in which the original technology is 
modified, improved, and adapted to better suit those employing it—especially those 
employing it outside the time and place of its original setting.
35
 To Rosenberg, 
understanding this process is just as important to understanding major inventions—whose 
importance, he says, is by no means immediately apparent but requires time to realize, as 
costs come down, technical obstacles to commercial feasibility are overcome, and enough 
people adopt the invention. So even “Eureka!” moments are more processes than 
moments, at least in terms of real social benefit.
36
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 Rosenberg, too, objects to North’s assessment of the role of technological change 
in shipping productivity. While lauding him for, and agreeing with him on, his argument 
for the overwhelming importance of organizational and marketing improvements, 
Rosenberg finds North’s “attempt to downgrade the contribution of technological change 
to the growth in productivity of ocean shipping …more questionable.”37 His specific 
objection is very close to Lane’s. To Rosenberg, the existence of a successful pure cargo 
ship type by 1600 (the fluit) means that, security-related obstacles to its employment in 
the Atlantic aside, the fact that it was eventually adopted constitutes technological 
change. He gives North the benefit of the doubt by saying that North’s impression of 
technological change as “scarcely of any significance whatever” was “doubtless 
unintentional,” but that it ultimately serves to obscure the process of diffusion of that 
technology in the Atlantic.
38
 
 Adding to our understanding of the productivity debate is secondary to the 
purpose of discussing this transitional material—transitional from economic to 
technological history. The primary purpose here is to begin considering the questions 
technological historians—and their counterparts in related disciplines—ask and how they 
go about asking them. Lane and Rosenberg show that we can only do that if we engage 
the economic history, while some of the economic historians, on the other hand, do 
attempt to accomplish their goals without seriously engaging technological issues. As we 
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move across the technological history shelf, we move farther from econometrics at one 
end and closer to technical ship history on the other—but the history of technology 
section has important questions to grapple with before we get to the narrow focus on the 
other side.  
 History, anthropology, archaeology, sociology, and economics all offer access 
points to the history of technology. Technology itself is an inclusive concept, 
encompassing tangible objects and complex machines, and everything we now refer to as 
‘intellectual property’—ideas, plans, processes. The great material-culture scholar Henry 
Glassie defines it with his usual elegance: “Technology is the means by which the natural 
literally becomes the cultural, by which the substances won from nature become useful to 
man.”39 Studying ships fits perfectly well within the parameters of the history of 
technology. Studying ships of this period takes departure, though, from much of the 
literature of that specialty, which concerns itself with the technology of the ‘industrial’ 
world, with its corporations, its factories, its mass distribution outlets, and its detailed 
records. The British Atlantic from 1600 to 1800 was not that world. The differences 
matter. Nor was it, though, the ancient world. The tools and techniques of prehistoric 
archaeology can and should be, to a large extent, adapted for use in our period, as the 
historical record—especially that related to technology—is so much more sparse than 
that of the last two centuries. There is a historical record, though, and it is much more 
complete and accessible than those of the ancient and medieval worlds. So a useful 
                                   
39
 Glassie, Folk Housing in Middle Virginia: A Structural Analysis of Historic Artifacts (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1975), 122.  
 
31 
 
history-of-technology approach to this topic can take something from the current 
sociological and anthropological approaches, but must also rely heavily on the 
archaeological contribution, and whatever results from all of that must have something to 
say to economic historians of technology. 
 Two closely related surveys by Joel Mokyr served as the principal overview of 
the history of technology for this project.
40
 Both introduce and explore central themes of 
the history of technology from the ancient world to our own. Particularly germane here is 
Mokyr’s observation that “[s]ome technological systems, such as ships, mines, and farms, 
are complex and interrelated. Dramatic sudden changes are not impossible in such 
systems, but are less likely because of the need to preserve compatibility with other 
components.”41 Mokyr contrasts “macroinventions,” which are revolutionary, to 
“microinventions,” which are evolutionary.42 The complex system which is also itself 
part of a larger complex system—such as the ship—tends to improve over time by 
microinvention, while remaining compatible with components of the larger surrounding 
system. Using different terminology, Mokyr is describing the same process Rosenberg 
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did. Whether we call it diffusion broadly defined, secondary invention, or 
microinvention, this is where the topic of this study fits into the history of technology.  
 Naturally enough, the social sciences focus on social groups as creators and users 
of technology. The introduction and growth of the SCOT (social construction of 
technology) approach from the 1980s into the present took technology studies away from 
the technological determinism of the 1930s Chicago school of sociologists and even 
further away from the Victorian ‘heroic inventor’ tradition that Gilfillan and the other 
Chicago scholars were reacting against when they resurrected, according to Christine 
MacLeod, an 18
th
-century form of determinism.
43
 SCOT is not necessarily squeamish 
about famous inventors—co-founder Thomas P. Hughes wrote a book about Thomas 
Edison
44—but sets out to show how the Edisons of the world, and their inventions, are 
not theirs alone but that their fame and the credit they are given in popular history stem 
from their success—both deliberate and fortuitous—in persuading their societies to adopt 
their versions of technology and not those of their rivals. 
 We have no Thomas Edisons to consider here. We are in no danger of paying too 
much attention to inventors, and are not tasked with properly contextualizing their stories, 
as Hughes was, because we are in no position to know who invented what and when. The 
social-group emphasis in current technological studies is a natural fit for us. That still 
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leaves us potentially vulnerable to technological determinism, and does not excuse us 
from considering agency, or the role of conscious human choice, whether individual or 
group, in technological decisions. Those concerns will serve as a frame upon which to 
hang an argument for the theoretical and methodological approaches of this study. 
 For now, we can turn around and give the economic historians their due. Mokyr’s 
“complex and interrelated system” includes the business organization, marketing 
techniques, infrastructure, naval developments, and maritime security concerns that 
North, Walton et al. brought to the fore, and the technology-in-culture context offered by 
those advocating—or arguing with—a SCOT perspective, without which our 
consideration of technology would be stripped of its context. Without that context, we 
would be left with a technical analysis unable to contribute to any of the discussions in 
our discipline. So when we are examining specific technological developments—whether 
they seem rather static or more dynamic—we are looking for how those developments 
mesh with their context—with the “complex and interrelated system” of which they are 
components. To do that, we will go back to economic history, consider insights from the 
history of ports and the history of navigation, and add insights from archaeology and 
material culture to make sense of why we find a change in rig or stasis in size when and 
where we do.  
Part Four: Technical Ship History 
Exploring those specific technological developments brings us to the technical history of 
the ship, and that requires leaving the academic history department. Museum curators, 
archaeologists, self-taught enthusiasts, and naval architects dominate this literature. The 
34 
 
volume of research they have done, on paintings, drawings, models, and plans, is 
prodigious and has much to offer the academic historian who possesses enough technical 
understanding to access it.   
 The most accessible ship histories are those that provide at least some historical 
context for the subject. Among those, probably the most accessible are Alan McGowan’s 
short illustrated surveys Tiller and Whipstaff: The Development of the Sailing Ship, 1400-
1700 and The Century Before Steam: The Development of the Sailing Ship 1700-1820.
45
 
McGowan was a curator at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, and he distills a 
vast knowledge of the subject into volumes no larger than a child’s storybook, providing 
the reader with an authoritative overview, no technical expertise required. 
 Much more demanding, though still amply illustrated and attractively presented, 
are the twelve volumes in Conway’s History of the Ship, re-published in the U.S. by the 
Naval Institute Press.
46
 The series brought together an international team of top maritime 
historians and, produced in the 1990s, remains reasonably current. Prominent among the 
editors were scholars also affiliated with the National Maritime Museum and with the 
major museums of the Netherlands, though academic historians are represented—
Christopher French, Carla Rahn Phillips, and Richard Unger among them. For its breadth 
and depth, the Conway series is an indispensable reference to historians of the ship, 
whether academic or not. It is, however, for readers already interested in ships. Non-
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maritime historians are not going to pick up one of these volumes and suddenly 
understand the importance of ships to their fields.  
 Digesting this literature leads to the conclusion that its most important general 
limitation is that it is descriptive rather than interpretive. It is about what and when, rather 
than how and why. The best example that comes to mind is from John Harland’s 
Seamanship in the Age of Sail, a unique, masterful and comprehensive reference on the 
operation of the sailing warship. Harland begins his third chapter with a summary of the 
development of the typical square-rig sail plan from 1580 to 1900. He finishes it in two 
pages. A typical excerpt reads: “The sail plan has extended upwards, topgallants now 
being set on all three masts, with royals on fore and main above these. The topsails are 
proportionately larger, relative to the courses, than was the case earlier.”47 The quote does 
not leave out the explanation of why these changes occurred. There is none.  
 What Harland and his fellows have done for us is, of course, a great service. 
There is no reason to doubt that Harland’s summary is accurate. Taking that as given, we 
have the outline we need to begin asking the how and why questions. Books like his, and 
Karl Heinz Marquardt’s Eighteenth Century Rigs and Rigging, omit no detail of these 
complex machines, and treat the evolution of those details with overt attention to sources, 
source problems, debates, and lingering questions.
48
 Leafing through these large heavy 
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books with their exacting diagrams and renderings brings home how fortunate we are to 
know as much as we do about ships that have not sailed the seas for two or three 
centuries. We know what these people did. We know some things—and not others—
about how they built their ships and how those ships worked. We know the ships changed 
over time and we know what most of those changes were. We know what aspects of them 
remained largely the same for relatively long periods between more drastic changes. We 
even know what some of the major benefits and drawbacks of these changes and 
continuities were. What remains is to explain those in terms of the world to which they 
belonged. The primary purpose of this technical literature was to explain how ships work. 
The primary purpose of the kind of study undertaken here is to explain how a society 
worked by relating that to how its ships worked.  
 To focus such a study on typical merchant vessels is problematic, since most of 
the technical literature has found it more convenient and compelling to focus on warships 
and on merchant ships specifically designed for speed. The convenience is source-related. 
We have far more contemporary plans, descriptions, inventories, and art related to ships 
of particular interest to the state and to the public imagination. We still have two warships 
from the end of our period—HMS Victory and USS Constitution.  
 The fascination with warships likely belongs to the broader fascination with war. 
The fascination with fast ships, on the other hand, is worth some consideration here, as it 
touches on issues of theory and method. Two of the most authoritative and informative 
references in this literature—Howard Chapelle’s The Search for Speed Under Sail, 1700-
1855 and David MacGregor’s Fast Sailing Ships: Their Design and Construction, 1775-
37 
 
1875
49—are easy to read teleologically and deterministically, though it would be going 
too far to ascribe such thinking to their authors. They seek to uncover the origins of, and 
evolution toward, the 19
th
 century “clipper” ships, the fastest wooden square-riggers ever 
built. They are also nationalist in scope if not intent. Chapelle is interested in American 
ships, MacGregor in British. The clippers sailed in a contest of maritime pride between 
the two powers, and these two ship historians start there, with MacGregor’s purpose 
being to prove that British clippers developed independently of, and were not mere 
imitations of, American ships. He does not argue with Chapelle on this point—in fact, the 
two collaborated behind the scenes—but Chapelle was clearly interested to highlight 
American maritime technological know-how leading up to those 1850s speed records.
50
 
 The nature of such selective works leads their authors to pick and choose from 
amongst the available evidence to find those examples that suit their purposes. We should 
not assume that the result represents anything approaching a comprehensive description 
of the evolution of the sailing ship. It is not that Chapelle and MacGregor are wrong. 
They were both careful scholars who stuck close to their source material, made clear their 
awareness of the limitations of that source material, and made no claims they could not 
support. A “search for speed,” though, is a narrow focus. It can lead us to view fast ships 
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as apex technology—as the best they could do. Fast, though, is usually not best, as far as 
commercial shipping is concerned. If we understand that, we understand far more about 
shipping than we ever will from reading any number of books about “fast” ships.  
 This is also a good place to point out the danger of using concepts like “apex 
technology” and value-laden terms like “best,” “improvement” and “stagnation.” As 
historians, we should be more interested in what contemporaries viewed as “best” or 
“improvements” than what seem to be so to us. The appearance of the phrase “apex 
technology” in the introduction to this thesis warrants explanation. There, it was applied 
to the sailing ship in general, but one cannot support the notion that any given type of 
sailing ship in the period deserves that appellation.  
 If the fastest ships are not the apex of the apex, why not? Because speed demands 
sacrifices of other desirable attributes that, for a cargo vessel, are usually too dear a price 
to pay for a benefit that may not be as innately desirable as we might at first assume. Fast 
merchant ships are niche technology. A ship is as much a balance of contradictory 
imperatives—a complex of compromises—as it is of wood, rope, air and water. 
Unpacking that complex will be a primary thrust of the study, and will afford us as much 
of our understanding of ships, their role in this world, and the way technology functions 
in the real world as anything. This technical history teaches us enough about the machine 
itself to do that, and the Atlantic World and maritime economic history imparts required 
contextual information, such as the seasons of certain markets for agricultural products 
and how those, combined with the distances of the trade routes for those products and the 
seasonal weather patterns on those routes, dictated the maximum useful speed, and 
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capacity, of the vessels engaged in those trades. We need all of that, and we need to put it 
together. 
Part Five: Archaeology 
Historians of the ship study plans and documents. Nautical archaeologists
51
 study those 
as well, but they also study ships—the wrecks of ships, the remains of ships’ cargoes, 
reconstructions of ships, and the performance of replica ships. We need to know what 
they have learned by doing that, and add that to what the Chapelles and MacGregors have 
to tell us. Ralph Davis had high hopes for nautical archaeology in the 1960s.
52
 The 
archaeology relevant to our purpose, though, like all historical archaeology, has worked 
at a couple of disadvantages relative to its venerable parent, prehistoric archaeology, and 
the historical archaeology of the early modern period has even more competition from the 
discipline of history than its classical branch.  
 Prehistoric archaeologists tend to be the sole authorities on their subjects, given 
the meaning of the word “prehistoric.” Historical archaeology, a much younger discipline 
developed, as we know it, in the 1960s, has had to justify itself to the history departments 
all along, and this is certainly just as true of the archaeologists who get wet as those who 
get dusty. Given the need for artificial life support, the archaeology of sunken ships is 
more expensive, more logistically difficult, and thus so far has been less extensive than 
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terrestrial projects. Be that as it may, in over a half-century of effort, the enterprise has 
produced a large volume of work, its own journals, and its own graduate programs.  
 What nautical archaeology critically lacks—for our period in the Atlantic—is the 
volume of data enjoyed by economic and archive-based maritime historians. For 
example, in North America and the Caribbean, we find studies of less than twenty 
archaeological sites containing remains of American-built ships from our period—out of 
the thousands of vessels of all types that plied our waters in those two hundred years. So 
an effort to, say, discern an evolutionary pattern in framing techniques—something we 
could never do without archaeology—is seriously hampered by the dearth of evidence. A 
scattered sampling of random types of vessels built in different places at different times 
and under different imperatives does not a reliable data set make—as the work on this 
particular problem freely admits. While a tentative theory of 18
th
-century framing 
evolution was proposed by a group of archaeologists in 1995, a 2004 study of the subject 
concluded that the evidence could not support that theory. The only solution to this 
problem is more evidence.
53
  
 Nautical archaeology is also limited by what does not survive from a wooden 
shipwreck. In simplest layman’s terms, all an archaeologist can hope to find—except in 
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very cold, anaerobic water such as the Baltic or Arctic—is the bottom of the ship.54 
Usually, anything above the turn of the bilge
55
 is lost, from long-term exposure to 
current, storm, decomposition, and marine animals. Only what is buried in an anaerobic 
environment such as sand or mud will survive. If the entire bottom section—from stem 
(front) to stern (back) survives, that is exceptional and fortunate. Usually, even the 
vessel’s length has to be estimated.  
 Archaeologists have to be clever at gleaning as much information as possible 
from what they have. The ship’s rig is gone, but if enough of the bottom survives, they 
can tell how many masts she had because masts terminate in distinctive structures on top 
of the keel (backbone) called steps. If the turn of the bilge survives, they can infer much 
about the shape of the hull, and thus what sort of ship she might have been—fast 
interceptor or capacious cargo carrier. From framing and fastening patterns and 
techniques, they can tell how heavily built she was, which may indicate whether or not 
she was a warship. Fortunately, cannon and shot remain on a wreck site, perhaps 
obviating the need for that particular piece of guesswork, but that is complicated by the 
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fact that merchant ships were frequently armed in our period. Types of woods indicate 
possible place of origin, and carbon- and tree-ring dating place the vessel in time. 
Artifacts found on or around the wreck yield more clues about what, and who, were on 
board. Comparing the remains of an actual ship to what we read in shipbuilding treatises 
provides a real-world corrective to the notion we would otherwise have little hard 
evidence to question—that shipbuilding techniques were fairly uniform and standardized. 
As a supplement to archived plans and drawings, actual wreck remains reveal details of 
physical construction we would never otherwise see.  
 Some archaeology, like technical ship history, is much more descriptive than 
interpretive. The example of the framing-evolution problem explains why this is so, to a 
large extent—the evidence is so limited. Much archaeology, though, is done for the 
purpose of recording cultural resources, under a mandate from governments to identify 
and record such things before they are destroyed by construction projects or nature. This 
bread-and-butter of the field also contributes to a descriptive bent. We cannot answer 
important how and why questions about ships by reading a stack of archaeological site 
reports and theses any more than we can by reading a stack of Mariner’s Mirror articles. 
Neither, though, can we ignore what they have to contribute. They are more evidence to 
be gathered and incorporated.  
 In Europe and the UK, theoretical and interpretive archaeology is more 
prominent, and the kind of study attempted here would more likely be done by an 
archaeologist than a historian over there. Scandinavians were pioneering practitioners, 
having excavated, reconstructed, and extensively tested vessels from the Viking age, and 
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they are still well-represented in the literature. The faculty of the  Centre for Maritime 
Archaeology at the University of Southampton in England, headed by Jon Adams, also 
pop up regularly in the latest theoretical and interpretive publications.
56
 This scholarship 
insists on interpreting the design, construction, and use of ships in the context of broad 
social forces while bringing to bear the technical expertise few academic historians can 
approach. Much if not most of what needs to be done on this topic can and should be 
accomplished by exporting their theory and method. 
Part Six: Material Culture 
Ships are objects. While not all archaeologists study objects, archaeology—along with 
anthropology, folklore, sociology, art history, and history—does contribute to the field of 
material culture studies, an effort to understand objects from a humanistic and/or social-
science perspective coalescing, like so many other new intellectual and cultural 
undertakings, in the restless 1960s. Their internal theoretical and methodological 
differences aside, pioneers of historical archaeology insisted that archaeologists move 
beyond description and take the interpretive step, refusing to leave that to their 
counterparts in the archives.
57
 Anthropologists applied theory and method developed for 
studying ancient and non-literate cultures to modern, literate ones. Folklorists expanded 
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their interests from storytelling to other vernacular and artisanal forms of expression—
including the making and using of objects for work, pleasure, artistic expression, or some 
combination of the three. Sociologists asked what mass consumption, materialism, and 
mass production could tell us about modern societies.
58
  
 All the colonial-period houses Henry Glassie studied in Folk Housing in Middle 
Virginia provided shelter from the weather, warmth in winter, and some sort of 
separation of space into more-public and more-private.
59
 It was Glassie’s take on how and 
why he found the similarities and differences in the way the houses performed those 
functions that made for an innovative, fascinating, and controversial study of how 
tangible culture reflects intangible culture over time. Glassie refuses to do archival 
research. Objects and landscapes and the things people show and tell him are his only 
sources. The archives could have helped him answer the questions he asked about the 
Virginia houses, and might well have altered his conclusions for the better. Instead of 
moving in that direction in his later work, he chose to move away from history and work 
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in the present and recent past, where his preferred sources could provide him with more 
of the evidence he wanted to look at. While he may stand well outside our discipline, his 
criticisms of what our discipline has typically ignored or downplayed in its devotion to 
pieces of paper demand our attention. The most important of those criticisms for this 
project has to do with continuity and change in history. In his collection of essays on 
Material Culture, he writes: 
Despite the revolutions, there is the humble, fulfilling continuity of daily 
life among family and friends. The great historian EP Thompson told me 
that here lay folklore's challenge to history, the basis of a powerful 
critique. History and its commitment to dramatic change, he said, had no 
graceful way to deal with the continuity that characterizes normal 
existence as people pass the time, working and eating, loving and fighting, 
and fading away. History incapable of describing most of life is no history 
at all.
60
 
 
In Folk Housing: 
History's 'decisive question,' wrote Von Martin, 'is whether inertia or 
change predominates.' The answer that comes clearly from artifactual 
analysis is that little things change swiftly but big things do not. 
Continuity more than change is the human condition. If organized around 
the goal of isolating variable, datable details, rather than around the goal 
of comprehending patterns of stasis and change, a discipline is doomed to 
the study of trivia.
61
 
 
Returning to the discussions of “productivity” and “technological change” in Parts Two 
and Three of this review, we can say that all of that literature agrees that ship technology 
in our period is not characterized by dramatic change. Rosenberg and Mokyr probably 
would agree that “little things change swiftly but big things do not,” and explain why. 
Regardless of how significant we decide the changes were that did take place, too strong 
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an emphasis on change would distort the reality of history. In a study of a technology that 
changed only somewhat, and remained the same in important ways for a long time, an 
apprehension of the proper relationship between continuity and change is important.
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Chapter Two: Theory and method: How to Study 17
th
- and 18
th
- Century Atlantic 
Merchant Ship Technology 
 
To explore possible answers to the questions raised by the literature, we need to employ 
multiple research strategies in analyzing specified concepts while avoiding intellectual 
and methodological traps and errors waiting to beset any such endeavor, should the 
scholar be unprepared for them. Since it is generally good practice to consider the 
hazards of a voyage before undertaking it, we will first discuss those. In addressing 
potential problems, we will identify and pick up important theoretical and methodological 
insights and tools to use in the rest of the study. Then we will move to the development 
of a vessel analysis map and comments on a list of concepts central to the understanding 
of the subject. 
Technological determinism 
We have a tendency to see technological imperatives writ small—as in, the need for 
better windward performance driving a rig change, or the lack of that need driving rig 
continuity—as primary determinants of technology and its use, assigned disproportionate 
weight at the expense of broad socioeconomic, cultural, political and environmental 
influences. When one is focused on technology, it is easy to be overly focused on it, as 
with any other topic. So we should make sure we understand that issue so we can avoid 
it. 
 Don Leggett and Richard Dunn, in their introduction to Re-inventing the Ship: 
Science, Technology and the Maritime World, 1800-1918, tell us that technological 
determinism is “more pervasive” in maritime studies than the evolutionary model—it 
reduces technology to a “’factor’ determining the grand narratives of maritime expansion 
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and naval supremacy”—as in steam technology determining the global expansion of 
Britain, for example. The model asserts “that technology, and its intrinsic characteristics, 
affect change in an inevitable way that necessitates action in the surrounding world, often 
reducing the complexities in a group's interaction with technology.”1 They claim that 
contemporary historians of technology offer this as one reason why their specialty has 
been marginalized—that it is too often perceived to be deterministic and thus 
unsophisticated and uninteresting. 
 We need to unpack this. First, we need to consider reductionism as something 
other than an absolute negative. Theories and models necessarily oversimplify reality. As 
Neil Kennedy deftly put it: “It is not the job of theory to reproduce the complexity of the 
world.”2 “[R]educing the complexities in a group's interaction with technology” is not 
necessarily a problem. The problem comes when we are wrong—especially, when we 
subscribe to false cause-and-effect relationships. When we assume that changes in typical 
Mediterranean merchant ship rigs in the early Middle Ages are best explained by 
successful experiments to increase windward performance, when a better case can be 
made that those changes were responses to economic pressures growing out of the 
collapse of the imperial Roman trading networks, we have fallen prey to the chief danger 
of technological determinism.
3
 We have to explore outside the technology itself—get off 
                                   
1
 Don Leggett and Richard Dunn, eds., Re-inventing the Ship: Science, Technology and the Maritime 
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Economy, 600-1600 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1980), 33-73; on the archaeological side, 
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the ship and take note of what is going on in her world—to understand why the 
technology is what it is. Back aboard, it is by experimentation—on the water and in the 
laboratory—that we can substantially augment what careful readings of surviving 
logbooks can tell us about how vessels actually perform. Should we discover no 
performance advantage of one vessel or rig type over another, that pushes us to look for 
other explanations for the differences.  
 Another way of expressing the issue is by casting it in terms of the old adage 
‘form follows function.’ Material culture studies have plenty to say about that. Adrian 
Forty’s Objects of Desire stands out here. Forty is highly skeptical of individual “agency” 
and emphasizes other forces at work to shape the technology that gets made and used. He 
is writing about consumption in our own world of industrial mass-production, but his 
thoughts apply more broadly. His emphasis is on design as an agent of ideology. He 
discounts functionalism and technological determinism, and is especially interested in the 
creation of demand. As for ‘form follows function,’ Forty expresses surprise that scholars 
should have given it the credence he thinks they have, which to him “can only be 
explained by its accordance with the widespread assumption that, despite all evidence to 
the contrary, individuals are the masters of their own will and destiny.”4 
 ‘Form follows function’ is a form of technological determinism, and whether or 
not we want to go as far as Forty in our assessment of the role of individual agency, we 
have to take into account the forces he is interested in to understand why technology 
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really gets created and used as it does. A different adage may well apply to merchant 
ships as much as it does to consumer products—form follows fashion, a theme to which 
we will return.
5
 
 The second danger here is of course the old nemesis, teleology. Any way of 
thinking in which the “intrinsic characteristics” of technology “affect change in an 
inevitable way” is teleological thinking. It is so easy to discern deliberate, logical, linear 
development, whether or not it is really there. What makes it more difficult to avoid is 
that there is such a thing as ‘progress’—in that there is such a thing as increasing human 
knowledge based on cumulative experience. We know how lift works—how the slot 
effect works between adjacent sails to produce a Venturi effect in air pressure. They did 
not know that. We can make a strong case that that represents ‘progress.’ What we must 
not do is ascribe meaning, or historical influence, to the possession or lack thereof of 
such knowledge based on assumption, without solid evidence.  
 Julian Whitewright, writing about rig development, argues that traditional 
explanations of that technology assume technological determinism—specifically, that 
“observable change must have occurred for an explicable, logical reason—generally the 
‘need’ for better windward performance.” The logical, unilinear process conceived by the 
deterministic model “dictates that ‘older, simpler’ technologies must become redundant 
once ‘newer, better’ ones are developed.” Whitewright, with other contemporary 
theoretical archaeologists and anthropologists, sets out to refute such a model.
6
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 The historian of technology Thomas P. Hughes’ influential Networks of Power 
(1983) “avoids technological determinism by showing how factors from all the areas of 
social or historical analysis have to coincide at the same time for a certain technology to 
develop in a certain way.”7 That is precisely how to understand the viability niche of a 
merchant ship, whether that niche lasts a decade or an age. 
 The foregoing, then, helps us know what not to think and what not to do. We still 
need a way of thinking and talking about contextualized technological continuity and 
change, though, so that we know what to think and what to do. Using concepts borrowed 
from evolution by natural selection is useful, but requires justification, as the practice has 
been, and still is, a matter of strong debate in archaeology and the history of technology.   
 Because natural evolution and technological developments work by different 
mechanisms—natural selection by random mutation in the former case and human 
conscious choice in the latter—Joel Mokyr, a proponent of evolutionary thinking in 
technological history, cautions that we must employ such thinking “with great care.” We 
are, Mokyr says, “between…a world of pure independence and a ‘necessity is the mother 
of invention’ type of world.8 
 Through analogy, though, we can relate those distinct mechanisms of change. 
“For economic and technical evolution the mechanism analogous to genetic mutation is 
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innovation.”9 Conscious choice, or “directed variation” as Mokyr calls it,10 drives 
innovation. Even when accident and unintended consequences create pressure to 
innovate, it is conscious choice—constrained though it may be—that causes it to happen. 
 Because the mechanism for change is different, we cannot use the evolution 
analogy as an explanation for how change works in technological history. Conscious 
decision can prolong or end the “life” of a technology no matter how well- or ill-suited 
that technology is to current operating conditions, whereas in nature, conditions would 
select for its survival or extinction. Some contemporary historians of maritime 
technology object to evolutionary language because it “weaves technological change into 
the fabric of maritime history without reflexive consideration, by shrouding the agency of 
actors and the cultural specificity of technical decision making.”11 The objection is valid 
insofar as it serves as a caution as to how not to use the analogy. It is also worth 
acknowledging here that a debate over evolution as a model
12
 for social and technological 
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change carries on in theoretical archaeology—a branch of that discipline more prominent 
in the United Kingdom and Europe than in the United States. A major objection to 
evolutionary archaeological models is that they do not properly account for agency: 
“…the frequent use of [evolutionary] terms both indicates and instigates thinking about 
developments of ship types as autonomous rather than being the function of human 
decisions regarding continuity or adaptations.”13 This is also the case for Leggett’s and 
Dunn’s objection for technological history. At least one prominent theoretical 
archaeologist, though, finds “agency” problematic too,14 and a proponent of agency 
within archaeology, John Robb, qualifies his endorsement of the concept. Individuals do 
act with intention, yes, but “agency is not necessarily about individuals” and “quite often 
an individual’s intentionality plays a minor part in social action and its consequences.” 
Robb assigns individual intentionality to the “’agency of why,’” an agency from the 
“actor’s point of view,” and contrasts that to the “’agency of how,’” “the reproduction of 
social relations in fields of action.” Because the “’agency of how’” guides and limits the 
“’agency of why,’’ “we should resist the temptation to view intentional, motivated action 
as the spark that drives social life and social change.”15 Robb seems to be leaving room 
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for evolutionary concepts by acknowledging that conscious choice is not the primary 
directive force in “social life and social change.” 
 We also should consider the real world in which “conscious choice” has to 
function. In their general rejection of “perfect rationality” in neoclassical economics, neo-
Schumpeterian economists include technological change. An evolutionary analogy can 
emphasize the “limited powers of perception and choice of human decision-makers.”16 
There is no need to deny what we tend to call “human agency” here, but we must 
acknowledge its limitations. A discussion of the law of unintended consequences will add 
to that presently. 
 British theoretical archaeologist Stephen Shennan refers to academic history as “a 
rather atheoretical discipline.” This is not intended to be dismissive or to suggest that the 
agendas of historians and social scientists are incompatible. In fact, Trevor Pinch is right 
to pitch his “radical” social constructivist agenda, which as far as he is concerned 
requires historians and sociologists of technology to collaborate.
17
 While Shennan is 
devoted to social science theory, he seems to leave room for an employment of 
evolutionary concepts as used here. We inherit cultural traditions. Multiple “processes act 
on existing and novel variation,” and that affects what future generations inherit. “Some 
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may wish to see that as a metaphor,” Shennan writes. “That is fine by me. The role of 
analogy and metaphor in scientific reasoning is well established….18 
 Even if we restrict our employment of evolution to analogy, that requires us to 
think of “operating conditions” broadly—which we should be doing anyway. A ship 
might be in many ways ill-suited for some of its operating conditions. We find expensive, 
heavily armed English merchantmen in the Atlantic service in the late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 
centuries, as opposed to cheaper, more efficient single-purpose carriers built to the Dutch 
fluit concept. Why?  
 The evolutionary analogue to the fluit concept is symmorphosis in organisms, by 
which “systems are built to minimally meet functional needs, without excess that is 
expensive to maintain.” The environment, though, may exert pressure for what, in normal 
circumstances, would seem to be overbuilt. Bones, for example, “are overbuilt for most 
circumstances,” because at times they may be highly stressed and the consequences of 
failure are dire. “These safety factors are under strong selection, because the extremes of 
function are frequently life and death situations.”19   
 Symmorphosis is indeed what we expect to find in the technological history of the 
merchant ship when we are coming at it from the perspective of economics—but the 
“environment” in this case includes much more than “economics”—it also encompasses 
the political, social, cultural, and natural environments in which the vessel operates, and 
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such operating conditions offer us explanations for why we do not find something 
analogous to symmorphosis in late 17
th
- and early 18
th
-century transatlantic British 
merchantmen. The protectionism of the Navigation Acts, the British government’s 
subsidies of the defensible ships British builders were accustomed to building, and the 
presence of pirates and privateers in the Atlantic and Caribbean acted together to trump 
any pressure toward adopting the Dutch example in those waters at that time.
20
  
 Steve Kinsey’s example of an exception to symmorphosis—the strength of 
bones—is just as apt to our subject as the concept of symmorphosis itself. We are 
accustomed by now to attribute what resistance to change there was in design and 
construction techniques in the early modern period to the prime reality that sending 
people to sea in ships was inherently dangerous, that the basic ingredients of safe ships 
had been worked out over a long period of time, and that with no way to predict all the 
possible outcomes of significant changes, such changes were assumed to carry 
significant—perhaps unacceptable—risks. Beyond that, we could consider what owners 
and builders were willing to spend to reach a certain comfort level with the projected 
strength and longevity of their vessels—are their ships “overbuilt systems”?  
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 We could base another objection to the evolution analogy on the law of 
unintended consequences. All individual and group human actions have unintended 
consequences. In nature, we can observe consequences of natural changes incidental to 
the condition or set of conditions that brought about those changes. Something analogous 
should apply to how the law of unintended consequences affects technology. If people 
make decisions to change or not to change a technology in response to a certain 
condition, and then realize that these decisions are having a negative effect on some other 
aspect of operation, then they will respond to that, either by making another change in 
response, or by continuing in the same direction, having decided that the benefits to that 
outweigh the costs, despite the unanticipated negative consequences. In a study of the 
history of residential stoves in the United States, Ruth Cowan examines the “social 
networks” in which her stove consumers were “embedded,” and shows how social 
groups, “acting in what they perceive to be their own best interests, can, because they are 
embedded in a complex network, produce effects that may be quite different, perhaps 
even diametrically opposed, to what they intended.”21 While the mechanism that 
determines change is different in nature than in technology, the two processes are still 
analogous. 
 To that we should add that the umbrella term “people” ignores the reality of 
different interest groups acting on the technology with their own agendas, which may be 
more or less complementary. For our late 17
th
-century Atlantic merchantman, those 
would include the Crown, factions within Parliament, London merchants, American 
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merchants, mariners, shipwrights, pirates, and foreign competitors, both commercial and 
political-military. That too is analogous to the myriad of forces acting upon the subject in 
nature—forces which, as in human affairs, rarely act in concert. 
 Conflicting selection happens in “systems that perform more than one function,” 
when a change in one of those functions interferes with the function of the other. That 
does not necessarily happen, though. One “function may drive the overall selection of the 
system,” but the other function may be altered in a way that benefits the system as well.22 
 If we consider the case in which one pressure is driving continuity and change 
more than any others, then we have an analogy for considering the ordering of priorities 
in the design and construction of merchant ships. Is capacity preeminent? Is it 
seaworthiness? Does one of those conveniently follow the other, as nutrient delivery 
follows oxygen delivery demand? Do both clash with speed in a conflicting selection 
scenario?  
 Since mutation is random, there can be no guarantee that a mutation will happen, 
regardless of the strength of the selective pressures. If a given mutation does not happen, 
the organism might die out. While conscious-choice innovations are more likely to be 
useful more times than they are not, though, how many times do conscious-choice 
changes in technology—or decisions not to change that technology—prove unfortunate? 
Here we can at least recognize a further analogy, between a mutation scenario in nature 
that does not enhance—or militates against—a subject organism’s ability to survive in its 
environment, and a technology about which decisions are made that militate against the 
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technology’s success. This of course relates back to the key concept that conscious choice 
options are limited. 
 In both the natural and technological processes, the subject—the organism or the 
technology—either remains the same or changes in response to environmental conditions. 
In both processes, the subject does not change itself—it is changed by forces acting upon 
it. In both processes, we observe adaptability at work. In both processes, we observe 
vestigial traits.
23
 If environmental conditions and/or mutation do not select strongly 
enough against the continuation of a trait, it may well exist for a long time past its 
usefulness—as is perhaps the case to some extent with 17th-century stern castles. In both 
processes, we observe the variety of possible successful responses to conditions, existing 
and competing at the same time. In both processes, we observe that changes can produce 
either viable or non-viable subjects in a given set of conditions. In nature, these are 
mutations or sudden drastic environmental impacts on the subject population. In 
technology, they are accidents and experiments leading to innovation.  
 We can add further richness to the analogy by considering “the independent 
evolution of the same trait,” or convergent evolution— 
This is very common, especially when there is a strong selective pressure. 
For example bioluminescence has evolved independently dozens of times, 
and it is under strong selection in certain environments because of the 
advantages it provides….24 
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In the history of ship technology, convergent evolution is an elegant analogy to the 
development of the two-masted fore-and-aft rig, a prevalent version of which we call the 
schooner. Almost a century ago, Yale professor E.P. Morris wrote a tour-de-force of 
investigation into the possible origins of such vessels.
25
 The study strongly suggested that 
such a satisfactory solution to the challenges of near-shore sailing at relatively low cost in 
money and manpower developed independently and simultaneously. Analogizing such 
development as convergent evolution also helps inoculate against jingoistic and culturally 
chauvinistic interpretations.
26
 
 Finally, the analogy reminds us that both organisms and technologies function in 
the same environment—they function in what we call “nature.” Ships must function in a 
human-created economy, culture, and political arena, but they must also function at the 
volatile boundary layer of atmosphere and ocean. They exploit variations in air pressure 
for motive energy, or convert oxygen and organic matter for it. They are made of 
materials that must be extracted from nature and that are subject to the natural processes 
of physical stress, fungal invasion, corrosion, and UV degradation. 
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 The evolutionary analogy has something more compelling to offer, which is that it 
can help us avoid teleological thinking. We are hard-wired to look for cause-and-effect 
relationships and to see patterns—whether or not they are actually there. A pertinent 
example is the “type fallacy” in the archaeological interpretation of shipbuilding, in 
which vessels are grouped into “types” that ultimately prove arbitrary, and obscure the 
discernment of true typologies.
27
 The structure of our language makes it difficult to avoid 
speaking teleologically even if we wish to avoid it. The “temptation to think in terms of 
… ‘standard type[s]’” of ships as representing technological equilibrium and of 
“imperfect approximations” of those types as “hybrid,” or intermediate stages in a linear 
process is a Platonic sort of thinking also closely tied to our predilection for finding 
patterns and order. Zwick is right to point out that the “underlying conceptual 
problem is deeply embedded within the rationale of evolutionary theory—without being 
caused by it, as has been often unjustly implied."
28
 
 Careful use of that theory can help us avoid, rather than fall into, that underlying, 
almost sub-conscious assumption of linear “progress,” of a “natural” process of cause-
and-effect “improvements” by which Thing B is “better than” Thing A, its “primitive” 
precursor—the kind of subconscious assumption that could make us forget to question 
whether an 18
th
-century merchantman’s rig is really “better” than that of its 17th-century 
counterpart—and thus that 18th-century people were better at solving their water-
transport problems than 17
th
-century people, which is far more important. That very 
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question has been the subject of lively discussion with replica ship masters and nautical 
archaeologists in this study. It is by no means settled. 
 The key fallacy to avoid is the assumption—conscious or not—that evolution is 
linear. Or rather, that evolution is solely linear. Evolution is linear, and simultaneously 
looping and branching and networked. If we remember that evolution in nature is far 
more complex than anything we do as humans, and think about the ways in which that is 
so, then we cannot blame any simplistic thinking on an evolutionary analogy. This is not 
making things more complex for its own sake. That impedes the effective use of theory. 
Using evolution as an effective analogy, though, requires appreciating its complexity. 
We can satisfy Jon Adams, who rightly insists that we look for the socioeconomic, 
political, and environmental pressures acting on continuity and change in ship 
technology—“operating conditions.”29 
 The analogy can also help us understand extinction. Mokyr points out the 
difference between biological and technological extinction. In the former, once DNA is 
lost, it is irrecoverable.
30
 In technology, the knowledge of the technology can be 
preserved, in memory or books, for example, even if the technology falls out of use. 
“Yet,” he adds, “when the knowledge is to a large extent tacit or deliberately kept secret, 
it may become impossible to re-create a technology.”31 This is what makes the extinction 
of early modern merchant sailing ships so challenging to us. So much of the how-to 
                                   
29
 Adams, A Maritime Archaeology of Ships. 
 
30
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 Mokyr in Fox, ed., Technological Change, 75, note 27. 
 
63 
 
information was tacit, given the nature of artisanal craft, and was kept secret, in the 
master-apprentice system, that when we attempt to replicate these machines, we are left 
to guess to some extent as to their design, construction and operation. We are left to pin 
our future hopes on experimental archaeology, learning through trial-and-error what no 
one alive can teach us, by operating best-guess replicas, and on the ‘reverse naval 
architecture’ of shipwreck archaeologists when we are lucky enough to find remains 
intact enough to permit the recapture of the original design method. We will explore all 
of that. 
Toward an analysis of the original evidence: two analysis maps, with comments 
Finally, as we turn from theoretical and methodological approaches to applying those 
approaches to the evidence, we will consider a generic analysis map inter-relating the 
broadest useful selection of contextual forces, and a narrower one restricted to the 
technological considerations whose relationships to each other we must understand, along 
with explanatory comments on each. 
General vessel analysis map 
This analysis map (following page) avoids linear thinking. The ingredients do not 
interrelate in a linear fashion but in a network spread out in all directions like one of 
David Hancock’s Atlantic business networks.  
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Figure 1 General vessel analysis map.32 
 
The closer a label is to another wedge, the closer it is conceived to be related to what is in 
the adjacent wedge. Labels crossing lines are labels bridging categories. A circular 
scheme presents several choices as to where to start and end. Following are explicatory 
comments on selected ingredients in the analysis map. 
Political and Ideological 
 trade laws—Trade laws attempt to dictate where and with whom subjects to those 
laws may trade, and what taxes and duties they will pay in doing so. Just as so many 
modern yachts have been designed as racing-rule beaters, taking advantage of loopholes 
in the design rules to gain an advantage, the way taxes and duties on ships were assessed 
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65 
 
at a given place at a given time could and did give a certain type of design a major 
advantage over another. The most famous example was the ‘Sound’ toll for northern 
European vessels passing between Denmark and Sweden. In the 17
th
 century, this was 
assessed based on deck area, so the extreme tumblehome
33
 that gave the fluyt great hull 
capacity relative to her deck space gave her a real advantage in this area. By 1700, when 
that toll structure changed, this advantage evaporated.
34
 Thus it is imperative to look up 
what taxes and duties were imposed on any ship, because this might explain an advantage 
or disadvantage that technological factors—or other economic factors—will not.   
 Trade laws in this period emphasized protectionism rather than free trade, 
designed as they were to further an imperial agenda whose economic policy we generally 
call mercantilism. Protectionism alters market conditions such that what would otherwise 
be competitive or not might be the opposite. Protectionism also is directly related to 
smuggling too, so any vessels specially suited to illicit trades are to that extent the 
creatures of protectionism as well. Depending on the situation, then, a vessel could be 
more or less fast or capacious or defensible depending on the status of her trade within 
the mercantilist sphere. The conflict between the imperial bureaucracy and smuggling 
merchants is an aspect of the conflict between mercantilism and free-market capitalism. 
The latter part of our period is the age of Adam Smith. 
 military policy— We are looking at a period with more war than peace, and while 
we would expect to find more emphasis on defensive—or, in the case of a privateer, 
                                   
33
 Tumblehome is the re-curve of the sides inward as they rise, so that the ship is much narrower at deck 
level than at the waterline. 
 
34
 See Hoving in Gardiner, ed., The Heyday of Sail, 47-51. 
66 
 
offensive—capability in periods of warfare and less during peacetime, it is worth keeping 
in mind that the supply of ships is not terribly short-term elastic, given the capital-,  
labor-, and time-intensive nature of shipbuilding.
35
 Something worth investigating is what 
changes in armament and associated defensive capability we would expect to find on a 
given ship at a given time, given the state of warfare in which she was operating.
36
  
 War in our period also leads to the capture of prizes—usually, thousands of them. 
So the presence of a vessel in the hands of a certain owner, flying a certain flag, engaged 
in a certain trade, may well be a direct result of a prize action. Davis wrote that the 
English shipbuilding industry waited decades to build ships inspired by the Dutch way, 
simply because the English had captured so many Dutch merchantmen in the series of 
Anglo-Dutch Wars in the mid-17
th
 century.
37
  
Cultural 
There is more than one means to an end, as previously noted. We see a constant 
interplay—and some tension—in ship design and construction between traditions and 
pressures to innovate, conservatism and dynamism, in the artisanal craft that was ship 
creation in the early modern period.
38
 Locales and regions had their traditions and 
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preferences, but individual designer-builders had plenty of latitude,
39
 and no one political 
power could hope to maintain exclusive control over any maritime technology, given the 
access to transport of the men in the trade
40
 and the nature of ships as technology that 
regularly showed up in foreign ports. Much ink has flowed in writing the history of the 
ship trying to trace the origin and progress of a certain technology from one group of 
people to another, such as whether the development of the fore-and-aft rig in Bermuda 
was due to direct Dutch influence. To make things more difficult, it is always quite 
plausible that the same technology developed in two or more different places at the same 
time independently of each other, such as French and Native American dugouts.
41
 
 We do see examples where a certain group does not adopt a certain technology 
even though it is effective technology, they know about it, and they are capable of 
executing it. Cultural factors—group pride, tradition, vested interests, tastes and 
aesthetics, including fashion, or just lack of enthusiasm for the perceived benefits—can 
lie behind decisions that directly affect ship technology, just as much as the political and 
security factors emphasized by Lane. 
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study is contemporary, but the basic character of his subject matter has not changed significantly over the 
centuries, even as tools and contextual factors have. 
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Technological 
 skills available—The relationship between available skills and what technology 
those skills could produce is a promising area for investigation, because different 
methods could produce similar products. Sometimes the historical and archaeological 
record tells us more about the skills available to build a certain craft, and sometimes it 
tells us more about the result, and we have to investigate the design and construction to 
infer the skill set, as with ‘reverse naval architecture,’ which we will discuss at length. 
 understanding of environmental forces—Early modern sailors knew a great deal 
about how sails worked, even if they did not know why they worked as they did. Much of 
what we know about hydrodynamics, they knew as well, though of course they could 
neither demonstrate the principles nor describe them as we can. Understanding their 
understanding of the forces acting on the ship is at the core of what nautical 
archaeologists have been working on. If we can identify ways in which their ships 
worked in accord with these forces, and ways in which they did not, that should help us 
advance our understanding of what they did or did not understand, though we must take 
care to distinguish between what they did not understand, and what they discounted, or 
sacrificed to other priorities. 
Environmental 
 materials available—Continuity is particularly strong here, at least in general. 
Variability in the specifics is an instructive subject in itself. Ships were made of wood 
lumber and pegs, iron bolts and nails, hemp rope, flax and cotton sails, and pine products 
for preserving and waterproofing. We should pay attention to what wood was available 
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where and when, given environmental and political vagaries, and how builders and 
owners evaluated the relative properties of different woods, employing them in 
construction accordingly. Trade laws and trade patterns for materials used in ship 
construction figure prominently in economic policy. 
 wind pattern—In maritime history courses, we teach the basic wind patterns, and 
the currents they drive, of the Atlantic basin to undergraduates on the first day of class. 
Sailing ships can only proceed to windward at wide angles to the wind direction. Sailing 
upwind is slow, inefficient, and uncomfortable, as the ship heels (leans over) much more, 
and heads into oncoming seas, which she takes on her bow and over her foredeck, 
making for a rough, wet ride. The ability to maneuver to windward to avoid danger is 
important, but steady winds blowing more or less in the direction one wants to go are the 
keys to voyaging. The circuitous route by which ships navigated the Atlantic basin was 
dictated by that principle. The ability to take best advantage of winds from abaft the beam 
(aft of amidships) was as important as any consideration in sail plan for ocean-going 
ships. Coastwise vessels needed more maneuverability, were more likely to encounter 
headwinds close to dangerous shores, and did not sail long downwind legs without course 
alteration to the extent ocean-crossing ships did. Assuming that is why they tended to 
have fore-and-aft rigs in this period, though, is a potential trap. Those rigs require fewer 
hands to work, and coastal vessels were smaller. Labor and size considerations are 
important. 
 sea conditions—The North Atlantic in winter is brutal. A succession of violent 
storms kicks up waves sometimes as high as these ships were long, and drives freezing 
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precipitation into the rigging and the faces of the crew. It would be incorrect to say that 
these ships were designed and built to survive Caribbean and Atlantic hurricanes, as that 
was not feasible given the technology available. These ships were not likely to survive 
envelopment by a hurricane, and tried to avoid them. That any of them did survive—and 
plenty did—is a testament to their seaworthiness. For Atlantic service, ships had to be 
designed, built, and maintained to a standard not at all necessary or even suitable for 
riverine or near-shore work, or even service in the Mediterranean. The teredo navalis 
shipworm (actually a mollusk) presented another constant threat to hulls spending time in 
the warmer southern Atlantic and Caribbean. 
Economic 
 value of cargo—Generally, low-value cargoes are bulk cargoes. Since the cargo is 
not worth much per unit—whatever that unit is—merchants need to ship a lot of it to 
make a decent profit on the voyage. Depending on other factors, though—distance of 
voyage, difficulty of voyage, costs of voyage—we might find a very large ship full of 
high-value cargo—such as an East Indiaman. Passengers are usually the highest-value 
cargoes, and passengers want to make the fastest possible voyages while remaining 
relatively comfortable, so vessels designed especially for carrying passengers (e.g. 
packets) may be quite technologically distinct—and emphasize speed.42 The same applies 
to advice vessels—those primarily employed in carrying express mail and/or important 
documents and messages. These, however, are frequently government or military vessels.  
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 cost of materials—Cost of materials is important, but cost of shipping those 
materials is also important. So, while timber was certainly far cheaper in America than in 
Britain, it was too expensive to ship bulk timber across the Atlantic in quantities 
sufficient to build ships in English yards—it was low-value, high-stowage-factor cargo. 
So the ships were built in America—and they could then carry timber with them across 
the Atlantic. For vessels to be used locally or regionally, we expect to find local materials 
used in their construction. 
 building cost—Shipbuilding in New England competed with its Thames Estuary 
counterpart by 1700. That was entirely due to the difference in building cost. Despite the 
loud protests of British politicians, that competition remained and grew until the 
Revolution. Who was building what and where at what time has much to do with cost of 
skilled shipwrightry as well as materials. 
Social 
 In merchant ship technology, an instructive issue arises when we consider the 
trade interests of artisanal shipwrights compared to those in the naval establishment who 
had political connections, and who were advocating for the new science of ‘naval 
architecture’ for all ships, as an improvement over the predominance of artisanal 
shipwrightry, which, like all guild-system crafts rooted in the Middle Ages, kept its trade 
secrets secret to the extent that it could, as the skills those artisans possessed were their 
livelihood. 
 geographic mobility—The moving-around of people and goods made this world. 
People left an old place for a new place. Sometimes they went back to the old place, and 
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sometimes they made their new homes permanent. They brought skills and attitudes with 
them from the old place, attempted to preserve them in the new place, and were forced to 
adapt them if they were to make it in the new place. We should learn much from 
exploring how ships changed, or did not, as ship technology crossed the Atlantic and 
European traditions met each other and met the traditions of New World natives and of 
Africans. Here, though, we have to remember convergent evolution. A similar trait in a 
canoe in Senegal to one in France does not prove a connection. Those traits could well 
have evolved independently. 
 Next, we discuss a secondary analysis map specific to vessel technology: 
Specific vessel technology analysis map 
 
Figure 2 Specific vessel technology analysis map. 
 
 speed—Speed is ideal in an abstract sense, but for most applications, too costly. 
Speed costs capacity unless size increases, and size increase carries its own set of high 
costs. A fast vessel costs more to build and rig than an otherwise-comparable slower one. 
In our day, we get the speed that comes along with huge size as a bonus, but only because 
our population is so high—and thus our markets so large—that we can make and sell the 
enormous cargoes our large ships carry. Size back then was limited by the amount of 
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cargo that could be obtained and/or sold, and also by the need to spread risk.
43
 Except for 
niche situations, where the value of the cargo trumped the usual considerations, it was 
much more advantageous to maximize capacity, defensibility, tons-per-man, and 
simplicity of rig. To what extent differences in hull form influenced speed for a ship of 
given capacity will be explored, as will the relative effect of surface friction (largely due 
to fouling) on hull resistance. 
 maneuverability—To a certain extent, maneuverability goes hand-in-hand with 
speed, provided the speed is due to factors other than size. One can, though, increase 
maneuverability by modifying the rig, without necessarily modifying the hull form, 
assuming no such modification is necessary to accommodate the modification in rig. So 
in our period, maneuverability is closely tied to variations in rig. The general increase in 
the presence of fore-and-aft sails
44
 on square-rigged vessels indicates the awareness that 
staysails and jibs and spankers made these vessels better sailers on (into) the wind, 
making them more versatile. Since these fore-and-aft sails were easier to handle than 
square sails,
45
 there was no labor-related penalty. For vessels primarily rigged fore-and-
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aft and used for coasting, windward ability
46
 and ease of handling were great advantages, 
but these vessels almost always carried some amount of square canvas as well, since fore-
and-aft sails are never as effective downwind as square sails, which are balanced over a 
vessel’s center line as winged-out fore-and-aft sails can never be, secured as they are at 
their leading edges to structural members on the center line.
47
 Square sails balanced over 
the center line reduce the tendency to roll by offering more-or-less equal sail area to the 
wind on either side of the ship. Roll is fatiguing—and sickening—to humans aboard, and 
hard on the rig.  It also slows the ship down.  Square sails also offer more sail area for the 
wind to push on than fore-and-aft sails, and their more complex rigging makes them 
easier to fix in place and prevent slatting, lifting, and collapsing. 
 rig—The rig of a vessel has to balance the hull. It must be powerful enough to 
move the loaded hull well, but not so powerful as to overwhelm it. It is also dictated by 
the crew factor. A large rig—or a  complex one, which is not necessarily the same 
thing—takes more labor to handle, and since crew is usually the highest cost of operation, 
this may dictate a simpler, and slower, rig than the hull could perhaps handle. The wind is 
free, but harnessing it is not. The caveat to that is that “simpler” and “cheaper” do not 
automatically go hand-in-hand. Rig is also related closely to size. As ships grew larger, 
their rigs needed to be divided into more manageable sails. The labor factor kicked in.
48
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 The spinnaker, the balloon-like racing sail flown when sailing downwind, on a yacht is a modern 
analogue, though the absence of a yard to restrain the bottom edge makes this sail difficult to handle. 
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 We have seen a reversal of this process in modern yachts, due to changes in technology. As sail-handling 
equipment got more powerful and more automated, and materials got stronger and lighter, yachts could fly 
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A square-rigged vessel whose sail plan is divided up in a typical 18
th
-century fashion 
does not necessarily sail better than one with fewer sails as in the 17
th
 century. In fact, her 
rig has more windage and thus drag, and it takes longer to operate her multiple sheets and 
braces and thus adjust her sail plan to conditions. The simpler square rigs of the 17
th
 
century, though, with their larger sails, may not have been viable for the larger 18
th
-
century square-riggers, given size and labor considerations. Too-large individual sails 
were too powerful for men to handle without more mechanical advantage than was 
available at the time. To what extent all of this can be sorted, proven or disproven, and 
prioritized in explaining continuity and change in rig technology is one of the most 
important issues for us to explore. 
 The rig is also related to maneuverability. A vessel intended primarily for 
reaching and running in the open sea would carry a primarily square rig, while one 
intended for coasting or operating in more restricted waters would probably be primarily 
fore-and-aft rigged.   
 capacity—Capacity is inherently desirable for a merchant ship and obviously 
closely related to hull form. The more she can carry per voyage, while still operating 
safely and efficiently, the more money she can make, no matter the value of her cargo. 
That, though, is only true if she can obtain and then sell the cargo. Half-empty vessels are 
not usually profitable. Ballast
49
 requires labor to load and unload but is usually worthless 
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on the market—so it is a cost. In some niche, high-value trades, such as highly perishable 
and highly valuable cargo, such as fresh fish, or illegal cargo that must be smuggled past 
armed interceptors, it might be worthwhile to sacrifice capacity for speed and 
maneuverability, but not for most trades most of the time. Even for slaving, where the 
cargo is high-value, perishable, costly to maintain, and extremely dangerous, we do not 
generally see particularly fast, specialized vessels employed, until after 1807-1808 when 
the trade became illegal and slaving became smuggling.  
 Before our period, capacity in the northern European trades was achieved by the 
‘round ship’ whose breadth was a much greater proportion of her length than what we are 
used to. That general design characteristic was still quite evident in the ships that showed 
up at the mouth of the Chesapeake in 1607. These vessels were seaworthy, and capacious 
for their size, but some were slow and ungainly. A manageable increase in size allowed 
builders to pursue the ‘box form,’ basically a rectangular cargo compartment fitted with 
some concessions to hydrodynamics.
50
 Perhaps the most important single development in 
the merchant ship throughout our period was this increase in the beam-to-length ratio 
which, while demanding a cost in terms of increased size, paid off in increased capacity, 
greater ton-per-man ratios as rigs were adapted concomitantly for ease of handling, and 
speed. Physics dictate that a longer ship is a faster ship, all other things being equal. If all 
other things were not equal, then owners and clients accrued benefits in other areas, and 
we must ascertain what those were if we conclude that speeds did indeed remain more or 
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 This is what we transport all our goods in now. 
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less constant even with increased size. We will need to consider the issue in some detail. 
Changing a major aspect of a ship’s design means changes in other major aspects as well.  
 cargo, load and trim—High stowage value means light, bulky cargoes. They 
weigh less than water so they do not have a significant impact on displacement,
51
 but they 
take up lots of space. Low stowage value cargoes do not take up much space but sink the 
ship down in the water. So an example of the former would be timber and an example of 
the latter would be iron. What makes it more interesting is that packing can change a high 
stowage value cargo into one less so. Tobacco and cotton are good examples. Once 
packers figured out how to compress them and pack them in barrels and bales, their 
nature as cargo changed.  
 The fluyt was an excellent vessel design for high stowage value cargoes.
52
 Such a 
vessel needs capacity but not great displacement. If a cargo to be transported consisted 
primarily of gold, one would need a very different sort of ship. One would also probably 
need cannon for defense, and would engage something like a galleon—or later a 
warship—for that purpose.  
 size—With a bigger ship we have more capacity and more speed, both of which 
are inherently desirable. As with all these factors, though, it is not that simple. Wood 
ultimately limits maximum size, but that is not an issue with merchant ships in our 
period. The depths of harbors and inlets limit size as well, which is why the Dutch 
became so adept at coming up with shallow-draft designs. For the most part, in this 
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 Displacement is the volume of water that the underwater portion of the ship displaces. That volume 
increases as she sinks lower into the water. 
 
52
 The hulking Dutch timber buss is a more extreme example. 
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period, though, the realities of the markets and the need to spread risk limited size. Ships 
tended to grow over time as the population of the Atlantic World grew. Still, a savvy 
shipper would take care not to employ vessels that he could not fill.
53
 While limiting size 
limits speed, that was not an issue in most trades either, as we will explore. 
 crew skill—The sailor on a sailing ship was an integral part of the machine in a 
much more literal sense than today’s mariners are54—but only if he possessed the skills to 
help operate it and the constitution to apply those skills under the demanding conditions 
of the sea. There were never enough skilled sailors to man both the growing merchant 
fleet and the growing navies built to fight the incessant wars of the period—wars whose 
naval components only expanded over the course of the period. In most trades, it was an 
absolute advantage to minimize the number of skilled sailors needed to run the ship, and 
to minimize the skill level required to do so.  
 armament—Cannon were long heavy hunks of solid bronze or iron—
overwhelmingly iron in our period—firing round heavy hunks of solid iron, propelled by 
powder stored in large heavy casks, and operated by crews of several men per gun, who 
had to have some idea what they were doing, and required lots of food and water to keep 
them functioning. When cannon went off, they recoiled—or tried to, if restrained—and 
put tremendous strain on ship timbers. So to accommodate both their weight and the 
strain of their use, ships had to be more heavily built, which added weight and cost. 
Cargo capacity was reduced. Operational expenses were increased. Nevertheless, in areas 
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 See Davis, 72. 
 
54
 The role of the development of technical skill among users of a technological innovation in reducing total 
labor costs over time is called the Horndal Effect. See Rosenberg, 15-16.   
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and during times when war or the threat of piracy, and the lack of consistent naval escort, 
made unarmed voyaging too risky, armament, with all its drawbacks, was deemed 
necessary. The value (desirability) of cargoes had to be able to bear the increased cost of 
transport. During times of peace and in places where depredations were not a concern, 
shipping rates could go down and it could be profitable to ship lower-value cargoes. It 
was the Dutch who first took advantage of the technological and commercial benefits of 
building ideal cargo carriers for peaceful trade, unencumbered by defensive armament 
and its requirements, and it made them a whole lot of money. That, in turn, exposed them 
to armed English jealousy, which manifested itself in a series of Anglo-Dutch Wars.  
 crew size, and thus cost—Perhaps the pivotal question for Ralph Davis was the 
cause of the marked reduction in crew size and thus increase in ton-per-man ratio after 
the mid-18
th
 century—a development certainly apparent in the transatlantic trades. 
Economic historians studying productivity were keenly interested in that question too. 
Labor is usually the highest cost in any business requiring labor. So the desirability of 
reduction in crew size is obvious. What is not so obvious is how it was achieved. It was a 
combination of political, economic, and technological factors, but we need to sort that 
out. Progress on that is a major goal of this project.  
 The foregoing assumptions, methodological approaches, and analysis maps come 
into play as we turn to the research and examine what the different sources have to tell us 
about the people who paid for, operated, and built these ships, and about how they were 
designed the way they were and why. 
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Chapter Three: Ships and Ship Owners 
 
Merchant ships only existed because merchants needed them and were willing and able to 
pay for them. Within the bounds of technological capability, financial and material 
resources, and state prerogatives, merchants’ priorities and desires determined what those 
ships were. Archival work in merchants’ papers did not yield much technical detail on 
those ships, but it did yield evidence of what those guiding priorities and desires were, 
and were not, and what some of those limiting constraints were.  
 Merchants from both sides of the Atlantic ordered and operated ships from both 
sides of the Atlantic. As time passed, more of those merchants were American, more of 
the ships were built in America, and the ships built in America grew larger.
1
 All of that 
reflects and supports the growth of the Anglo-American economy. Shipping and 
shipbuilding were important “invisible earnings” for British America, contributing to the 
rise in productivity demonstrated by economic historians over the past half-century. By 
1800, the most successful American shipping firms—say, the Browns in Rhode Island 
and the Crowninshields and Derbys in Massachusetts—ordered and sailed East Indiamen 
to Asia to compete directly with the European powers, while forty years earlier, they 
were engaged almost exclusively in coastal and down-island trade with small vessels—
sloops, schooners, brigs.  
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 That was not a linear process. Most of the shift happened after 1750. 
81 
 
The basic type nomenclature for Atlantic merchant ships, 1600-1800 
Including an introduction to the basic types of vessels discussed in the rest of the study is 
important, as we will be using information on who built and owned what types, where 
and when, and referring back to type nomenclature in subsequent chapters. 
 A word of warning is in order here. The etymology of watercraft names is one of 
the most byzantine subjects one can take up. In our period—but more so in the earlier 
part of it than the later—vessels tended to be named by their hull form and/or intended 
use, while in later years, into our own time, they tended to be named by their rigs. The 
freedom with which people of the period employed nautical terminology fits well with 
their casual approach to orthography. 
 Frequently, trying to determine whether vessel use changed over a period of time 
means first determining whether it was the vessels themselves or what people called them 
that changed. That can be near to impossible. The best plan of attack for the problem is 
difficult—a  positive match between a vessel description from the written record to an 
archaeological site.  
Coastal and island traders 
In general, these vessels were the smallest ocean-going merchantmen. They carried the 
great bulk of trade between American ports and between American ports and the West 
Indies. They were much less common on, though certainly not absent from, trans-Atlantic 
passages to and from Europe and Africa. The overwhelming majority were built in the 
Americas and operated by American merchants, even early in the period. 
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Shallop
2—The shallop was an early coastal craft, employed from the earliest days of 
English exploration and settlement, and the term remained in use at least into the 1750s.
3
 
A one- or two-masted work boat, usually 18 to 28 feet long, sometimes at least partially 
decked, the basic type remained ubiquitous after other terms for them became more 
common (such as ‘Chebacco boat’). The sail area was small, and the sails did not require 
booms,
4
 thus preserving the crew from the constant threat of a cracked head. Shallops 
were frequently carried as tenders on larger vessels.
5
 
 
Figure 3 Shallop. 
 
Sloop
6—The sloop, for our purposes, was a single-masted coastal and island trader. It is 
helpful—especially for the 18th century—to distinguish it from the schooner, which was 
                                   
2
 The word is pronounced “shal-LOPE,” similar to French “chaloupe” and probably related etymologically 
to Dutch “sloep” and English “sloop.” All of that etymological inbreeding is most helpfully suggestive of 
how vessels actually developed and how loose and mutable all these terms were. 
 
3
 Thomas & James Wharton Jr. ship book 1756-1758, HSP.  
 
4
 The boom is the spar to which the foot or bottom edge of the sail is attached. 
 
5
 See Howard I. Chapelle, American Small Sailing Craft: Their Design, Development and Construction 
(New York: Norton, 1951), 10-20; and William A. Baker, Sloops & Shallops (Barre MA: Barre Publishing 
Co., 1966), 1-37. 
 
6
 See etymology for the shallop. 
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similar in all respects, but had two masts. The sloop dates to the beginning of the period 
and remained in service throughout, though its share of the trade relative to the schooner 
seems to have declined from the mid-18
th
 century.
7
 Sloops relied primarily on a large 
mainsail, either square or fore-and-aft, as drawn here. 
 
Figure 4 Sloop. 
 
Figure 5 Schooner. 
 
Schooner—The two-masted coastal and island type either became much more common 
as the period progressed, or the use of the term did, or both—most likely both. In any 
case, it remained a popular workhorse into the 20
th
 century, while the single-masted sloop 
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 An investigation into why that was would be a worthwhile project. 
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did not.
8
 Schooners relied primarily on two fore-and-aft sails. They frequently sported 
square topsails, and triangular staysails and jibs in the bow. 
Ocean traders 
The line here is as blurry as every other line in nautical affairs of the period. Schooners 
and larger sloops engaged in ocean passages, and the vessels defined here spent plenty of 
time in coastal and island trades. However, the bulk of commercial ocean passages in our 
period were made in these vessels. 
Brig (or brigantine)—Merchants, shipbuilders, and officials used these terms 
interchangeably in this period, as their papers make clear. By the mid-18
th
 century, the 
term referred consistently to a two-masted, square-rigged, medium-sized vessel, and by 
that point, they were ubiquitous in the Atlantic. The brig is almost identical to the snow, 
with one distinguishing difference. 
 
 
Figure 6 Brig.
9
 
 
                                   
8
 See Marquardt, The Global Schooner; and MacGregor, The Schooner: Its Design and Development from 
1600 to the Present (Barnsley UK: Pen & Sword Books, 2003). 
 
9
 https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ac/Brig3.png 
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Snow—In the brig, as illustrated above, the spanker, or driver—the aftermost bottom 
sail—was attached to the mainmast (aftermost mast) like most fore-and-aft sails. In the 
snow, this sail was attached instead to a separate short trymast set just behind the 
mainmast. So technically it can be thought of as three-masted, but it never is in this form. 
Snows could be somewhat larger than brigs, but frequently they were in roughly the same 
middle size class in Atlantic merchant service. For our purposes, this is primarily a mid- 
to late 18
th
-century vessel. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Snow.
10
 
 
Ship—The term “ship” is both generic and specific. Generically, it refers to any vessel 
larger than a boat. What that means is somewhat up for grabs, but it helps to think of a 
ship as a vessel that is intended for open-water service.
11
 So, a schooner is a ship, a brig 
is a ship, etc. Specifically, especially later in our period when vessel names became more 
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 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Snow.png 
 
11
 The current popular term “tall ship” has no historical meaning for the early modern period. 
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closely tied to rigs, a ship was a square-rigged vessel with three masts and square sails on 
all three.
12
 In the earliest years of the period, the mizzen (aftermost) mast frequently 
carried only a lateen mizzen sail.
13
 That was true of Columbus’s Santa Maria and of 
Christopher Newport’s Susan Constant.  
 
Figure 8 Early ship.
14
 
 
The small galleons that founded and supplied the first tentative English colonies carried 
this rig, though their hulls were not as relatively bulky as this late-medieval carrack’s. 
 
Figure 9 18
th
-century ship.
15
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 If she only had square sails on the forward two masts, she was a bark. 
 
13
 A lateen sail is a triangular sail, but hung from a long yard rather than a stay (rope). Its origin is 
Mediterranean. 
 
14
 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Carrack_rigging.png 
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The later ship rig split its sail plan into more sails, and carried triangular headsails.
16
 The 
lateen mizzen in this diagram is an earlier version—later examples carried the gaff 
spanker we see in the diagrams of the brig and snow. This vessel would have probably 
also carried the by-then-ancient spritsail—the square sail slung under the bowsprit 
pictured in the carrack diagram. 
 Ships were not always larger than brigs and snows, but the largest vessels in 
service were ships. They were the earliest vessels to cross the Atlantic in the early 
modern period, and the type most consistently in service throughout the period. 
Ship owners and ship technology 
So, even among these most common types, merchants had plenty of choice in ordering 
and buying and utilizing their ships. Using the historical record to determine what choices 
they made is much easier than using it to determine why they made them, but we will 
attempt both. It is worth keeping in mind that records are much better for the 18
th
 century 
than for the 17
th
, and that there was much more Atlantic maritime commerce underway in 
the 18
th
. So the level of confidence we can place in our interpretations will differ 
accordingly.  
 At least some ships were built and sailed out of most ports of trade in British 
America, from Newfoundland to the Lesser Antilles. By far the largest producer of ships 
on the western side of the Atlantic, and the largest center of shipping interests from the 
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 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Alternate_fully_rigged_ship_sail_plan.png 
 
16
 A study of why that is, combining experimental archaeology and maritime economic history’s data, 
would be worthwhile. 
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mid-1600s, was New England, specifically Boston and the Merrimac River of 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, with the Delaware Valley, especially Philadelphia, a 
clear second.
17
 On the other side, no port came close to London in importance, though 
Liverpool, Bristol, and Glasgow would become important centers of Atlantic trade in the 
18
th
 century. The Thames Estuary was the center of British home island shipbuilding 
throughout the period, though important numbers were built in the northeast, the south 
coast, and Liverpool, especially in the 18
th
 century. 
 As a general pattern, in the early years of the Empire, English merchants ordered 
ships from English yards, and employed them in trans-Atlantic trade to and from 
American, African, and Caribbean ports. Meanwhile, American merchants ordered 
smaller vessels from American builders, employing them in coastal trade and in 
supplying provisions to the West Indies, returning with tropical produce, especially sugar 
products. This coastal and island trade remained consistent in character and grew in 
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 See Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1955); James Hedges, The Browns of Providence Plantations: Colonial Years 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952); John McCusker, The Pennsylvania Shipping Industry 
in the Eighteenth Century (Unpublished bound typescript, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
1973); and Simeon Crowther, “The Shipbuilding Output of the Delaware Valley, 1722-1776,” Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society, 117:2 (April 10, 1973): 90-104. On London, start with Davis; also 
see Nuala Zahedieh, The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy 1660-1700 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); for Liverpool, Francis E. Hyde, Liverpool and the 
Mersey: An Economic History of a Port, 1700-1970 (Newton Abbot UK: David and Charles, 1971); R. 
Stewart-Brown, Liverpool Ships in the Eighteenth Century (Liverpool and London: University Press of 
Liverpool/Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1932). For Bristol, see Kenneth Morgan, Bristol & the Atlantic Trade 
in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Glasgow’s primary importance 
was as a tobacco port; see Jacob M. Price, Tobacco in Atlantic Trade: The Chesapeake, London, and 
Glasgow, 1675-1775 (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1995).  
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volume as best it could in a voluble and violent world throughout the period. Over time, 
though, the character of trans-Atlantic trade changed. First, a few American merchants 
began ordering trans-Atlantic vessels from New England and Delaware Valley yards, but 
more British merchants were doing so, as they had the capital and the established 
networks. Over time, those American merchants ordered a greater percentage of those 
ships, and some from British yards. Their networks grew as well, along with their capital. 
They were less likely to be serving as agents for British clients and more likely to be 
serving themselves and their partners, to whom they were likely to be related by blood or 
marriage. Although British American merchants risked and made fortunes under the 
protectionist umbrella of British mercantilism, conflicts large and small flared up around 
trades where metropolitan and colonial interests clashed, especially in the provisions-for-
sugar trade with the French West Indies.
18
 Eventually, these conflicts overshadowed the 
benefits of imperial membership in the hearts and minds of American business and 
political elites, and thirteen eastern seaboard colonies withdrew, at a terrible cost. By the 
end of the period, though, American shippers were trading once again within the Empire, 
and competing with it directly in a more comprehensive way than they ever had, most 
conspicuously in the East Indies trade, which required unprecedented levels of capital 
investment and risk on the part of shippers who became rich as they never had before—
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 This was at the heart of illicit trade in 18
th
-century British America, and war with France never stopped 
it. Neither did imperial efforts, though they did at times force it into convoluted channels. See Wim 
Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800,” in Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. 
Denault, eds., Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 141-180; and Allan Karras, “Transgressive Exchange: 
Rewriting Atlantic Law in the Eighteenth-Century Caribbean,” paper presented at Seascapes, Littoral 
Cultures, and Trans-Oceanic Exchanges, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., February 12-15, 2003. 
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including the man purported to be the U.S.A.’s first millionaire, Elias Hasket Derby of 
Salem. The end of our period is when we find the real establishment of an independent 
American maritime commercial empire that would offer the British serious competition 
in technology and trade until the implosion of the Civil War in the 1860s, from which the 
industry would never completely recover. 
The records 
Reading through the business records of these shippers fills in the details of this general 
sketch, gives us the opportunity to understand how and why ship owners used their ships, 
and affords us the chance to hold up the archival record against the predominant 
secondary literature. We find the largest collections of such records on this side of the 
Atlantic in the same places we would have found the major shipping centers—New 
England and Philadelphia.
19
 Merchants’ papers typically include: 
a) outgoing correspondence: Merchants in this world managed their affairs by letter. 
They wrote to their factors or agents in other ports, to their business partners, to their 
solicitors/attorneys, to their bankers, insurance agents, and to the masters of their ships.
20
 
This last usually took the form of a loosely standardized set of instructions for a voyage 
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 For this study, I used archival collections in New England and Philadelphia, though the vessels and 
businesses recorded there were built and operated all over the British Atlantic and beyond; Bermuda, Nova 
Scotia, and west Britain were important sites. New England and Philadelphia, though, present unusually 
good archival collections in general, and maritime collections are no exception. Significant archival 
collections certainly exist in other port, museum, and national collections. Future work based on this study 
should utilize those to the fullest extent possible, though I would expect the evidence they contain to add to, 
rather than contradict, what is presented here. 
 
20
 Factors were partners or employees of an owner or firm who was entrusted to conduct business in 
destination ports on behalf of the owners. Thus, the master himself was a common factor. Agents were 
contractors who performed the same function; they were not employees or partners. The terms “master” 
and “captain” are somewhat, but not entirely, interchangeable in the merchant service, though not at all in 
naval service. The master of a merchant vessel was directly addressed as “Captain,” but it is more correct 
for us to refer to them indirectly as masters. 
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called Sailing Instructions. An extant Sailing Instructions letter yields quite a lot of 
information for a short, matter-of-fact document. They are so common and important in 
this sort of research that an example, with comment, is called-for: 
Cap
t
 John Lovitt          Salem New England June 20 1758 
 
        You being appointed Master of our Sloop Andrago, Our Orders are 
that you proceed the first good wind with our s.[ai]d Sloop & Cargo for 
Barmuda upon your Arrivall there make report &  entry according to Law 
and Dispose of our Cargo to our best advantage & make us Returns in a 
load of Salt if you can purchase it so as that you are well assured it will 
pay a good freight here if not proceed with our Sloop & the Effects of our 
Cargo in Cash or good Bills from Barmuda to Charlestown in South-
Carolina & there lay out our Cargo in good Rice some pitch & Tarr & 
Staves or any other goods that you are well assured will be most profitable 
to us, If we should not have Effects sufficient to fully load our Sloop, you 
may fill her up with freight goods. Or if you think it best for us you may 
draw upon us for as much as will fully Load our Sloop & we will 
punctually pay your Bills, Write us by all Opportunities make all [the?] 
Dispatch possible & in all Cases & Circumstances do that which you shall 
think best for our Interest. We wish you a good Voyage & are your 
Friends & Employers. 
 
P.S. If you should be Taken going or Coming                                            
       Bezaliel Toppan 
we would  have you Ransome at the best                                                   
       Tim
o
 Orne 
rate you can ---------                   
 
       BT 
                                                           TO 
 
The above a True Copy of Orders Rec.
d
 from 
my Employers 
                                      John Lovett
21
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 Orne Family Papers, MSS 41, Box 1 Folder 3, PEM-Phillips. 
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Unpacking this short letter will prove it a treasure chest of insight into how all of this 
worked.  
 As shipping agreements go, this was a short one, certainly run-of-the-mill, for a 
typical island run in a typical sloop with typical cargo. There were thousands of letters 
just like this one. That makes it more valuable. The instruction to sail with the “first good 
wind” reminds us that these voyages did not take place on a timetable as ours do. Ships 
might sit in port for weeks waiting for a wind and tide combination suitable for making 
way. As much as owners may have wanted to control such things, they could not. Nor 
could they control the ship’s business in destination ports as much as they might have 
liked—that is clear in agreements like this. Note the leeway given to the master to 
conduct trade. As much as merchants tried to stay on top of markets in destination ports 
by devouring newspapers, correspondence, and hearsay, the speed of communication was 
just too slow. The market conditions that made the voyage attractive in the first place had 
all too frequently evaporated by the time the vessel made port—a pervasive theme of 
incoming correspondence, as we will see. So owners gave the vessel’s master a degree of 
latitude that would be wholly unnecessary now,
22
 and that meant the master had to act as 
the owners’ agent, whether or not he was actually one of the owners, which he sometimes 
was, and whether or not the owners had a business agent or “correspondent” in the 
destination port. Sailing Instructions that bound the master too tightly—that constrained 
his choices too much—placed greater risk of a financial loss on the voyage. As it was, 
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 Sometimes—more commonly early in the period than later, as a general trend—a supercargo served as 
the owners’ agent on the voyage. That person, too, had to be someone the owners trusted.  
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such loss occurred all too often. Masters’ letters to owners routinely complain of poor 
market conditions and offer justification for the masters’ decisions, in an attempt to shield 
themselves from culpability for a voyage’s failure. 
 The first choice stipulated here is to Bermuda for salt. Salt was always in demand, 
so that part was a sensible risk, but if the price were high enough at Bermuda, that cargo 
would not provide the owners a profit. The owners are placing the onus on Lovett not 
only to judge the price of salt in Bermuda, but to judge the market conditions for selling it 
back home. Besides, the salt in Bermuda had already come from elsewhere—most likely 
the Turks & Caicos—so who brought it there, and on what terms, affected that market. 
Regardless of whether Lovett chooses to load Bermudan salt, though, he is to comply 
with Customs laws and procedures. Owners did not want their vessels fined or seized for 
failure to declare themselves and their cargoes according to the law.
23
 
 Should Lovett decide not to buy salt, the instructions suggest that he is still to sell 
the outward-bound cargo in Bermuda for “Cash or good Bills.”24 That was not always the 
case. Owners frequently gave masters the option of not selling the cargo if prices were 
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 If they intended to smuggle, owners would typically abide by the usual practice of putting such language 
as we see here in the official sailing instructions, but then they might deliver illegal instructions orally. 
Regardless, owners  used these agreements to shift the onus of any illegal activity onto the master. This 
might help protect them from vessel seizure and cargo forfeiture in the event that the vessel ran afoul of the 
customs laws, whether inadvertently or intentionally. Smuggling is an important subject in the maritime 
history of this time and this world. The place to start is Wim Klooster’s Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the 
Caribbean, 1648-1795 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998). On American smuggling in the West Indies during 
the Seven Years War, see Thomas Truxes, Defying Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 
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 Bills of exchange were basically I.O.U.s asking the recipient to pay the bearer the amount presented and 
charge the issuer. These, though, were complicated by exchange rates and the perceived, or actual, 
creditworthiness of the issuer, and were also traded as commodities themselves, like stock options and 
securities. Owners also sometimes gave masters the option of selling the vessel if good terms were to be 
had. 
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not to their liking, and ships might sail to multiple ports before selling the cargo, or they 
might sell part of the cargo in one port, where the price for that commodity was 
attractive, and sail somewhere else to sell the rest, looking for a better deal. This of 
course drove up cost and risk of damage considerably for the voyage. The master had to 
weigh the potential gain for doing so against that. In this case, a nearby alternative to 
Bermuda was Charlestown (today’s Charleston), and the commodities specified for that 
option were the chief products of the Carolinas—rice, naval stores, and barrel staves. The 
other options offered by the owners were to take freight—goods shipped by others for a 
fee—or to borrow money (“draw upon us”) on the owners’ credit to buy a return cargo. 
Next, the owners instruct Lovett to keep them as well-informed as possible by writing to 
them frequently. Masters typically did this, though there was no guarantee their letters 
would reach the owners in a timely manner. Both outgoing and incoming correspondence 
are full of complaints about letters not received and decisions delayed or made without 
requested advice. Owners had no idea what had happened to their ships and cargoes 
without letters. The desire for mail was urgent and insatiable.  
 Toppan and Orne then urge Lovett to conduct the voyage as quickly as he can. 
Time equals crew wages—and more time to suffer desertion for better wages elsewhere 
or personal reasons, more time to succumb to disease, more time to suffer accident. More 
time underway meant more wear and tear on the vessel and cargo, and the tying-up of 
capital in them. They close by reminding Lovett of how much trust they are placing in 
him.  
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 In a postscript, they acknowledge the possibility of interception by privateers or 
enemy cruisers—this was during the Seven Years War. Maritime predators frequently 
demanded ransom to let the ship go rather than take her as a prize—it was less profitable, 
but much easier and allowed the predator to continue the cruise and intercept many more 
vessels. In such case, there would be nothing for it but for Lovett to get the best terms he 
could to preserve his own freedom and that of his ship and most of his crew—though it 
was common practice to take one or two crew members hostage, to be held until the 
ransom bill was paid (along with a fee for the hostages’ sustenance).25 
 What comes through most clearly from one of these letters is the sense of risk. So 
many things could go so wrong—market conditions, bad business decisions, disease, 
accident, weather, war—that it is no wonder owners fretted constantly about their ships at 
sea and cargoes for sale. The risks these people took seem outrageous to us. Yet they had 
no choice but to accept them and try to mitigate them if they were going to engage in 
maritime commerce. The ship itself was just one of those risks. The risks we associate 
with these ships, that seem so stark to us—their plank-on-frame wooden construction, 
their wind-dependent power source manipulated by human strength with little mechanical 
advantage, their relatively small size by our standards, the exposure of their crews to the 
elements and to physical injury or death during normal operations—seem less aberrant 
when considered in the broader context of risk laid out so clearly by a simple letter like 
this. 
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 Chet, The Ocean is a Wilderness, 57. Chet in turn cites multiple sources. 
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b) incoming correspondence—The incoming correspondence that most concerns us here 
is that from masters to owners. Those letters rarely mention anything having to do with 
the performance of the vessel beyond the duration of the passage and whether the master 
considers that “good” or “indifferent”—not very good. The overwhelming concern of 
these letters is business—the business of the master acting as the owners’ agent. The 
following is as good an example as any found. It is from Capt. George F. Blunt from 
Cape Francois in Saint Domingue (now Haiti) to owner William Hale, 29 August 1799, 
describing a poor market at Trinidad and his decision to sail from there to Grenada, after 
selling only the cargo of lumber on deck—not in the hold—for cash:    
...The wind being far Northerly, a strong Lee Current and the Brig still 
Very Crank, I could not gain sight of Grenada, and the first Land I could 
fetch was the West End of St. Croix,  the only offer I had there was 40 
Doll.s for my Boards only [which is what he got in cash at Trinidad for his 
deck lumber], and that payable in Rum, there I gained Intelligence of the 
Cape being open to us, and thinking it not prudent to run to a French Port 
with Naval Stores on board I sold my Pitch @$4. Tar & Turpentine @$3 
& Varnish @55 Cents per Gall. and took Rum in paym.t I then proceeded 
on for this Infernal port, from whence we had at St. Croix the most 
flattering prospect of making a grate Voiage on Lumber I arrived here 
yesterday, and the Current prices of this Day. are, Boards $15, Shingles $1 
1/2, Staves & Headings all together $16, Beef $7 1/2 Fish 2@3 if good 
...
26
 
 
Mainwaring’s Sea-mans Dictionary says that a vessel is “crank-sided when she will bear 
but small sail, and will lie down very much with little wind…”27 and “a crank-sided ship 
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 William Hale Correspondence, Box 2 Folder 3, NHHS. 
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 Henry Mainwaring, The Sea-mans Dictionary : or, an exposition and demonstration of all the parts and 
things belonging to a shippe (1644), in The Life and Works of Sir Henry Mainwaring, Volume 2, edited by 
G.E. Mainwaring (London: The Navy Records Society, 1920), e-reader edition published by The Internet 
Archive, 2007, location 1997. 
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can never sail well by the wind.”28 That is because a sailing vessel must be able to stand 
up to the wind to sail to weather, as the wind has its greatest heeling force from forward 
of the beam (amidships). So Blunt is complaining that his brig will not go to weather 
well,
29
 and thus his options for his next landing are further restricted by that. Blunt, as his 
other correspondence in this collection reveals, is a perennially unfortunate master, a 
perennially self-pitying one, or both. He bewails his misfortunes and takes pains to 
ensure that his owners know that nothing is his fault. Is the brig crank? We cannot know. 
Perhaps her rig was out of tune. Perhaps she was loaded out of trim or balance. Perhaps 
she was just a crank design. Perhaps she was not crank at all and the conditions forbade 
making Grenada. These masters’ letters, though, represent a consistent effort at self-
justification very much in the writers’ self-interest, so we should read them with that in 
mind. 
 Most masters’ comments to owners on vessel performance—if any—were 
offhand and vague. After a passage from Massachusetts to Canton in 1800, Capt. Bently 
of the Brown East Indiaman Ann & Hope wrote home that "...our ship Behaves Very 
Well and tite..”—which is all he had to say about her performance on a voyage of five 
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 Mainwaring, location 3188. For a better sense of this: In a letter from Capt. John Crowninshield to owner 
Elias Hasket Derby from the ship Henry on 4 July 1791, he writes that, though otherwise a good sailer, the 
ship “is however very crank & tender & has in fact come so far almost upon her b[eam] ends, & her Spars 
are so [stighty?] (The top masts) and she has so little spread to her rigging, that we have sometimes been 
obliged to double reef when we might have carried top Gall
t
 sails--we make just enough water to keep her 
sweet. ...” (Crowninshield Family Papers, MH 15, Box 1, Folder 9, PEM-Phillips). To double reef is to 
drastically shorten sail area. 
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 Meaning she will not sail as close to the direction from which the wind is coming as she might otherwise, 
or as another vessel might. 
 
98 
 
months and ten days.
30
 In 1805, John Odiorne wrote from Norfolk to James Locke in 
New Hampshire that "We have at last arrived here after a long passage of nine days, we 
are all well and the Ship behaves extremely Well, the Ship Answers your expectations as 
it respects Sailing to the uttermost, you will without Doubt have received Capt. Adams' 
letter on this..."
31
 The following year, from Alicante, he writes: "The Ship continues good 
and strong and sails exceedingly well upon an even keel we out sail Capt Robt Follinsbe 
[?]  and Capt Rob.t [?] Bagley by one half which you must thnk is very gratifying to me.-
-----------------------------"
32
 These are typical.  
 This one is not typical, and perhaps here the exception proves the rule: 
The Rangers sailing does not answer the general expectation oweing in a 
great measure, to her being too deep, very foul, & overmasted. her ballast 
Laid too high, on Account of its improper Quality, for a Ship of this 
construction; this, with the extraordinary weight of her lower Masts, 
occasioned her being very crank. I am paying my whole attention to 
remedy these inconveniences as much as possible; I am shortening the 
lower Masts, shifting the Main Mast further aft, and mean to Ballast with 
Lead as that Article will stow under the lower tier of Water, the less 
quantity will be sufficient, of course the Ship will be so much the lighter, 
and Sail so much the faster; and we shall then, I hope, be able to Stow the 
Cables under the Platform.
33
   
 
That was written by John Paul Jones to John Wendell, 11 December 1777, at the 
conclusion of USS Ranger’s first passage as a new U.S. warship. Jones was expected to 
take prizes and engage the Royal Navy in combat at public expense, and the performance 
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 Shipping Papers (a topical collection), Box 1, Folder 6, NHHS 
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of his vessel had to be a top priority to both him and his paymasters. No merchant master 
would bother his owners with details like this. The rest of the letters from merchant 
masters from which the brief quotes above were excerpted are preoccupied almost 
exclusively with details on market conditions, prices offered, declined, or accepted for 
goods, and any legal issues the master is handling or seeking advice on from the owners. 
That material consistently supports the impression we get from the Sailing Instructions 
from owners—that they are preoccupied with the ship’s business, not the ship. It is rare to 
read praise or complaint about the vessel itself. Where it exists, it is more likely to 
comment on the ship’s condition than on her performance qualities. Those seem more or 
less taken for granted, as a known quantity. She does what her owners and masters expect 
her to do. If only the markets could! 
c) official documents: crew agreements, portledge bills, passports & rolls of equipage, 
customs clearances, prize adjudications, crew protests,
34
 privateers’ commissions—We 
can always make good use of a list of crew signed on to a vessel whose basic 
specifications we know. The more we know about the vessel, the more useful the list. Of 
course we want to know about the vessel herself. We also want to know how many 
sailors, serving in what positions, the owners and master deemed proper to operate her on 
a particular voyage. If we know what type of vessel she was, and how big, and how she 
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 Crew protests have a misleading name. They are sworn statements, given before a notary, by a delegation 
of a vessel’s crew after an accident or other misfortune, giving a detailed account of the events of that 
misfortune and especially what efforts the crew made to avoid the misfortune and, if the vessel was lost, to 
salvage as much of the owners’ property as possible. These documents bring maritime accidents in this 
period to life, and remind us of how bad luck and nature could destroy a vessel despite her crew’s best 
efforts, but we should remember when reading them that their purpose is to exonerate the crew to the 
owners.  
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was armed,
35
 not only can we figure a ton-per-man ratio for that vessel on that voyage, 
but we can compare the relationship of crew-to-ship in the list to that of a similar replica, 
should one be available, and get a better idea of whether she may have been over- or 
under-manned— there were good reasons why she might have been either. Masters 
would sometimes sign on more crew than they needed to operate the vessel to pad the 
crew against desertion, disease, or loss in combat during wartime. If the ship were armed, 
she might well need more men to make use of that armament than she would otherwise.  
 These documents in merchants’ papers do not provide a consistently complete and 
large enough source for compiling reliably hard data on ton-per-man ratios for the 
purpose of ascertaining long-term trends. That is best done with the records kept by port 
officials of all vessels entering and leaving their ports. Still, there is much they can point 
out to us (see Table 1, following page). 
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 Customs clearances seem to be the most reliable sources for finding tonnage, armament, crew size, and 
destination all in the same place. They also list cargo on board. 
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Table 1: Crew complements and ton-per-man ratios of  
27 merchant ships, 1727-1820
36
 
 
Year Vessel Type Tons Arma- 
ment 
Crew # Ton-per- 
man ratio 
Destination 
1727 Rainbow schooner 40 none 4 10 Newfoundland 
(from New Hampshire) 
1746 Betty & Molly schooner 53 ? 5 10.6 Leeward Islands 
1747 Betty & Molly37 brig ? ? 7 ? Barbados 
1758 Andrago sloop 70 ? 4 17.5 ? (prob. Bermuda) 
1759 Betsy schooner ? ? 7 ? Guadeloupe 
1765 Morning Star brig 120 ? ? ?  
1770 Defiance sloop ? ? 13 ? whaling; “western islands or 
elsewhere” from Providence 
1770 Sally brig’t ? ? 9 ? Surinam 
1772 Betsey sloop ? ? 13 ? whaling (Providence) 
1783 Active brig’t 95 none 7 13.6 Nova Scotia 
1784 Astrea ship 300 ? 13 23 Dominica 
1784 Astrea ship 300 ? 15 20 Grenada 
1784 Eagle brig 100 none 7 14.3 Virginia 
(from Lisbon, 
bound from there 
to L’Orient) 
1785 Astrea ship 300 none 16 18.8 Dominica 
1789 Astrea ship 300 ? 23 13 Canton 
1798 Ann & Hope ship 550 12 60 9.2 Canton 
1798 Benjamin ship 169 ? 13 13 London 
1798 Cruger brig ? 8  13 ? ? (privateer) 
1798  Hannah brig’t 138 ? 8 17.3 ? 
1799 Recovery ship ? ? 24 ? Calcutta 
1799 Henry ship 190 ? 17 11.2 Cape Francois 
1799 John ketch ? ? 22 ? Spain 
1799 Gadsden ship ? 16 50 ? Spain 
1799  Martha ship ? ? 17 ? East Indies 
1801 America ship 654 ? 49 13.3 West Indies 
1803 America ship 654 ? 30 21.8 France 
1806 John Langdon brig 124 none 7 17.7 Guadeloupe 
1806 Anna brig 162 none  8 20.3 Guadeloupe 
1809 Jane schooner 54 none 5 10.8 Cuba 
1810 Telemachus brig ? ? 10 ? ? 
1820 Eunice brig ? ? 10 ? East Indies 
 
Here we have 27 vessels making 31 voyages, almost all after 1750, when the Anglo-
Atlantic maritime economy surged. Over half of the voyages (18) took place during 
                                   
36
 Shipping Papers (a topical collection), Box 1, Folders 2 and 7, NHHS; Orne Family Papers MSS 41, Box 
1, Folders 3, 6 and 9, PEM-Phillips; Wharton Family Papers, Box 7, Folder 2, HSP; Brown Family 
Business Records, Box 681, Folder 3; Box 682, Folder 2; Box 475, Folder 3,  JCB; Derby Family Papers 
MSS 37, Box 1, Folders 1 and 5; Box 24 (OS), Folder 1, PEM-Phillips; Jones and Clark Papers, Box 1, 
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Phillips; Tredick Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 12, NHHS. 
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 It is not possible to determine from these records whether the vessel listed by this name as a schooner and 
that listed as a brig are one and the same. The assumption here is that they are different. 
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wartime. Only 14 vessels and 18 voyages permit a ton-per-man ratio calculation. Of those 
18 voyages, the records for only 10 list the vessel’s armament.38 
 As is usually the case, the records occur with more frequency the later in time we 
go. In the 62 years between 1727 and 1789, we have 15 voyages—one less than in the 
12-year period 1798-1810. 
 The smallest vessel is the earliest—the schooner Rainbow, 1727, 40 tons. Her ton-
per-man ratio of 10 reflects the small size of the vessel—her crew is minimal at 4. She is 
unarmed and making a rather short voyage from New Hampshire to Newfoundland, in 
perhaps challenging conditions but unlikely to be molested. Everything about her and her 
voyage is typical for a British American vessel of that time. Two other schooners with 
complete data present similar information: Betty & Molly in 1746, at 53 tons with a crew 
of 5, a ton-per-man ratio of 10.6, and Jane, in 1809, at 54 tons and with a crew of 5 
almost identical to the one 63 years earlier (10.8 ton-per-man ratio). 
 The schooner Betty & Molly was headed for the Leeward Islands in 1746 during 
King George’s War. If she was armed, she was not carrying extra crew. She probably was 
not, given that Jane was also sailing to the Caribbean during wartime in 1809, and we 
know she was not armed and that she carried the same size crew for the same size vessel. 
These vessels were workhorses, and their small size limited the profit they could make 
per voyage. It may well be that owners were willing to risk their capture rather than go to 
the expense of arming them and paying extra crew. Also, owners frequently sent them 
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 For the context of general trends in armament, see Shepherd and Walton, 76, 196-197; and French, 
“Shipping Productivity,” 631. 
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down-island to be sold along with their cargoes if the master could get a good price. That 
would save the expense of sailing them back, as well as depreciation of the vessel.
39
 
 The lowest ton-per-man ratio here, though, is not from a little schooner. It is from 
the large East Indiaman Ann & Hope (1798), built and sailed by the Browns of 
Providence. Ann & Hope, though, was armed with 12 guns and sailing all the way to 
Canton during wartime—a voyage that could take six months. She stood to make a 
substantial profit, too, in bringing back high-value East Asian goods.  
 The highest, and thus most efficient, ratio is for the 300-ton ship Astrea, sailing in 
1784, 1785, and 1789—in peacetime. The two highest ratios are for the earlier voyages, 
to the West Indies. The lowest ratio is for a later voyage to Canton. Larger American 
ships were entering the East Indies trade more and more as the new country recovered 
from the Revolution and its aftermath. We do not know from these records whether 
Astrea was armed for her voyage to China. It is doubtful, given that an extra seven men 
probably could not account for both defensive needs and the general increase in crew size 
we see for these longest of voyages. Astrea was not armed for her 1785 voyage to 
Dominica. In her prior two voyages, to Dominica and Grenada, she carried almost the 
same size crew—13 and 15—and there is no reason she would have been armed for these 
two voyages and not for the 1785 one. She sailed to Canton during peacetime. It is much 
more common to find ordinary merchant vessels armed during wartime. The ship 
Gadsden, of unknown tonnage, was sailing for Spain in 1799 with 16 guns and a large 
crew of 50. That makes sense.  
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 This was especially common with Bermuda sloops, which were always in high demand by both English 
and Dutch buyers. 
104 
 
 Privateers, outfitted purposefully—and expensively—for wartime predation, 
usually carried extra-large crews. The brig Cruger, listed here, seems to be an 
exception—we do not know from these records how large she was, but 13 men is not a 
large crew to sail a brig and man eight guns. It is possible, though; the Armed Sloop 
Welcome, with seven guns, carried a crew of 12 on military sortie during the American 
Revolution.
40
 
 Brigs tended to fall into a fairly narrow size class in the mid- to late 18
th
 century, 
though, so it would be reasonable to compare the 100-ton Eagle’s crew of seven, for 
transatlantic service during peacetime, to Cruger’s of almost double that, even though we 
do not know Cruger’s tonnage. Ideally, a merchant’s papers would yield a crew list for a 
vessel in normal service, and another after her conversion for privateering.  
 Note that the brigs Eagle (1784) and John Langdon (1806) carried no guns and 
seven men on these voyages. Because the later brig was somewhat larger, she has a 
higher ton-per-man ratio. The owners of John Langdon were probably getting a bit more 
for their money, provided they did not pay too much for the vessel. The brig Anna, also 
sailing to Guadeloupe in 1806, was even more efficient. Her 20.3 ratio is up there with 
Astrea’s. Though she had almost the same capacity as the 1798 ship Benjamin, the latter 
carried 13 men to Anna’s eight, for a much lower ratio of 13. Benjamin was sailing to 
London during the Quasi-War with France, though, so one wonders whether she was 
armed. It does take more work to run a ship than a brig. Exactly how much more work it 
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takes, in terms of numbers of crew for the same size vessel, would be instructive to know. 
Perhaps modeling and consulting with replica masters can tell us that. 
 Comparing these brigs reminds us that if owners could accept the risk of 
operating with a minimal crew, they could increase the efficiency of the operation by 
operating a larger vessel within the same general vessel class. The brigantines Active of 
1783, at 95 tons, and Hannah of 1798, at 138 tons, reinforce that point. Hannah’s ratio of 
17.3 is comfortably higher than Active’s of 13.6. As Davis tells us, the general tendency 
was for these vessels to increase modestly in size over time. As John McCusker makes 
clear in his study of the Pennsylvania shipping industry, owners ordered and bought 
larger vessels when they could afford to.
41
 Aside from the limits of the owners’ capital, 
the limits on size were set by the size of the markets served. 
 Finally, this small sample of data reminds us that, even though security at sea in 
the western Atlantic and Caribbean benefited from the eradication of piracy in the area by 
the 1720s, privateering and enemy cruising during the frequent and long wars in the 18
th
 
century required the arming of ordinary merchant vessels and larger crews to defend 
them, with the expenses incurred accordingly. So, while it may have been possible 
technologically to increase ton-per-man ratios in this period, political conditions made it 
difficult to achieve such efficiency consistently without serious increase of risk—and 
risk, as we have seen, was automatically high for these merchants, even in settled times. 
In the later part of the period, from which we find the bulk of the records, both the British 
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and American insurance businesses were well-developed, and insurance policies for 
specific voyages are not uncommon in merchants’ papers. Premiums varied considerably 
based on the presumed condition of the vessel, her defensive capability, the value of the 
cargo, the season of the year, and the real or anticipated political conditions on the route. 
Especially risky voyages, such as Betty & Molly’s to the Caribbean might have been in 
1746, were frequently either impossible or prohibitive to insure. The owners took that 
risk along with the other risks in such cases. 
c) journals, ship books and waste books—An initial examination of the ledgers and 
accounts kept by these merchants, and the masters in their employ, reveals meticulous 
attention to detail.
42
 accounting for every cent paid out and taken in, leaving us in no 
doubt of what they traded, and for what price, nor of what sundries went into everyday 
business and the maintenance and repair of ships, and what all that cost. Also fortunate 
for us is that ship owners took pains to keep expenses separate by vessel. So we can see, 
even for an ordinary little sloop, what material and labor went into her construction, her 
fitting-out, provisioning, and maintenance. Of course, we can rarely assume that such 
records for any given vessel are complete, but an economic historian interested in 
comparing costs associated with various vessel types from the same narrow period—say, 
a few decades—could compile such data from a large sample of merchants’ papers in 
multiple repositories and assume rather safely that the level of completeness for those 
records would be comparable enough, averaged out over the large data sample, to provide 
meaningful information. This would be ill-advised over a period much longer than that, 
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as records are so much more complete in general for the later part of the period that 
making such comparisons from any period prior to 1750 to 1750—1800 would be of 
dubious merit. 
 As with their letters, though, the overwhelming bulk of merchants’ journals and 
account books are much more concerned with cargoes for sale than ships in service, 
reinforcing the already-strong impression that the vessel was a rather stable quantity 
while salable cargoes were anything but. Prices and qualities fluctuated, demand 
fluctuated, credit with which to buy goods fluctuated, and merchants were constantly 
challenged to enter a profit rather than a loss in their ledgers. 
d) bills of lading and cargo manifests—While journals were kept in the office, bills of 
lading and cargo manifests were ships’ papers. They tell us exactly what was on board for 
a voyage, who owned it, how much it cost, how much the owners were charging to ship 
freight for others, how much of each item was carried, and what units of measurement 
were used for each. Cargoes were almost always mixed. That helped to spread risk, given 
the unpredictability of markets. There were exceptions of course—tobacco ships from 
Virginia would carry little else to Britain after the harvest, but they would certainly return 
with mixed cargoes. Sack ships would carry dried cod from the Grand Banks fisheries in 
large volumes, every year, to Europe and the West Indies, but then typically load wine 
and other Mediterranean products or tropical produce.
43
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 For an introduction to the Newfoundland cod fishery and its wider context—the trade network of which 
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e) bills and invoices—These make up much of the bulk of ship owners’ papers. They 
bring the everyday details of maritime business almost to life. Frequently just chits of 
paper with a few mostly misspelled words and a few numbers scrawled on them, they 
were written by everyone from a humble glazier submitting his bill to an owner for 
repairing stern-gallery windows, to someone as eminent as a Brown, Crowninshield, or 
Derby issuing a “pay-to-the-order-of…” From stacks of these, we learn what tradesmen 
charged for what work at a certain place at a certain time—and how many of those trades 
a ship owner relied upon—sailmakers, glaziers, masons to build and repair the ship’s 
brick stove, painters, rope makers, coopers, blacksmiths, spar makers, block makers, 
riggers, caulkers, joiners. To acquire and maintain a good ship, an owner had to know 
how to find good tradesmen and be able to pay them. The paper chits remind us that 
payment, especially in the earlier part of the period, was not always in currency—
something in chronic short supply. Everyone wanted pounds sterling but most had to 
settle for something else much of the time. There were colonial currencies whose value 
fluctuated by location and people’s assessments of their worth in the near future. As 
important as any “colonial currency” were sugar and its sister products, molasses and 
rum—especially rum.44 People along the waterfront in this world paid each other in the 
produce of the sugar cane all the time. Of course no one in the shipping centers of the 
northeastern seaboard produced the raw products themselves. They imported as much of 
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them as they could from the West Indies, and relied on those imports in large part to keep 
their maritime economy going and growing. It is no wonder that these ship owners were 
willing to go to great—including supra-legal—lengths to procure the sugar products they 
wanted, and to offer their own goods in exchange for them wherever the best markets 
were—and the best markets were so frequently the off-limits French islands, with no 
eastern seaboard colonies of their own to supply them with provisions and building 
materials, and with booming sugar production and no home market for rum in a country 
where brandy was so well-protected by law and taste.
45
 Rum distilling was the number-
one industry in New England in this period.
46
 
 Of particular interest in the stacks of merchants’ bills and invoices are bills of sale 
for ships. These reflect the cost savings owners might realize by buying used versus new. 
On 2 September 1799, Brown & Ives bought a six-year-old brigantine called Maria for 
$3,200. On 14 February 1801, a George Robinson offered to sell them a new one, when 
she was finished, for $6,500. No size difference between brigantines eight years apart in 
age would account for that disparity. Most of it was depreciation. Obviously Brown & 
Ives thought Maria was worth buying, even though six years was plenty of time for a 
wooden ship of this period to deteriorate badly. The importance of evaluating the 
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condition of a used ship before making an offer on her is made quite evident in 
merchants’ correspondence on the matter. In 1777, Nicholas Brown and Christopher 
Starbuck were considering buying an 80-ton sloop called Success. The memorandum of 
sale, which we would call a listing, claimed she was “a good Sailing Vessel,” seven years 
old, standing rigging one year old, which might mean it was already due for replacement, 
depending on usage and maintenance, running rigging “pretty good,” with sails fit for a 
voyage to the West Indies—her one-year-old standing rigging and “pretty good” running 
rigging could reasonably be expected to make at least the one-way trip—as noted, owners 
frequently sent these smaller vessels down-island in hopes of selling them there rather 
than bringing them back.
47
 Note also here that typically vague description of the vessel’s 
performance—“a good Sailing Vessel.”  
 For over a year, in 1807-1808, Jacob Smith, working for Brown Benson & Ives of 
Providence, tried to sell the ship George & Mary. Just as he thought he had a deal, the 
ship was damaged in a gale by a ship riding alongside her. His letters to his employers 
concerning the drawn-out affair span three folders in the collection.
48
 Seven years later, 
Smith was working on another deal—this time, to buy a ship called Two Catharines. 
Smith had been writing to the firm about other ships, but not with the detail or 
enthusiasm he did about this one.  
 On 21 September 1815 he wrote from Newport that he had examined the ship 
thoroughly and spoke with the man who graved her—cleaned her bottom—who said she 
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was worm-free except at the waterline and that her bottom timbers were good. Smith 
reported that she was well paid (bottom-coated) and caulked from gunwale to garboard 
strake (rail to keel). He examined the mastheads and they seemed sound. Her captain, 
Smith wrote, claimed she would carry 500 tons. Smith says he does not doubt she will 
carry 400 "and will be a Very Good Sailer"and that the owners have recently spent four 
to five hundred dollars on her. He thinks they can have her from $13,200 to $14,000 
depending on terms, and that if so, she was the cheapest ship to be had in the U.S. of 
equal tonnage. Smith probably was not too happy, then, when on 16 October, he 
forwarded terms from the captain and co-owner: $15,000, 1/3 St. Petersburg hemp (for 
rigging) and quality duck (sail canvas), 1/3 cash on delivery, 1/3 cash “Ninety days 
payable at Either of the Banks of Their State.” The ship would be delivered with adequate 
cordage for the spars she carried, and all sails. The sail inventory that follows indicates a 
full suit, but no spares. She would need some spares for the primary sails, or at least 
significant canvas to make them, before she would be fit for ocean service. She seems to 
have had a full complement of ground tackle.
49
 The captain and co-owner touts her stout 
construction, for which he provides some supporting details, and says her standing 
rigging is large for her tonnage, and her running rigging "of Suitable Sizes mad[e] … of 
the best Saint Petersburg Clean Hemp," sails of "first Quality English duck" of proper 
gauge ["number"] "and have not been bent." That means he is claiming they have never 
been used. He lists a full complement of ship’s boats and water casks. Just as a car owner 
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writing a classified ad might list recent work done and care taken, Capt. Dennis reports 
that Two Catharines had her topsides caulked in the spring of 1813 and her decks caulked 
“about a year ago She has always had a ship keeper to keep her And untill last fall and 
this spring and Summer the Bow lumber port has allway been kept Oapen and Cabbin 
Windows---Ower Price for the Ship is Sixteen Thousand Dollars Cash Thomas 
Dennis…”.50 So perhaps Smith had gotten Dennis to come down a thousand dollars, and 
agree to accept much of the payment in goods rather than cash, a ubiquitous reality of 
business transactions in the period, as we have noted. Alas, it seems all Smith’s efforts to 
acquire this ship for his employers came to naught—he wrote on 17 October that he made 
an offer according to their wishes but it was declined, and that they were so far apart he 
was sure they would not accept the counteroffer he made. He then moved on to other 
business.
51
 
 Note that the priorities of all parties in this exchange were the condition of the 
ship, her price, and what conveyed with her for that price. We see that now-familiar 
“Very Good Sailer,” and that is the only performance-related comment in the exchange. 
Her capacity received more attention, with Smith seeming to imply that the seller 
exaggerated it but that it was generous for her size nonetheless. Merchants wanted the 
greatest cargo capacity for size they could get, without compromising the ship’s sailing 
ability too much. What “too much” meant, of course, was subjective—and, for us, 
elusive. 
                                   
50
 Bow lumber ports were like gunports cut in the bows, which could be sealed for voyages, through which 
long timbers such as mast timbers—basically entire tree trunks or sections of them—could be loaded into 
the hold. 
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f) ships’ logs—We are fortunate that entire ships’ logs do survive in some number, 
especially (as usual) for the 18
th
 century, and most especially for the late 18
th
 century. It 
is worth taking note of what a ship’s log contained, as they were quite standardized in  
format and content. In the late 18
th
 century, printers even produced blank ones for sale. 
They are on heavy paper and stoutly bound, contributing to their longevity in a hostile 
environment of moisture, heat, and rough conditions.  
 
 
 
Figure 10 Log excerpt for the snow George, 1805-1806.
52
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In the log excerpt shown in Figure 10, the snow George is underway from Wilmington, 
Delaware to Cork, Ireland. On this page, we see the end of one day’s entries at the top, 
followed by the next day’s entries, for Tuesday, November 19th. The columns are 
consistent in logs throughout the period. To the far left is the time, in two-hour 
increments—ship’s time was kept noon-to-noon, since that was when the master took his 
sun sight, weather permitting, to establish the vessel’s latitude as best he could. Sand 
glasses and bells kept time and told the officers when to change the watch. Running 
twenty-four hours a day while underway, ships needed a time system distinct from that 
used on land.  
 The next columns are for measured speed—Knots and Half-Knots. So, a “5” in 
the K column and a “1” in the HK column means 5 ½ knots. This was measured using a 
chip log—a flat piece of wood tied to a string with knots tied in it at regular intervals—
hence the measurement of speed in “knots”— wound around a reel. The chip was thrown 
overboard from the stern, and the line let out, while an assistant watched the sand glass. 
However many knots ran out in a measured interval of time was the speed. The concept is 
similar to taking a person’s pulse.  
 This is speed through the water, not speed over the ground or absolute speed. 
Since absolute speed is distance covered divided by the time it took to cover that 
distance, absolute speed is better, but at sea, before GPS, very difficult if not impossible 
to obtain. By keeping up with speed through the water and time underway since leaving a 
known fixed point, masters could estimate their position using deduced, or “dead,” 
reckoning, but this was seriously vulnerable to significant error caused by currents from 
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ahead, astern, or abeam, slowing or speeding the vessel, or pushing it off course at an 
angle, or a combination of both—and by leeway, the sideways-pushing effect of the 
wind, and by the inherent inaccuracy of chip logs.  
 This is a good place to discuss vessel speed at some length. While the log kept 
underway could only provide speeds over the ground or absolute speeds once fixed points 
of land were observed, those fixed points were noted in the log, marking the official 
beginning and end of a voyage. Finding the distance between those, and dividing that by 
the time the vessel spent underway from one point to the next—passage time—gives the 
average absolute speed of the voyage. Because sailing vessels almost never sail the most 
direct route from one point to the next, owing to their need to take advantage of wind 
direction, or fight it, sailors—and experimental archaeologists—find it useful to employ 
the concept of velocity made good (VMG).
53
 Let us suppose that the destination is 
upwind—not unreachably upwind, but far enough upwind that the vessel must sail hard 
on the wind (close-hauled) to reach it. This is the most uncomfortable and usually least-
efficient way to sail. Unless forced to, by the presence of a lee shore or other hazard, 
masters would rarely elect to sail close-hauled. They made better speed and subjected the 
vessel and her crew to much less punishment if they bore away some. In our example, 
though, doing so means no longer sailing directly toward the destination. In general, that 
is preferable, as vessel speed will increase, perhaps making up for the less-direct route, or 
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coming close.
54
 So if the straight-line distance between beginning and end point is, say, 
2,000 nautical miles, the vessel might actually cover, say, 2,300 nautical miles to make 
the passage. Her average speed through the water is 2,300 miles divided by the time it 
took her to do it. VMG, though, is not the speed the vessel is making through the water—
it is the speed she actually makes toward her destination over the course of the voyage, 
no matter her course changes and the changes in wind speed and direction. So in our 
example it is the straight-line distance to her destination—2,000 miles—divided by the 
time it took her to get there—the time it took her to actually sail 2,300 miles through the 
water. Since, by that calculation, it took her more time to cover less distance, VMG is 
lower than average speed made good over the voyage. VMG is a true indicator of vessel 
performance, taking into account the vessel’s sailing characteristics, the judgment of the 
master in route planning and in taking advantage of wind shifts and changes in sea 
conditions. We can calculate VMGs from the information presented in most log books, 
and we can use VMG calculations from replica trials to make comparisons. Passage times 
are generally unsuitable for evaluating relative vessel performance, subject as they are to 
so many external and variable forces.  
 Passage times have something important to tell us nevertheless. If we compare log 
speeds and average speeds over the course of a voyage, we see a clear picture of the 
speed ceiling of ocean sailers. Any good ship, properly laden and equipped and well-
sailed, could make a good turn of speed. True tubs were rare, as they would have pushed 
the capacity-performance continuum too far in the former direction to be satisfactory. It 
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was common, in steady breezes and reasonably well-behaved seas, for vessels to make 
hull speed and even to sustain it for periods of time ranging from hours to days. Hull 
speed is worth a brief explanation. A displacement hull—any hull that does not plane, so 
any ship hull other than that of a hydrofoil, cannot climb out of the trough of its own bow 
wave—the wave it makes as it pushes through the water.55 The hull speed is easy to 
calculate—1.34 multiplied by the square root of the vessel’s length at the waterline. So 
the hull speed of a vessel 80 feet at the waterline—typical of a middling commercial ship 
in the 18
th
 century—is just under 12 knots. Even respectable average speeds on ocean 
voyages, though, were but a fraction of the vessel’s hull speed—2 to 3 knots was typical. 
A host of impediments lined up against a vessel’s making anything close to hull speed 
over the course of a passage, including surface friction from bottom fouling, periods of 
light winds or calms, storms which kicked up rough seas through which the vessel had to 
labor, foul winds—winds from unfavorable directions—contrary or side-setting currents, 
and gear failures.  
 Returning to the snow George on her journey to Cork: She dropped anchor at 5 
pm on Thursday 19 December in Cork harbor. Calculating her average speed for the 
passage gives us 3.64 knots.
56
 Note the speeds her master recorded in the log excerpt. 6 
and 7 knots were common. Elsewhere in the log, he records speeds up to 10. This is the 
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 A vessel can, however, certainly exceed hull speed by surfing, and frequently will do so at sea. Surfing is 
accelerating down the front of a wave. The wave does not have to be breaking. The hull speed of the 
author’s own 28-foot sailboat was 6.6 knots, but she would surf under full sail at 9 knots. 
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hour days. That's 768 hours. 2,799 nm / 768 hours = 3.64 knots average speed, for a ship capable of 
measuring 10 knots through the water. 
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norm for these logs. If conditions had allowed these ships to maintain their best speeds 
over most of a passage, passages would have been at least twice as fast if not more. They 
almost never did, though, as the vagaries of weather and sea conditions retarded a ship's 
progress even when the crew did what they could to maximize her speed at all times and 
in all conditions—and this log, like most, records constant sail changes in reaction to 
changing conditions—adding sail as winds grew lighter, taking it off as storms built, with 
luck before something broke.  
 So minor differences in the performance speed of a vessel were likely to make 
very little difference in the passage times she could accomplish. The 3.64-knot average 
speed calculated for George’s transatlantic is perfectly respectable for the period. It is 
difficult, in that light, to imagine any incentive to exert effort, expense, risk, and loss of 
relative capacity in an attempt to increase performance speed in an ocean-going 
merchantman. What a vessel like George really needed, beyond a fair hull and stout 
construction, were good sails, sound rigging, proper maintenance, proper lading, and 
enough hands to accomplish the never-ending hard work of putting up and taking in sails 
to keep her moving at her best speed in the Atlantic’s exhausting swings between dead 
calm and howling gale. When John Crowninshield reached Bordeaux in America in 1803, 
he wrote an utterly scathing letter home to the family firm, excoriating the owners with 
bitter sarcasm for sending the ship out on the cheap, at the expense of himself and 
everyone else in her: He says he did not have enough hands to "carry sail handsomely" 
and so his passage was much slower than it should have been, and that though the crew 
did their best to take in sail for rough weather, "we are half man[n]ed" and it is not fast 
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enough, "every rope breaks" and their sails are torn up. "…this is the real effects of small 
economy--". He says a proper-sized crew would have made a difference of 20 days 
underway.  
you all ought to know what sailors are after a disagreeable, hard, 
labourious, tedious long passage----------ask them what kind of a ship is 
she-------why Sir as damned a thing as ever swam-----how so does she 
leak----ask her pump ports------does she strain---ask her seams--------does 
she sail fast---see what a passage we had-----------how is her rigging & 
sails-----we had neither when we left home & if possible less now, … 
[but] with a full crew every thing goes smooth & easey & in fact such is 
all before the wind.... 
          then ask each -- what kind of a ship are you in----by God sire as fine 
a ship as ever swam-- -- does she leak---not a drop---- ------ does she 
strain, never------is she well found---certainly ------does she sail fast, very-
-------this is the very ship we want, & she will sell well-----will the other I 
fear not----" 
 
He goes on to castigate them for not providing adequate spare rigging and sailcloth. He 
compares the paltry sum it would have cost with the substantial cost in labor of the longer 
passage: 
         but if you ment we should run under last reefed topsails all the way 
then I grant we were compleatly man[n]ed------- ---------… 
         …I hope to  God you will have a poverty auction ------- even the 
T[op] G[allant] top rope was either taken out or left on the warf-------------
- T[op] G[allant] sheets would not hold a 10 knot breeze ------" 
"puttyed ports (for fear of hurting the paint if paid with pitch) is an 
excellent thing to keep out water on a cold Europe winter passage-----[no 
it is not—he is being facetious]… 
...what will you say---how many excuses have you to make-----------the 
America not in in 50 days....what think has become of John --- --- have 
you heard of the America yet--------------...then an old man picking his 
teeth they dont say much but they fear she is gone------- 
          (how much better & to our credit & perhaps her exit would have 
been the more honourable---for one of the boys coming from the post 
office allmost out of breath-------sir the America is in Bordeaux in 16 
days---by heavens is it possible) 
           [Later he uses superstition as another way of commenting on an ill-
fated passage] …& don't you remember after they sailed we remarked that 
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one of the white hens stood up & crowed in the long entry------& that our 
great black cat sat to the fire backwards & wisked her tail left handed. & at 
the same time what was that which hapened to Johns white horse-------all 
ominous of squalls---then you will begin to realise how astonishingly 
oversighted you was to send us to sea in so miserable a plight --- --- 
  
Captain Crowninshield is pointing out that, because he was undermanned for the 
conditions in an ill-equipped ship, he had to run the vessel under reduced sail even when 
she could have carried more, because he did not have the manpower to spare for the 
constant physical labor of going aloft and changing sail. Apparently, his dismal 
prediction that the ship would be difficult to sell once he reached France was borne out. 
He reached France on 29 November and did not manage to sell her until 31 March, and at 
that he was displeased with what he got for her.
57
 He makes a compelling case that 
penny-wise-and-pound-foolish was a dubious strategy for risk management in this 
business. 
 Returning again to George’s log: The Course column is for entering the compass 
course. Note that we do not see degrees here, as we would now. Courses were read and 
recorded using the point system—a point was 11 ¼ degrees, but mariners did not think in 
degrees. There are 360 degrees, but only 32 points. Given the limits of precision of every 
other means of measurement available, there was no need to bother with the precision 
offered by the degree system on a compass. On a sailing vessel in motion in open water, 
it took skill to read an average course correctly at all, as the compass card swung one way 
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and the next with the motion of the ship in the waves and wind.
58
 The courses we see 
here are East by South, East by South ½ South, and East South-East. Just as with speeds, 
these are estimates, averaged from a period of time underway, whose trustworthiness 
depended much on sea and weather conditions and the skill and alertness of the man at 
the helm. 
 Winds were measured using the same point system, but described in terms of the 
direction they were coming from, rather than direction heading toward, as with vessel 
course. So the log can tell us roughly what point of sail
59
 the ship was on at a certain time 
in certain conditions.  
 At the end of a day’s entries, we find the master’s best estimates of distance run 
for that day, position, average speed and best speed. In the Remarks column we can read 
his observations about the weather, and about gear breaking and being repaired, which 
was almost constant—“hands occupied in mending rigging” or something similar is one 
of the most common remarks. Sometimes Remarks include crew behavior and morale, 
and the master’s own assessment of the voyage’s progress. Here, as so often happens in 
these, we are reminded of how violent this experience was. A barrel of beef broke loose 
when the snow was hit by a particularly vicious sea and did much damage in the cabin. It 
could have killed someone. 
 The carefully drawn straight lines, neat entries, and elegant sweep of penmanship 
offer an impression of tidiness and control that utterly belies the reality of what was 
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really happening on a ship like George on the Atlantic. Here is literally an attempt to 
impose order on chaos, a strong and widespread human impulse, particularly obvious 
here. The tidiness and system of habit of the logbook also belie the reality that the 
information recorded there could only be trusted to a strictly limited extent. A diligent 
master always had a good idea of where he was, but that would not necessarily keep him 
and the lives and property in his care off a reef or a lee shore. 
 Once the vessel made port, the ship’s log shifted to the business of selling and 
unloading cargo, procuring and loading a new cargo, trips into town—or farther—on 
ship’s business and for mail, repairs and reconditioning of the ship, watering and 
provisioning, and concerns related to the retention, desertion, and recruitment of crew, as 
well as their health, or lack thereof. These sections remind us that, while voyages were 
long by our standards, time in port was even longer. While maritime economic historians 
have shown that efficiencies in this area improved over time, contributing materially to 
the growth in shipping productivity, some of the basic realities of the entire period 
militated against, and limited, such improvement.
60
 While populations grew, demanding 
more goods and services, and the density of population centers and plantations grew 
concomitantly, allowing ships to dock or anchor closer to more sources of product, those 
changes only went so far. Density was still low enough in most places—and land 
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transport inefficient enough—that ships typically spent weeks or months waiting to finish 
loading and unloading even late in our period. Financial, technological, logistical, and 
political obstacles stood in the way of artificial port and harbor improvements in the 
period, though major projects were attempted—and to some extent successfully 
concluded—later in the period. These, however, were most evident in major British port 
cities—London, Liverpool, and Bristol.61 Business networks grew and gained experience, 
but communication was still no faster than ships could sail, though there were more ships 
to deliver mail and news. Market volatility meant that masters might drop anchor fully 
intending to fulfill their sailing instructions, only to have that hope dashed by prices and 
product availability. Owner William Hale’s papers contain a printed letter soliciting his 
business from the House of Jacques & Theodore Rocheteau & Company of Surinam, 
agents: 
...There is no market, more exposed to sudden changes, than that of 
Surinam, and it has often happened, that in the short space of a week, 
sometimes of one day, a voyage, that would have been the most 
advantageous, had the vessel arrived, but a little while before, proves 
ruinous, from her  arriving two or three days later; it would there, be 
essential, to keep up a correspondence, with some good character there, in 
order, to be advised, what may best suit  the market, at any particular 
time.
62
 
 
Like most advertisements, this one claims more than was likely to be delivered. While it 
was always advantageous to have a reliable correspondent at a destination market, if the 
market at Surinam really were that volatile—and it may well have been—it is doubtful 
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that a correspondent would be able to shield owners and masters from that, given the 
speed of communication versus the speed of the market’s ups and downs. 
 Perhaps demand for lumber was high on a certain island when you left with your 
load of lumber, but if you knew that, so did your competition. If you were the tenth 
schooner to drop anchor there with a load of lumber within the month, chances were you 
would either find your cargo unsalable there, or you would be selling at a loss. Logs and 
masters’ correspondence are full of just that misfortune. At that point, if you decided not 
to leave, you might decide to sell at a loss and procure a cargo to make up for it, but that 
would likely take weeks or even months. You would have to find a buyer, assess that 
buyer’s liquidity or credit, come to terms, do the paperwork, have the cargo transported 
to the vessel, load the cargo—which you could only do if you had unloaded your own 
cargo—and you could only do that with care or you risked capsize from instability. If the 
cargo needed to be fully unloaded, the crew was frequently put to work loading ballast, 
which was exhausting and time-consuming, and they might have to unload that ballast 
again once a new cargo was procured. It was worth finding cargo that could serve as 
ballast, actually. Recall poor Captain Blunt, sailing all over the islands trying and failing 
to find good prices for his cargo. In 1799, he wrote from Antigua, reporting that he had 
loaded 1,150 bushels of salt "@ 3/3. it will save buying Ballast at 1 Dollar per ton. & tho 
high will Answer as well as Rum..."
63
 If a cargo could serve as ballast, that was worth 
considering as part of its value.  
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 If all this were finally accomplished, you might run into trouble with the officials 
and have to waste even more time trying to sort out your clearance and port duties. The 
sad saga of Captain Blunt has gone from bad to worse. From New York, he writes of his 
latest misfortunes in Jamaica, from whence he has just landed after a 37-day passage: 
...to Crown the Voiage and Compleat my unhappyness, was refused a 
Clearance by the Mean and Dirty Colle[cto]r for having 6 Puncheons Saint 
Croix Rum on board ...and had been knowingly and fairly reported for 
Exportation, and Bonded in the penalty of £2000, at Port Antonia where I 
first Entered the Vessell, in Jamaica, I Immediately made my will, and set 
off for Kingston by land to wate on the Govonor , (thinking never to return 
from such a Journey in such a Country), 
     after daneing attendance on the Govonor 6 or 7 Days I obtained his 
Special order for my Immediate Clearance, and returned to Montego Bay 
on 3d Nov.r and saild on the 4th,           But previous to all this, Mr. Bolt 
of Saint Anna, who had promised me the Freight for New york as far as 
the Word of a Gentleman was binding Sold his Sugar and Coffee and 
Disapointed me there, --------------- after getting on the Coast of America 
finding the weather Cold and Windy, my riging & sails much shattered 
from beating through the Gulf. and being short handed, (John Brown 
having deserted at Montego Bay) 15 Chances out of 20 of Being Blown 
off to the West Indies again the Rivers being froze up and many 
Dificulties attending the procuring another Cargo at Portsmouth the low 
prices it bairs (Our Country Lumber) in the West Indies, the Wretched 
payments we meet with here, Rum the sacrifices we must have Made to 
fitt her away again Out of Rum, putting all those together and suming up 
the Whole, I judged it Most prudent for the Intrest of all to make this port, 
hopeing you will Not Censure the step, ---- here we can realize the Cash, 
and obtain a higher price than at any port in the United States, ----------- I 
Could have Chartered the Brig at Montego Bay. to bring a load of staves 
and heading from Wilmington or Savannah at 50 Dollars Freight payable 
in Rum, I would not accept it.
64
     
  
Blunt then proposes a venture to Wilmington, North Carolina. The owners confer 
amongst themselves and reject it firmly. It is apparent that by that point whatever 
confidence they had in Blunt’s business judgment was limited. Some of that may have 
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been that all his vacillations came through in print, in his copious outpourings to the 
owners. Most of it was surely that the owners had sat home through a series of 
miscalculations and consequent losses. 
 On 19 June 1794, the Brown brig Friendship left Providence for Bayonne, 
France. Her voyage log ends 18 July, for a 30-day crossing—unremarkable for a 
transatlantic passage in that direction. Master Henry Olney writes in the log that he has 
unloaded her full cargo of flour, rice and fish by 8 August. Three days later, they took on 
three boat loads of ballast—it was unsafe not to. By the 13th, they were working on 
repairs and maintenance. Those lasted the rest of that month and, apparently, all of 
September. On the last day of that month, Olney writes that they are just sitting there 
waiting to get paid for the cargo they unloaded two months ago, and for official 
permission to load brandy. That loading did not begin until just before Christmas. On 13 
February, they were waiting to load more. Same for 21 March. Same for 2 May. They 
finally sailed for St. Thomas on 26 May. They had been in Bayonne for over ten 
months.
65
 
j) shipbuilding agreements—This was the primary quarry of the archival research. If a 
merchant were to go to the expense of buying a new ship, built to his specifications, what 
would those specifications be? What would he dictate to the shipwright, and what would 
he leave to the shipwright’s discretion? 
 For the most part, shipbuilding agreements were formal documents, drawn up 
with fairly standardized language, though varying in detail, signed by all parties, and 
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witnessed. Detailed reference to such agreements in correspondence was rare, but we will 
consider an exception to that rule.  
 Some ship owners had direct experience running vessels at sea, and some did not. 
South Carolina magnate Henry Laurens was a planter and merchant with no direct 
maritime experience, and that is reflected in his order for a ship from England. Laurens 
does not specify much technical detail in his order:  
You know that I do not take upon me to be a good Judge of Shiping, 
therefore let it suffice that i say I would have a Ship of about 700 Barrels 
burthen as well built as possible, having an eye to profit & shall have no 
objection to a good Cabin & some little expence to decorate the whole.
66
  
 
Such a brief and vague commission turned out to be the exception, but even this tells us 
much about owners’ priorities. The first stipulation is capacity, and that is typical. 
Owners primarily saw ships as conveyances of their goods to market, and so the 
characteristic of a ship they were most concerned with was how much of what cargo she 
could carry. Given the owner’s perception of the size of the intended market, and the 
limits of his credit and capital, the more the better. Next, Laurens wants her as well-built 
as possible without costing him so much that he cannot make a profit with her. He is 
willing to provide a nice cabin for her master, which should help him entice someone 
worthy to serve in that capacity, and to make the ship look nice, which will reflect well 
upon her owner in foreign ports. We find in merchants’ papers that gilders and carvers 
are routinely on the payroll when a ship is ordered or refitted. Such aesthetics mattered 
enough to owners that they were willing to incur costs for them. It is clear, though, that 
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Laurens is perfectly willing to trust whatever builder he commissions—and, as it turns 
out, his agent in England, a captain he charges with overseeing her construction and 
delivery—entirely when it comes to matters of design and performance. 
 While researching colonial shipbuilding for his dissertation in 1968-1969, Joe 
Goldenberg found an unusual correspondence in the Coates and Reynell Papers at the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
67
 Spending a month looking for something similar in 
that repository made it clear how unusual it was. It is found in an exchange of letters 
between John Reynell in Philadelphia and Daniel Flexney in London. Reynell is acting as 
agent for Flexney, having a ship built for him by the successful Philadelphia builder 
Charles West. This was a typical role American merchants played for their better-
capitalized counterparts in England, especially before 1750. The first letter, from 
Flexney, dated 24 May 1740, is primarily concerned with the usual business of goods and 
prices, but two lines of it read: "...if thou hast no allready begun I desire thee build a 
vessel about L 120 Tun Square Sternd beleive to be a Brig will sail with least expence & 
lett her be finished with all possible expedition ..."
68
 A 120-ton brig was a typical mid-
sized Atlantic merchantman of this period, as we have noted, and Flexney tells us why. 
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 The book eventually resulting from that project, Shipbuilding in Colonial America (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1976), is still the only monograph on the subject. Goldenberg’s archival 
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 Coates and Reynell Family Papers, Box 2, Folder 8, HSP. The “thee” lets us know that Reynell and 
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 We find a follow-up reference in a letter of 19 June 1740, unusual because it 
describes the details of the ship and expresses a technical opinion on nautical matters, if 
only in passing. Reynell writes back to his client: 
Have agreed with Charles West to Build a Square Stern Vessel of 55 foot 
Keel, 21 foot Beam, 10 foot  Hold, 4 foot betwixt Decks, 12 foot Rake 3 
of which to be in the Keel and 9 [?] Inches [?] Dead Rising for thy 
[Custom?] to be lanch'd the 1st of May next. Could not get her done 
sooner by any good Carpenter besides am informed, it would be a great 
Disadvantage to the Vessel to plank her up in Winter am to give him £4 6 
June. Would not advise thee to make a brigantine of her their large Booms 
soon beat [?] 'em to Pieces, in my Opinion a Snow is a much Handyer 
vessel.
69
 
  
The specifications listed here do not just indicate size. The specification for “Rake” and 
for “Dead Rising” (deadrise) indicate aspects of the shape of the hull and thus the design 
of the vessel. It is not clear whether Reynell or West came up with those specifications. 
Reynell politely suggests to Flexney that he exercise patience, as building a vessel out of 
wood takes time to do properly and the construction schedule must take into account how 
the seasons of the year affect the exposed timbers. The final sentence here, advising 
Flexney to specify his new vessel as a snow rather than a brigantine, is one of only two 
such explicit opinions found in merchants’ papers in two months of work in five archives 
with extensive collections of such papers from our period. Obviously a fair number of 
owners—or at least builders and masters—had to believe that the snow offered 
advantages over the slightly simpler brig, but it would be worthwhile to explore, 
experimentally, what those advantages were. 
 On 6 July, Reynell includes the following in another letter:  
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As the vessel I had agreed with Mr. Charles West to build for thee is not 
yet put up have desired him to get a keel 3 foot longer, that it may do for 
Capt. Stephenson w[hi]ch he has promised he will, and certainly I think 21 
foot Breadth will be full narrow for that length.
70
 
 
We can read into this that Captain Stephenson, who, later letters reveal, Flexney uses as 
his man-in-the-yard and probably senior captain at sea, has voiced the opinion that the 
keel should be extended, and thus the vessel made longer for her breadth, and that 
Reynell believes that at that length, she needs to be 21 feet in the beam. Too narrow a 
ship will not stand up well to her canvas. Apparently there was some discussion of this—
perhaps Flexney was concerned that broadening her would increase his cost even more, 
which it probably did, but Flexney’s side of that correspondence was not located, if 
indeed it exists. The next letter mentioning this ship is dated 14 December, from Reynell:  
The new ship is raised, we are obliged to make her 21 foot Broad. 
Agreeable to my former agreement, or the Carpenter would not build her. I 
cannot help being of the Opinion that she will be abundantly the better for 
it, much more than the Cost of it will be. If she had been made narrower, it 
would have been a greater Disadvantage to thee, than [then] the Carpenter, 
and he was Unwilling to make her any Deeper then [than] our former 
agreement which I thought was full deep for warr Time. However we got 
over that.
71
 
 
Reynell and West were probably in cahoots here. We do not know how much of the 
insistence on changing the beam was Reynell’s and how much was West’s. We do know 
that a builder of West’s stature would have to uphold his own standards for the sake of 
his reputation. If he was convinced a narrower beam would make for a bad ship, it is 
completely believable that he would refuse to build her so. The builder’s eye was a 
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powerful guide, and still is in wooden shipbuilding. This passage also reminds us that, 
though Flexney may have had the money, his control over what was happening in the 
yard in Philadelphia was limited. He had to trust Reynell and West. That was another 
owner’s risk he incurred. 
 Formal shipbuilding agreements, as we might expect, tend to be more detailed the 
larger the vessel—and thus the more money and work being risked on her. These 
agreements are clearly as much about risk management as sailing instructions and 
insurance policies. A short one, for a small vessel, reads much like the excerpt from 
Reynell’s letter to Flexney in 1740. Twenty years after that, William Peirce contracted 
with Joshua Coffin and Samuel Hale, all of Newbury, Massachusetts, on 5 September for 
“The Hull of a Small Vessel Designed for a Sloop...," to be 40 feet on the keel, 6 feet 4 
inches in the hold, 17 feet in the beam, planked outside with 2 ½ inch thick sound white 
seasoned oak, with ceiling plank (inside lining) 1 ½ inches thick. Deck planks were to be 
2 ½ inches thick and free of sap and rot, timbered with good sound white oak, top 
timbers
72
 to be all white oak, short quarter deck "as Customary for such Vessels.." a long 
floor, but short floor timbers, about 7 inches deadrise. The builder was to find the spars—
mast, boom, bowsprit and gaff—and was to launch her, caulk the treenails, and find a 
rudder, tiller and windlass, grave her and stop the worm holes, and launch her before 8 
December. The owners were to contribute all iron nails, pitch, turpentine, and oakum. 
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The price per ton was three pounds one shilling and four pence, to be paid in West Indies 
good, corn and/or money.
73
 
 Again we see design details specified here, and we do not know whether those 
were specified by the builder or by the owners. Perhaps the owners, if they were 
knowledgeable and experienced, expressed design preferences to the builder, who 
translated those into quantifiable specifications. Note that there is no capacity specified 
here. That omission was more common for these small vessels than for ships. Any good 
builder, though, would have been able to translate a roughly specified capacity to the 
dimensions we see here. The rest of the agreement—the bulk of the agreement, and 
indeed of all these agreements—sets out details of scantlings and construction. Scantlings 
refers to specifications for sizes of timbers to be used—particularly thickness. More 
detailed agreements set out the fastening method and fasteners to be used—what the 
owners are about here is ensuring stoutness of construction. Mention of seasoning, and of 
timber quality—“free of sap and rot”—point to a consistent concern with quality of 
construction, promoting seaworthiness and durability. Seasoned white oak was generally 
the timber of choice for shipbuilding in the Atlantic, especially for structural members 
(frames). A specification for that is also a quality-assurance specification. The mention of 
a “short quarter deck, ‘as Customary for such Vessels’,” lets us know that all parties 
concerned herein know what sort of vessel they are talking about. Sloops of this size 
carried far more cargo, far more cheaply, than freight wagons on dirt roads in this period. 
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 Two months may seem a short time to build such a vessel, but this was not 
atypical. If the timber were already seasoned, it was possible. Correspondence and 
journals in shipwright’s papers indicate that delivering vessels on time was routine. 
Delivery dates were always specified in these agreements, as were payment terms. As we 
would expect, those terms usually acknowledged the necessity of at least partial payment 
in goods—preferably sugar products. For all but the smallest vessels, a specified rate per 
ton was common. 
 So the agreement touched briefly on the design of the vessel—the type, and rig, 
were pre-assumed—and the rest of it, like any business agreement, is concerned with 
protecting the interests of all parties—of risk mitigation. We have explored a range of 
risks assumed by merchant owners, and the strategies they employed to mitigate those 
risks. The other party to such an agreement as this—the shipwright—had his own money 
and labor to venture, and his own risks to mitigate. A better understanding of merchant 
ships demands an understanding of the people who actually built them, and these building 
agreements provide a useful place to start, so we will not leave them just yet. How ship 
design and construction worked in this world, though, merits its own chapters. 
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Chapter Four: Ships and Ship Builders 
 
On 6 June, 1661, John Browne of Jersey, on behalf of himself and two other merchants, 
signed a building agreement with shipwright William Stevens of Gloucester, 
Massachusetts, for  
one new shipp of sixty eight foot long by the keele & twenty three foot 
broad from out side to out side & nine foot & half in hold under the 
beame, with two decks, fore Castle, quarter deck & round house; the decks 
from the mainmast to the forecastle to be five foot high, with a fall at the 
fore Castle fifteen inches & a raise at the mainmast to the quarter deck of 
six inches, the great cabbin to be six foot high, and the said Stevens is to 
find timber & plank, trunnells, pitch & tarr & ocum [oakum] & to finish 
the hull & lanch the said vessell by the last of July one thousand six 
hundred sixty two and the said Mr. Browne & Company is to find all iron 
work, carved work & joyners in time convenient soe that the work be not 
hindered for want thereof – In Consideration whereof the said John 
Browne in the behalf of him self & company doth covenant & grant to & 
with the sd Wm Stevens to pay or cause to be paid to the sd Stevens or his 
assigns the just sum of three pounds five shillings for every tunn of the 
said shipps burthen in such kind and maner as followeth … dated the sixth 
day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred sixty one …1 
 
Only 40 years after the first settlement in New England, the shipping industry there was 
already viable, and competition between shipwrights there and their counterparts in the 
old country would only grow over time.  
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“sixty eight foot long by the keele & twenty three foot broad…” 
The quickest way to get a sense of where a vessel sits on the tub-to-greyhound continuum 
is to calculate her length-to-beam ratio.
2
 The broader she is for her length—the lower the 
ratio—the closer to round she is. A perfect square would have a ratio of 1. The narrower 
she is for her length, the sleeker she is. Narrow beam, though, works against both 
capacity and initial stability,
3
 so we find merchant ships of the entire period staying 
within a fairly narrow range—roughly 2.5 to high 3s. The ship ordered by Browne is to 
have a length-to-beam ratio of 3.23. The ship Reynell would have Charles West build for 
Daniel Flexney in 1740 was to have a ratio of 2.76. This helps give the lie to the common 
assumption that 17
th
-century ships were much tubbier than their descendents. Much of 
that impression, especially for later 17
th
-century ships, is imparted visually by 
tumblehome and high castling.  
Digging into design and construction I: the case of tumblehome 
Tumblehome is the curving-inward of the topsides toward the rail, as opposed to the 
topsides rising straight up or flaring out. It tended to be much more pronounced in the 
17
th
 century than in the 18
th
.
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 It is important to use the same length measurements in comparisons. Keel length, rather than length 
overall, is the usual length measurement in a contract such as this. 
 
3
 Other factors, though, can increase ultimate stability vis-à-vis a beamy vessel. 
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Figure 11 Tumblehome (on left). 
 
Tumblehome, like any other aspect of design, has its pros and cons. The pros and cons 
that matter most to us as historians are those that mattered to the people who designed 
and used these ships. While it is true that they may have perceived pros and cons that did 
not actually exist, as with their medical practices, it is just as important for us to learn 
about those to understand the cultural and technological milieu of ship design. Having 
said that, none of the evidence of any type gathered for this project points clearly to a 
misapprehension of hydrodynamic or aerodynamic principles applied to ships actually 
built.
4
 Delving into a discussion of that aspect of design allows us to consider a range of 
design and construction criteria. First, we always have to remember that any aspect of 
design or construction will manifest influences other than “pure” hydrodynamics or 
aerodynamics. A ship is not a theoretical construct. It is a material construct manifesting 
a set of competing imperatives and thus compromises. Consider this excerpt from 
Captain John Smith’s Sea-man’s Grammar, one of our most relied-upon published 
primary sources for 17
th
-century nautical know-how. Note that Smith uses the term 
“howsing” to mean what we call tumblehome. 
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The howsing in of a Ship is when she is past the breadth of her bearing she 
is brought in narrow to her upper works [her topsides narrow above the 
point of maximum beam]: it is certain this makes her wholsome in the Sea 
without rowling [rolling], because the weight of her Ordnance doth 
counterpoise her breadth under water, but it is not so good in a Man of 
War; because it taketh away a great deal of her room, nor will her Tacks 
ever so well come aboard as if she were laid out aloft, and not flaring, 
which is when she is a little Howsing in, near the water, and then the 
upper work doth hang over again, and is laid out broader aloft, this makes 
a Ship more roomy aloft for men to use their arms in, but Sir Walter 
Rawleigh's proportion, which is to be proportionably wrought to her other 
work is the best, because the counterpoise on each side doth make her 
swim perpendicular or straight, and consequently steady, which is the 
best.
5
 
 
One does not need the ability to analyze these remarks as a naval architect might to glean 
some insight from them. Note that much of what Smith lays out here is not about 
maximizing vessel performance as a watercraft, but about carrying ordnance, interior 
accommodation, and ease of working and defending the vessel. To make the point most 
clearly that every ship is the product of compromises, we can reduce that to its absurd 
extreme. Every ship is, first and foremost, a compromise between the ideal attributes of a 
watercraft on the one hand and the ideal attributes of a carrying vessel on the other. The 
ideal watercraft, one might argue, is a racing catamaran or trimaran—basically knifelike 
foils in the water with enough air in them to be buoyant, bridged together to provide 
lateral stability, or resistance to heeling forces, with giant aerodynamically optimized 
sails providing so much power that these craft plane most of the time. These are the only 
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vessels that have ever beaten the sailing records of the 19
th
 century clipper ships, but they 
will barely carry a handful of miserable crew. The ideal cargo carrier, on the other hand, 
would be of a shape that maximized the amount of volume for a given length, width, and 
depth. That shape is a rectangular box, and a box does not move through the water very 
well. So there is the fundamental compromise of the design of every cargo ship ever—
how to make a reasonably hydrodynamic box.
6
  
 As the ship heels, or leans laterally in response to the pressure of wind on the sails 
and waves on the hull, tumblehome will not offer as much resistance to the water as 
straight or flared sides would. In that sense, does tumblehome sacrifice some stability? 
English maritime historian Richard Barker argued that “at normal angles of heel” it did 
not, compared to flared topsides.
7
 Naval architect and marine engineer Dan Walker is 
unequivocal that it does.
8
 Is “normal angles of heel” the key to that contradiction? It 
stands to reason that, once the vessel has rolled past her maximum beam, her inward-
sloping topside will not offer as much resistance to further immersion as a straight or 
flared topside. On the other hand, we have “Walton’s observation that tumblehome 
delays the immersion of the deck edge at large angles of heel…but the other side of the 
coin is that righting moments are reduced, and the hull may roll further.”9 
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 Tumblehome could bring heavy guns closer to the centerline. Did that contribute 
to stability? Ship archaeologist Jon Adams says it is a given that it did not, referring to it 
as a well-known fallacy, at least by the 18
th
 century. He does not know whether it was 
known as such earlier. He points out, though, that tumblehome did have an “indirect 
benefit, as by lightening the deck structures above the waterline it lowered the centre of 
gravity and this may have been part of the thinking behind reducing castling.”10 An 
assumption that such a universal aspect of ship design for such a long time—two 
centuries—was primarily due to a “fallacy” must be rejected, even if some—like John 
Smith—subscribed to that fallacy at some time. A discussion in The Mariner’s Mirror 
emphasizes several benefits of tumblehome, in addition to Adams’: 
 the inward-sloping topsides made it easier and safer to come alongside the vessel 
for boarding or loading and unloading, especially if she were rolling at all;  
 the shrouds and backstays—the standing rigging holding up the masts, attached at 
the sides and stern of the vessel and to the masts—could be tensioned in a more 
direct line;  
 it was easier for the shipwright to find, and pay for, shorter deck beams; 
 it would make it much easier to careen the ship;11 
 it would reduce wave stress on the hull and decks compared to flared topsides.12 
 
To all this we must add the observation that small open boats tend to have flared topsides, 
especially in the bow, and this helps keep them dry inside. It also increases buoyancy as 
the flare resists immersion. Open boats, though, do not have decks, and it would seem 
from the foregoing that tumblehome’s advantages have much to do with decks—keeping 
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them strong, keeping them light, and keeping them dry. Small boats do not weigh 
much—neither do their structural members, nor their cargo.  
 The comparisons we have been making are between sides tumbled-home and 
flared sides. What about straight sides, which have been the norm since the 19
th
 century, 
when tumblehome in wooden ships was reduced to just a slight vestige of what it had 
been? Straight sides are universal now, but we build in steel, so no material or structural 
considerations would have carried forward into our time. 
 We could have a number of similar discussions, one about each aspect of design 
and construction—bluff bows, square sterns, deadrise, framing patterns—and none of 
those issues are ‘put to bed’ in maritime scholarship. It is striking, in a way, that we 
should still be discussing, and wondering, and disagreeing about a basic design and 
construction aspect of 300- to 400-year-old ships. It should be clear, though, from this 
discussion of tumblehome that these issues are woven into their context in several 
dimensions. It seems as though, as soon as something makes sense and we think we can 
stake a claim to an opinion, something else comes up to contradict it. It feels akin to 
pulling a thread. 
 That does not mean we should throw up our hands. No historical subject matter 
lends itself to easy explanation. We have to weigh all the evidence and come to tentative 
conclusions based on where it seems the aggregate of the evidence is pointing—and 
rarely if ever will that evidence point to one factor to the exclusion of all others as 
explanatory. We are not done with the question of tumblehome, but if we are asked 
whether it is this factor, or that factor, or this other factor, that explains it, our first answer 
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should probably be ‘yes,’ and after that we can set about trying to rank the factors in 
order of importance. That is what doing history so frequently looks like. Explaining 
tumblehome, in that sense, may well look like explaining the fall of the Roman Empire. 
Digging into design and construction II: Castles in the sea 
The other distinctive design characteristic that, as a rough rule of thumb, makes earlier 
ships easy to distinguish from later ones is their higher castles—especially stern castles. 
The historical record does allow us to trace a fairly linear devolution of these from 
medieval ships through galleons and into later 17
th
-century vessels. The castles tend to 
lower until, by the mid-18
th
 century, they are gone. It is worth pointing out that later 17
th
-
century ships—including, in all likelihood, the one ordered by Browne and his partners in 
1661—did not look like Mayflower II, Susan Constant, Sea Venture, and the other small 
English galleons of the early exploration and settlement period.
13
 They had much lower 
stern castles and their forecastles did not protrude much above the waist—the lowest 
upper deck, amidships. Illustrations of merchant ships from the 17
th
 century are 
uncommon. We have the detailed, expert sketches of the Van de Veldes, father and son, 
in the major maritime museums of the UK and the Netherlands, and that is a singular, 
priceless resource. We also have the drawings made by mariners, whether sketches or 
graffiti on walls and stones. Notable among those is the work of Edward Barlow, who 
started his career afloat as a seaman and ended it as a master. Barlow’s journal was 
published, and that is also a singular resource. Barlow made a point of drawing every 
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ship he served on, as well as harbors and islands and other features he knew would be 
useful to other mariners. On the following page is Barlow’s drawing of a ship called 
Mayflower, launched in 1676, of 150 tons and 14 guns, Barlow writes, and “a very pretty 
ship.” He sailed on her on a voyage carrying corn from England to Tenerife. This would 
have been an ordinary Atlantic merchant ship of the time.
14
 The ship ordered from 
Stevens by Browne would likely have closely resembled this one, though it is unlikely 
that the fancywork on the stern would have been quite so impressive on a New England-
built ship. 
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Figure 12 Ship Mayflower by Edward Barlow.15 
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 Conventional wisdom has it that later castles were vestiges of the fighting 
platforms that gave taller ships an edge in combat when ship-to-ship fighting was less 
about cannon volleys and more about small-arms fire at close range, boarding, and hand-
to-hand combat. As that situation reversed itself, there was selective pressure to reduce 
castling, due to its weight, cost, and windage. As with any de-escalating arms race, 
though, letting this guard down took time and caution. The evidence suggests that, as far 
as the naval aspect of this is concerned, the conventional wisdom is correct. Here is as 
good an example as any of why such a study as this is worthwhile. We have a reasonable 
explanation for this gradual change, including why it was so gradual, supported by 
evidence. Why not just put it to rest?  
 We just came up with the answer to that question in the discussion of 
tumblehome—because there is always more than one factor in play. Selective pressures 
to retain or discard a technological characteristic are multiplex, not simplex. So even if 
we accept that the decrease in castling was a de-escalating arms race, which the evidence 
suggests we should, we should also assume that other pressures existed and that if we are 
to understand this design aspect, we need to find those. We will re-visit the issue later in 
this chapter, and in Chapter Six, when we turn our attention to analyzing experiences 
with replica ships. Meanwhile, we should return to William Stevens’ yard, and to 
shipbuilding. 
“…the said Stevens is to find timber & plank…” 
Wood does not have to be made. It grows—it is there for the taking. Just about anywhere 
Europeans decided they wanted to settle in the Americas, they found trees. In fact, they 
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found trees we do not find now—much older, taller, bigger ones than we allow to grow. 
When the Sea Venture wrecked on the Bermuda reefs in 1609, the would-be Virginia 
colonists waded ashore, found trees and built themselves two new ships out of them. 
Wood was readily available. 
 The skills for working it were also readily available. Shipwrights in Europe had 
been teaching new shipwrights how to build wooden ships for hundreds if not thousands 
of years. Specific techniques varied widely and evolved, but basic concepts of how to put 
a seaworthy vessel together out of a multitude of specially selected or specially cut 
timbers were proven.
16
 
 Wood had no rival as a shipbuilding material in the western world in this period—
and long before, and for a short time after. If we understand the realities of wood as a 
material, and as a commodity, then we understand something key.
17
 That requires 
understanding the limitations as well as the advantages of wood—a natural resource that, 
like all other natural resources, would become problematic by the end of this period, 
given the inexhaustibly extractive and exploitative nature of western economic growth. 
 Wood’s most obvious suitability for shipbuilding, next to its availability, is its 
buoyancy. It floats, unless it is completely waterlogged—hence the term. While it is true 
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that the buoyancy of a ship is created by the water it displaces and the air within it, the 
fact that shipwrights and mariners appreciated the buoyancy of wood—and that some 
drastically over-estimated its importance—is borne out by the not-uncommon suspicion 
of iron ships in their early days. 
 A more important characteristic of wood as a building material for watercraft is 
its outstanding strength-to-weight ratio. For smaller craft, only the latest, best, and most 
expensive composites can rival wood in that regard. Even high-quality fiberglass hulls 
cannot approach wood’s strength-to-weight ratio.18 
 Wood can be worked with hand tools and low-heat fire—forced induction not 
required. Its relative softness compared to stone and metal means it can be shaped as 
desired by human muscle power. A handful of adult humans can build a good-sized 
wooden ship, given the time. With no need for foundries, heavy machinery, or other 
sophisticated physical plant, builders of ordinary-sized wooden ships can work outdoors, 
with hand tools, just about anywhere with land clear enough for the ship, next to 
navigable water.
19
  
 Some trees contain natural bends and curves from which compass timbers can be 
derived—curved or bent structural pieces. The trend over our period was for this 
characteristic to move from being a great advantage to being a great problem, as adequate 
sources of compass timber were used up faster than new trees could grow. In 1661 in 
Massachusetts, we can assume William Stevens would be able to go out in the woods and 
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find specific trees with particular branch-fork patterns for specific structural members. In 
fact, he had probably identified and marked such trees already—perhaps years earlier. A 
century later, that would not be as easy around the shipbuilding centers of New England 
and the Delaware Valley. In England, of course, it had become difficult much earlier—
except in the forest reserves kept by the Crown for naval use. In such timber-growing 
repositories, trees whose branches spread such as to provide compass timber were 
protected for that reason.
20
 
 Shipwrights, then, had to have an eye for the right tree for the right job. When the 
right trees grew scarcer, he had to adapt his design and construction techniques to fit the 
available materials—or move. Usually, this meant figuring out a way to make up a 
structural piece by joining together smaller pieces, instead of using one ideally shaped 
compass timber. The archaeological record shows us clear evidence of that.
21
 Whether it 
was fashioning composite pieces where one would have been preferable, or scarfing 
together a long structural member out of multiple pieces because no single timbers of 
sufficient length were available, shipwrights had to consider the inherent weaknesses in 
joints, and in some cases reinforce the structure by improvising a new technique. They 
could not use the same techniques to build ships with different materials, and they were 
frequently not in control of exactly what materials were available to them.
22
 They had to 
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adapt. The six wrecks from our period found in American waters that Kellie VanHorn 
analyzed showed more variance than consistency in how they were executed. VanHorn 
found no rule that could explain how all of them were designed and constructed.
23
 Six 
vessels is a small data sample, as VanHorn points out, but it adds to and reinforces other 
evidence we have pointing toward the pressures to adapt and responses to those pressures 
that indeed show adaptability and adaptation. 
  Even if the timber available was ideal, wood does have inherent drawbacks, like 
any material, and those drawbacks did much to determine the reality of building and 
operating a ship in our period. First, of course, wood rots. Fungi and bacteria eat it. All 
they need is water and oxygen, and they can irreversibly compromise the structural 
integrity of a large timber in a matter of months. The war against rot was constant. In his 
treatise of 1711, William Sutherland indicated that the old method of placing floors and 
lower futtocks—the lowest and next-lowest pieces of a ship’s frame—next to each other 
had been shown to cause rot in the timbers, so he recommended leaving some space 
between them.
24
 More than a century later, no less a personage than Michael Faraday 
delivered a lecture to the Royal Institution in which he announced success in his 
experiments with mercuric chloride—“corrosive sublimate”—in preventing rot even in 
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timbers subjected to a completely anaerobic environment.
25
 The Admiralty conducted 
trials of Faraday’s method for five years, declaring it a success in 1833.26 This ship-rot 
business was an important problem indeed. For ships operating in temperate waters, so 
was the teredo worm—actually a mollusk that bores into any unprotected submerged 
wood. Hence all the attention paid to paying and sheathing a ship’s bottom.27  
 Decay always won in the end. All ship owners could hope for was to stave it off 
until the vessel was no longer fit for the service the owners had her in. It was common for 
owners to sell vessels while they were still fit for their originally intended service, and 
still worth some money, before expensive major repairs became necessary. Such was the 
case with the George & Mary and the Two Catharines. If a ship survived all the other 
dangers she was constantly exposed to, eventually she would be rotten enough that she 
would be condemned and broken up, or abandoned in some out-of-the-way cove or river 
bend.  
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 Rot was not the only inherent drawback of wood that worked against the 
longevity of the ship. So much of the shipwright’s skill was focused on making the 
strongest and most watertight joints possible in a vessel made up of hundreds if not 
thousands of pieces of wood, each of which was at least somewhat flexible. Such a 
structure, when put in service, would then be subject to constant stress, flexing it and 
straining it in three dimensions. Water could potentially enter the hull in a thousand 
different places.
28
  
“…trunnells, pitch & tarr & ocum…” 
 This is why it was so advantageous to the shipwright to have the longest 
timbers—and thus the oldest, tallest trees—possible, and to have compass timbers in the 
shapes they needed. The fewer joints and holes there were the better. Naturally curved 
timbers also helped stave off rot. Cutting curved pieces out of straight timbers 
unavoidably exposed cross-grain and left sapwood in the ends of timbers, inviting rot, as 
the heartwood is the most rot-resistant, and wood takes in moisture through the end-grain 
where its cells are cut across.
29
 Hence we find the stipulation in the 1760 Peirce building 
contract that “Deck pl.ank … be 2 1/2 in thick and free of sap and rot…”30 
 “Trunnells” is a corruption of “tree nails”—thick round wooden pegs, pounded 
into exactly sized holes, to join two pieces. Shipwrights used trunnells along with iron 
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bolts and nails for different fastening purposes. They were labor-intensive to make and 
use, but they could not corrode as iron did nor did they work themselves loose under 
stress as easily. They were used throughout the modern age of wooden ships. 
 Pitch and tar were pine products, and thus major export commodities for British 
America, especially the Carolinas. They were the most readily available and widely used 
products for waterproofing. Ships’ bottoms were “payed” with pitch, and hemp rigging 
was tarred to keep water out of it and stave off rot. Sailors were called tars because they 
always had the stuff on them and on their clothes. It was unavoidable.  
 Oakum is loose fiber, twisted into strands, pounded into the seams between the 
planks of a ship’s hull before caulking. Sailors made oakum out of old rope that was no 
longer fit for rigging service. It was a time-consuming but necessary menial task to which 
the crew was frequently put when there was nothing else pressing to do. Recall the brig 
Friendship from Chapter Three, languishing in Bayonne for ten months. Capt. Olney 
records in his log several times that he has the crew picking oakum.
31
 
 In the Stevens agreement, Stevens is to procure the trunnells, pitch, tar, and 
oakum, but which party was responsible for securing which materials varied. Regardless, 
Stevens would be responsible either for using those products skillfully himself, or 
subcontracting with other tradesmen to do it. Ship caulking was a skilled trade in itself. 
Full-time caulkers could be found in the major shipbuilding centers throughout this 
world, then and later. 
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 All this work may seem menial and archaic—perhaps un-technological—but it 
was central to the employment of this technology. All wooden ships leaked, but if a ship 
leaked badly enough, she could ruin her cargo or, worse, sink. Pumps were human-
powered. The stories of crews working the pumps around the clock to save a damaged 
ship are testaments to human endurance, but human endurance has limits. So the 
shipwright could not pay too much attention to jointing, fastening, strengthening, and 
sealing. He had no choice but to find new solutions to those challenges as his available 
materials changed.  
 The other inherent weakness of the wooden ship, besides her vulnerability to rot 
and leaking, was structural rigidity—particularly, longitudinal structural rigidity. With so 
many joints and so many pieces, fashioning an interlocking structure that would hold its 
shape under the stresses of motion in a seaway over a period of years was quite a 
challenge. Failure to maintain longitudinal rigidity resulted in one of two conditions, both 
of which were seriously detrimental to the ship’s hydrodynamic performance, let alone 
her integrity. The first was sagging, in which the middle section of the ship drooped 
relative to her ends. The second was hogging, in which the ends drooped relative to the 
middle. William Hutchinson, in his well-known treatise, recounts his first job as a 
supervising shipwright, building a merchantman for the Jamaica trade, 90 feet on the 
keel. He built her on concave stocks as a prophylaxis against hogging, and recommended 
building all vessels on stocks with a concavity of two inches for every 30 feet of length.
32
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The thought was that, as the ship settled with age and use, her originally slightly convex 
keel would become horizontal, not concave. There is a rough analogy to the modern 
flatbed trailer, built with a curve so that it will not sag under load. Hutchinson did not 
believe that a slightly convex keel was detrimental to performance.
33
 
 In 1737, Blaise Ollivier was sent by the French government to observe 
shipbuilding in the naval dockyards of England and Holland. His comments on hogging 
in English vs. French ships point out the factors the shipwright had to consider in 
combating this problem: 
The English claim that their ships hog less readily than do ours, and that is 
true. Many causes contribute to delay this hogging in the English ships. 
1st, the treenails which fasten the planking and the ceiling to the frames 
provide a more solid fastening than do our nails. 2nd, the bow and the 
stern of the English ships weight proportionately less than those of our 
ships, since the riders forward and aft have neither lower nor upper 
futtocks; and since the counter and the stern-galleries extend less beyond 
the perpendicular of the sternpost, and since the head is burdened with a 
bowsprit which is less thick and with rigging which is less weighty than is 
the case with our ships, 3rd the English ships are finished and caulked up 
to the waist when they are launched, whereas our ships are caulked but as 
far as the load waterline or at most to the middle deck ports. ... they are 
never lightened of all their ballast as are ours each time they are graved.
34
 
 
So, of all the other considerations the shipwright had to keep in mind when deciding just 
how to approach all the elements of design and construction Ollivier mentions, he also 
had to consider longitudinal rigidity. Hogging was closely connected to the bearing of 
armament. As the 17
th
 century went on, there was a trend in English construction to 
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increase displacement in the ends as a countermeasure.
35
 That means broader, not 
sharper, bows and sterns. The structural problems of wooden construction have much to 
do with why we would never see the knife-like prows of modern steel warships on 
vessels in our period. 
From the cradle to the graveyard: longevity 
With all the skill and care and time, proper materials, proven techniques and clever 
improvisation going into a ship, how long would she last before the entropy ruling all of 
nature claimed her, and she was quietly towed to the breaker’s yard or to that out-of-the-
way cove or river bend and left there. 
 The longevity of merchant ships in our period has been a matter of some 
discussion. Some of that discussion is centered on the issue of British-built vs. American-
built ships. For a long time, British merchants held on to the opinion that the latter were 
almost always inferior—that they might have been cheaper, but that you got what you 
paid for. Lord Sheffield, who consistently and publicly decried American competition 
with home-based shipping and shipbuilding, claimed American ships would only last five 
or six years, but John McCusker says this was almost surely an exaggeration, and that the 
real average was probably more like ten.
36
 It is clear that some amount of irrational 
conservatism—mixed with the general British arrogance toward the colonies and the 
colonials—is responsible for this attitude. In 1799, Lloyd’s of London, however, rated 
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southern-American-built ships their A-1 rating at the time—twelve years.37 So at least in 
their probably dispassionate judgment, these were fine vessels, and we should not paint 
British prejudice with too broad a brush. Southern live oak had managed to gain 
recognition for its outstanding combination of rot-resistance and strength by that point, 
obviously. It had taken time, though, and the southern shipbuilding industry remained 
small.
38
 Live oak is too hard to be worked easily with hand tools, once it has seasoned. In 
the South, the wood could be worked green, but by the time it could be transported to 
New England, it would have hardened. It would be the 19
th
 century before New England 
yards, with their new industrial tools, could make full use of Southern live oak in their 
yards.
39
  
 Marshall Smelser and William Davisson complicate the matter, writing in the 
same year as McCusker. Examining New York Navy Office records from 1715 to 1764, 
they found that the average age of the ships listed there was 4.7 years, and that only 9.4% 
were over ten years old. What was most striking, though, is that the British-built ships 
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tended to be twice as old as those built in America. They attribute this to construction 
methods—thus casting an aspersion on British-American shipwrights.40  
 Christopher French followed up on this in 1991, and his findings remind us of the 
inherent limitations of data from one source—a linchpin of most scholarly disagreements 
on shipping productivity over the past 50 years. French looked at ships trading between 
London and Virginia or Jamaica, and says that, while their age was always relatively low, 
it was “also noticeably higher than the mean age of vessels trading between London and 
New York.” The former averaged 7.2-7.7 years.41 French, though, supports the Smelser-
Davisson conclusion that British-built ships lasted about twice as long, and he also 
attributes that to construction methods. He points out that the British-built ships were 
bigger, and that bigger ships were more expensive to build—thus it was more compelling 
to build them to last—especially since bigger ships were also likely to be more profitable 
if properly employed.
42
  
 The listed age of a ship in a document, though, is not the same thing as how long 
she lasted. These studies tell us that, on these routes at these times, there were more old 
British-built ships than old American ones. That does support their conclusions, to be 
sure, but it does not prove that British-American building methods resulted in lower 
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durability. Were some of these ships pulled off these routes after a time and employed in 
other service? Were ships on other routes, or at other times, older or younger, on 
average? Recall too that, in her small data sample of wrecks found on this side of the 
Atlantic, VanHorn found evidence for economizing on timber in the British-built, not 
American-built, vessels. Those were smaller vessels, though, than those considered by 
Smelser, Davisson and French.  
 Merchants’ and shipbuilders’ papers provide additional information. When 
Brown, Benson & Ives purchased the brigantine Maria in 1799, she was six years old.
43
 
The sloop Success was seven years old when considered for purchase by Brown and 
Starbuck.
44
 That same year, 1777, they either bought or thought about buying the sloop 
Bonetta, estimating her age at eleven.
45
 The Crowninshield ship America was in that 
family’s service in 1796, and sold by them in 1803 after John Crowninshield’s miserable 
transatlantic crossing to Bordeaux, after which indications are she was to continue in 
Atlantic service.
46
 The Derby ship Astrea, already in West Indies service in 1784, was 
deemed fit enough for a voyage to the Far East in 1789-90.
47
 The Browns’ papers first 
mention their brig Harmony in 1774-1775.
48
 Further records indicate she was still in their 
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service in 1794.
49
 There is no sense in performing statistical calculations on such a small 
sampling. What it can tell us is that these American-built ships in service to these 
merchants were between six and twenty years old. 
 A correspondent to the British Society for the Improvement of Naval Architecture 
pointed out the importance of environment to this issue when he wrote, in 1791, that of 
two identical ships, one on station in a hot climate would be useless in 12 years, while 
one on station in a cold climate might last 30 or even 40 years. He cited British colliers as 
an example of the latter.
50
  
 Whether American and British shipwrightry differed in such a way as to make 
American-built ships less durable is a question for which we need much more 
archaeological evidence to answer, though more studies along the same lines as 
Smelser’s and Davisson’s and French’s would help too. VanHorn’s evidence suggests 
that, if so, it is unlikely to be attributable to disparities in know-how, as she found no 
“clear distinction between regions of build or even between the two nationalities.” 
Variations “appeared to relate more to vessel type or perhaps the individual practices of 
shipwrights than location of construction.”51 
 Analogous to the evolution of the reputation of the Japanese automobile industry 
from the 1970s to the present is the likely possibility that American-built vessels were 
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probably not as well-built overall as their Thames-built counterparts at first, and that that 
gap closed over time, leaving the reputation to play catch-up, as opinions harden once 
formed and passed down. Where that analogy breaks down is that certainly by 2000 the 
average American car buyer had a very positive impression of the quality of Japanese 
cars. None of the evidence considered here indicates that British ship buyers ever felt the 
same way about American-built ships. We cannot trust the cultural history here—the 
clear record of prejudice—to tell us anything conclusive about the actual quality of the 
built product. To better understand the craft of the shipwright, and the relationship 
between that craft and the market for its products, we should investigate this issue further, 
being very careful about generalizing, as VanHorn is right to highlight “the individual 
practices of shipwrights.” What do we know about those “individual practices”? 
The mysterious art: unlocking the shipwright’s secrets 
To an outsider, the shipwright’s craft would have seemed a mysterious art based on 
secrets. The trade of the shipwright was an artisanal craft with an advanced skill set, and 
like every other such craft in the European world, it had organized and structured itself 
according to the guild system in the Middle Ages. Any craft guild had two main 
purposes: 1) to protect the interests of its members, especially their trade secrets; and 2) 
to control the standards for the craft; and 3) who would be admitted to practice the trade. 
According to “Records of the Worshipful Company of Shipwrights” of London, 
published in 1939 by the Company’s archivist, the first records of the London 
shipwright’s guild appear in 1387-1388 under Richard II. The first company Ordinances 
appear in 1428, and punitive Ordinances—formal power to enforce craft standards—were 
160 
 
granted in 1483.
52
 So by the time Browne and his partners ordered a ship from William 
Stevens of Gloucester, the organized and regulated craft of shipbuilding would have been 
considered an ancient one in the English-speaking world.  
 This ancient craft does seem to present to us some inscrutable arcania—if for no 
other reason than by leaving so much for us to guess at. Returning to the Browne-Stevens 
agreement, we can ask how, with only these barest of specifications, did the parties 
involved know how to actually build this ship—how to shape her hull, where to put her 
masts, how tall they should be, how broad her yards should be, how much camber to her 
decks, and on and on? Even if we have a shipbuilding agreement that specifies every 
dimension and detail necessary for us to reconstruct the vessel—and a few do come close 
to that—how can we know why those dimensions and details were selected as opposed to 
others?  
 From the shipbuilding agreements alone, we cannot. We will have to turn to other 
sources. First, though, we need to understand the craft of the shipwright—and to do that, 
understand the shipwright himself. 
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Artisanal craft 
Shipwrights in our period were highly trained but usually poorly educated. They learned 
what they needed to know in the shipyard, not in the classroom. They did not need formal 
mathematical or mechanical training.
53
 
 Vernacular craft is manufacturing for one’s own use. In our period—and, for the 
most part, in our own time as well—vernacular craft is also artisanal craft, an approach to 
manufacturing that is best understood—by a modern reader—by contrasting it to mass 
production in the factory system, overseen by formally trained engineers and technicians. 
To understand vernacular and artisanal craft, we need the insights of the discipline of 
folklore, but we need to import those insights without also importing romanticism. 
 Folklore, as an academic discipline, grew out of the 1960s counter-culture, as a 
reaction to modernity—a modernity its devotees found as distasteful and discouraging as 
the 19
th
 century Romantics found theirs.
54
 Both movements found modernity 
dehumanizing. The individual and society were under assault by corporatism, 
automation, mechanization, technological control, and ephemeral mass popular “culture” 
that was little more than commercial advertising. By studying, resuscitating, and 
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perpetuating cultural traditions, both movements sought to push back the effects of 
modernity on the human psyche. It is not surprising, then, that in addition to folktales, 
folksongs, and traditions of dress and ritual, folklorists began to pay close attention to 
vernacular and artisanal craft. Here was the way people made things before Henry Ford—
before factory magnates reduced work to repetitive mundane tasks, before the money-
man de-skilled the craftsman, sentencing him to wage slavery. The potential intellectual 
pitfall in studying artisanal craft should now be clear. If the modern factory system is 
“bad,” then artisanal craft must be “better.” As always, such value judgments will not aid 
our understanding of either in its proper historical context.
55
 They can predispose us to 
color our perception of the shipwright and his assistants in the shipyard. Folklore is now a 
mature discipline and such a taint is not ubiquitous in its scholarship—but it is present. 
 Having pointed out the danger and its origins in the very roots of the discipline, 
we can apply what folklore and its related academic enterprises have to tell us about 
artisanal craft to understanding what was behind shipbuilding agreements and 
shipbuilders’ business records.56 Here is where folklore meets up with the history of 
technology. Folklore does not tend to use the word “technology,” and histories of 
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technology do not tend to include the word “folklore.” Understanding how artisanal craft 
works, though, is necessary for understanding the history of technology. Who develops 
technology and why? How is technology transmitted? When and why is technology 
conservative, and when and why does it change rapidly? What is the relationship between 
a society and its technology? These are the important questions in the history of 
technology, and the study of artisanal craft has much to contribute to answering them.  
 Recall the expression “jack-of-all-trades,” and the less-often-repeated follow-up 
to it, “and master of none.” The combined expression is pejorative, especially in the 
context of a society in which skilled trades operated within the craft guild system. We, 
though, tend to drop the second part and use the first part as a compliment, describing 
someone versatile and handy—which, in our world of hyper-specialization, is an 
uncommon and useful person. In a small community—like any town in 17th or 18th-
century British America—people had to be adaptable to make a living. Specialization 
was a luxury few could afford, because there was usually not enough of a market for that 
specialty to sustain full-time employment in it, and with currency scarce, ordinary people 
could not afford to pay for services as easily as we can. Less insularity from the climate 
reinforced the need for flexibility. Farm work is seasonal in the temperate zone, and most 
working people in our period outside the few cities were engaged in agriculture at least 
some of the time. Fish run at certain times of the year. Wood should be harvested at 
certain times and not others. We know that much commercial sailing was accomplished 
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with seasonal or short-term labor,
57
 and the same was true for boat- and shipbuilding. We 
do not need to read archival documents or history books to know how this worked. We 
can do studies like David Taylor’s of boatbuilding in Newfoundland in the late 1970s—
or just read them.
58
 The boatbuilders Taylor studied were born around the turn of the 20
th
 
century in the fishing villages of Newfoundland. The boats they built followed a tradition 
of design and construction that had been proven effective in local waters in the 17
th
 
century, but the builders still tinkered with that design and construction, experimenting 
with small changes, adapting old designs to newer engines, newer materials, and 
evaluating whether or not they found those experiments satisfactory. They built boats 
some of the time, and did other work some of the time. They built most of their boats in 
the winter, when they were not fishing. They could build boats in their work sheds, out of 
the weather. They built boats for themselves, and boats for customers, but boatbuilding 
was not a full-time business.
59
  
 Traditional designs, traditional construction methods, traditional tools—those 
were learned, by observation and supervised work, from a young age. A master 
boatbuilder—any master craftsman—does not merely replicate what he was taught, 
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however. David Taylor noted that experienced boatbuilders could recognize each other’s 
work. Masterpieces bear the distinctive trademarks of the master. 
 Gerald Pocius was not writing about boats in A Place to Belong.
60
 He was writing 
about how people who lived what we would consider an unusually traditional life, in a 
small village in Newfoundland, adapted old things, mixed old things and new things, 
rejected new things that they saw no need for, and discarded old things and old ways that 
no longer served practical needs, in an unself-conscious approach to life born of a reality 
that could not afford the nostalgic attachment to old things for the sake of their oldness 
that has come to be called “heritage.”  
 Archaeologist Nick Burningham reports from his own field experience: “I was 
able to watch the change in design of the last decade of engineless sailing ships in 
Indonesia – fashion was important there. Few people wanted a new ship that looked like 
it had been built a decade or two previous.”61 Those boatbuilders were not building boats 
for “heritage.” They were building them for work. As artisans, they were no doubt proud 
of their skills and proud of the inherited nature of those skills. Artisanal boatbuilders 
building for work, though, would laugh heartily at the suggestion that they should use 
sails if they had access to Yamaha
®
 outboards.
62
 When we talk about artisanal craft, we 
are not talking about some sort of hidebound reactionary traditionalism. During the long 
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transition from lapstrake to carvel planking of ships in northern Europe, once carvel had 
become associated with newer, 'prestige' ships and clinker construction was old-fashioned 
and associated with peasant vessels, ships were built in the old clinker shell-first method 
but with carvel planking above the waterline—the part of the ship that could be seen. 
Archaeologist Daniel Zwick offers this as an example of 'prestige-biased  
transmission' .
63
 
 Some of the retention of the stern castle was fashion—or at least aesthetics. To 
their builders, they would have looked proper. There is no necessity for the stern works to 
look just as they do on these ships, even if we assume they did not detract from 
performance. The almost-delicate point to which the stern castle comes on Duyfken 
makes the most sense as an aesthetic flourish of sorts.
64
 On the other hand, we may well 
wonder if the stout and sturdy appearance of early 17
th
-century ocean-going ships offered 
some sense of confidence and reassurance. It would be worthwhile to enlist an expert on 
17
th
-century European visual taste to comment on whether this aspect of design fits into 
an identifiable broader aesthetic context of the culture.  
 The way vernacular-artisanal boatbuilding worked forty years ago is, to a large 
extent, how it worked 300 years ago. It is a major reason why we should reject the notion 
that commercial ship design and construction in this period was a technology held 
prisoner by unimaginative traditionalists who sought only to preserve their own 
livelihoods—a technology in dire need of rescue by modern, enlightened, educated men 
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with the wider interests of the state at heart—as late 18th-century British propaganda 
would have us believe. 
 In this story, while the elite social-political establishment did have much control 
over naval construction and the East India Companies, the artisanal shipwrights—and 
their clients, of course—retained control of all other commercial construction throughout 
our period and beyond. Those members of the late 18
th
-century British elite who 
published the bulk of the contemporary commentary we have on shipping have a much 
better chance of warping our historical understanding than they did of displacing the 
independent shipwright from his yard. 
So who were these shipwrights?
65
 
Shipwrights were much less likely to build for their own use than boatbuilders, though 
they did do so, as ships were expensive enough that they usually required corporate 
ownership. As we have seen, ships were usually owned by partnerships. In fact, it was 
common for someone to own as little as 1/16
th
 of a ship.
66
 This makes perfect sense. It 
allows someone to venture a risk in the investment within that person’s means, and with 
limited financial exposure. By combining the investments of several people, the risk is 
spread and the burden is too—after all, your ship might come in, or it might not.  
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 In small yards building small vessels in small villages, we find the closest 
similarity to the kind of boatbuilding David Taylor observed in Trinity Bay. The builder 
might build for his own use, or only build for others. He might go in with a partner or two 
and build a sloop, or he might start building one on speculation, hoping to find a buyer 
for her while she was still on the stocks. This was true in 1661 and it was still true in 
1800.  
 David Lowell was a small-time shipwright, carpenter, ferry-boatman, and short-
haul captain-for-hire in Amesbury, Massachusetts in the late 18
th
 century. We have his 
journal from 1781 to 1801.
67
 Some highlights from it present the characteristic—and 
necessary—versatility of someone in Lowell’s position as well as anything could. 
 On Saturday, 16 January, 1792, Lowell notes that he began work on a sloop for 
Captain William Coombs. So right away we know that New England shipwrights are 
building during the winter, despite the harsh weather. January in Massachusetts is cold—
and in the 18
th
 century it was colder. Lowell writes down observations on the weather 
more than any other item. Weather dictated when he could work on the sloop and when 
he had to take care of necessities. He managed to raise the sloop by the 6
th
 of February 
and had her frames “up to lay” by the 9th. On 18 April, he says he launched Capt. 
Coombs’s “schooner”—the best explanation for the change is that Captain Coombs 
decided to change the rig after construction had started. It would be helpful to know why, 
but Lowell does not say, and that is typical. He refers to the vessel again as a schooner, 
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though, later in the journal, noting that he and 6 other men were due wages for repairing 
her.  
 So in three months, in an 18
th
-century New England winter, with the necessities of 
survival always pressing, David Lowell built and launched a commercial schooner. 
Today’s backyard boatbuilder, with his dreams bigger than his bank account, spends 
years building or restoring a vessel ¼ - ½ the size of what Lowell built—and his bank 
account is bigger than Lowell’s would have been if he had had one, which he almost 
certainly did not. 
 On 30 April, Lowell launched another schooner, and finished work on it on May 
4
th
. He had not mentioned that vessel before, but it is fairly certain that pieces of this 
journal are missing, and that it was bound or re-bound after being written, as it is not 
always in chronological order. By 16 June, he had completed much work on another 
schooner, which he launched on 12 July. He records the launch of another schooner 30 
March of the following year, and a brigantine the following September. So from 16 
January, 1792, to 5 September, 1793—less than two years—David Lowell built or helped 
build five vessels.
68
  
 Meanwhile, he was operating a ferry boat from Amesbury to Newbury, across the 
Merrimac(k) River. He was freighting goods on his own schooner, which he also 
employed for towing other vessels on the river. Meanwhile, he kept building vessels, 
getting paid in British currency, U.S. dollars, and rum. One summer, he worked on an 
aqueduct and a barn. 
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 One need only read the catalog listing for the Samuel Coker Account Book for a 
good idea of what Coker was up to:  
Account book kept by Samuel Coker [from 1749-1774], shipwright, 
grocer, and dry goods merchant, of Newbury, Mass. Includes descriptions 
and prices of items sold, tallies of days Samuel spent working on ships, 
and tallies of days his employees spent working on ships.
69
 
  
Gideon Woodwell worked with his “boy,” Nat Hunt, and usually charged customers for 
partial construction—laying a deck, planking one side of a schooner. He charged 
different customers different rates for different work, suggesting a negotiation process for 
pricing. He too was paid in currency and goods in various combinations.
70
 Woodwell’s 
account gives the impression that perhaps he was not the primary contractor for these 
vessels, but subcontracted for someone else who was.  
 Richard Hacket (1716-1767) kept an account book, from which some loose 
papers—account statements, chits, receipts—survive, evidence of his getting along by 
selling groceries, day labor, including plowing, oar-making, and a little mast-making.
71
 
William Hacket (1739-1808), though, took advantage of the growing population and 
economy of New England to become a prominent shipbuilder. His surviving records are 
quite different—here we find a collection of formal shipbuilding agreements.72 Steve 
Klomps of the Peabody Essex Museum provided a context summary of the Hacket 
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contracts that encapsulates the growth and change of this area’s maritime economy, and 
political situation, in the 18
th
 century. Most of the early William Hacket contracts are for 
Banks fishing schooners of 60 to 90 tons. A fairly standard type at that time and place, 
they “did not require detailed specifications.” After forming a partnership with his cousin 
John in the 1770s, William could design and oversee the building of larger vessels, as 
John’s yard could accommodate those. They built larger merchant ships until the 
Revolution, built the frigate Alliance for the Continental Navy, which acquired a 
reputation as the finest of her type in that service, and after the war began building the 
large frigate-style merchantmen for the new East India and China trades.
73
  
 The fishing schooners Klomps mentions were already famous in the British 
Atlantic by the Revolution and would remain so into the early 20
th
 century. The Hacket 
partners were the shipbuilding equivalent of the Crowninshields and the Derbys by the 
Federal period, when they were building much bigger ships. Their contracts were detailed 
and clearly indicative of a sophisticated understanding of their craft. While they tell us 
what the specifications were, though, they still do not tell us why.  
 For that, ironically enough, we return to a more humble—and unlikely—source—
David Lowell’s account book. In the final section of what is left of it, we find that Lowell 
has copied down substantial sections of a shipbuilding treatise. We do not know which 
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treatise it was, or how he managed to see a copy of it.
74
 His handwritten heading is, “A 
Rule to Proportion Masts & Spars.”  
Digging into design and construction III: the treatises and the glory of proportion 
We have plans of warships from both centuries, and a smattering of specifications and 
builder’s contracts for merchant vessels, but few plans for 18th-century merchant vessels 
and none for the 17
th
 century. The most important written source for information on 17
th
 
and 18
th
-century ship design and construction is a small number of treatises on 
shipbuilding—some published at the time, some of those obscure and some well-known, 
and others never published in their own time but re-discovered and published in ours.
75
 
For the most part, these were written by shipwrights or public officials involved in naval 
construction, either writing for an audience assumed to be well-versed in the craft or 
dismissive of what later authors saw as the outmoded and arcane ways of the traditional 
artisan and enamored of the new “science,” with its promise of universal principles 
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universally available and the opportunity to impose centralized, standardized control on 
ship design.
76
 However, finding material from a treatise copied into David Lowell’s 
journal proves that at least to some extent, the material in these treatises was something 
useful to a practical tradesman far from the naval dockyards.
77
 
 Lowell writes that to find the height of the mainmast of a ship,  "Multipli the 
Wedth and Depth together of the Ship then Multiply by 3 and divide by 5 gives the 
Length the Ship's Main Mast in Yards-----" So it goes for the rest of the journal. The 
length of every spar is a proportion of the length of something else. For the mainmast, 
take the length of the lower deck, and the extreme breadth, and adding them together, 
take half—that is the length of the mainmast.78 So it goes in every treatise on 
shipbuilding surviving from this period. The answer to the question how did they design 
these ships? is, ultimately, “by proportion.” The beam is in certain proportion to the keel, 
                                   
76
 For an introduction to this subject, Larrie Ferreiro’s Ships and Science, already cited, will do nicely, and 
it is recent. All English treatises of the period owe much to a manuscript called “Fragments of Ancient 
English Shipwrightry,” attributed to Matthew Baker c. 1570, in the Samuel Pepys Library, Magdalen 
College, Cambridge. For such a long period, there are not many, reminding us that ship design and 
construction was overwhelmingly artisanal. They are listed in the bibliography as published primary 
sources, along with two important French treatises and one in German. William Baker discusses the 
English treatises in The New Mayflower, and allows the non-specialist some insight into how he used them 
to help him design Mayflower II. (A treatise discovered later, and published in 1994, long after Baker had 
done his work, provided some guidelines and dimensions for merchant ships not available to Baker and not 
available to Brian Lavery when he worked on the design for the 1991 Susan Constant replica, but 
according to Peter Wrike, both designs fell within the parameters of what is specified in the tables 
published in 1994. For the manuscript, see Richard Barker, “A Manuscript On Shipbuilding, Circa 1600, 
Copied by Newton,” Mariner’s Mirror 80:1 (February 1994): 16-29; for the 1991 Susan Constant, see 
Lavery, The Colonial Merchantman Susan Constant 1605 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988); 
for Wrike’s comments, see Peter Wrike, “The Jamestown Replicas,” in Jenny Bennett, ed., Sailing Into The 
Past: Learning from Replica Ships (Barnsley UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2009), 120-133.  
 
77
 Fred Hocker pointed out that, with the exception of Sir Anthony Deane, who wrote his treatise for 
Samuel Pepys, treatises were written for those who already knew how to build ships, and that is why they 
leave out so much of the technical detail we would love to have (Hocker, personal communication, 18-19 
August 2015).  
 
78
 David Lowell Account Book, MSS 1229.1, PEM-Phillips. 
 
174 
 
the depth in hold in proportion to both, and so on. The proportions are complicated, and 
exhaustive. The actual proportions vary some—but usually not much—from author to 
author. The clear overall impression is that, within a rather narrow range of variance, the 
proportions for building certain types of vessels were generally agreed-upon. Some of the 
questions left us by the shipbuilding agreements can be answered in the treatises: "Put a 
Sloop's mast halfway between one Third & one Quarter of the Keel from forward or from 
the Rake forward----"
79
 For us, though, this is still frustrating. We want to know why. 
Why do you put a sloop’s mast there? Why is the fore yard 7/8 of the main yard? If 
David Lowell knew the answers to those questions, why would he bother writing this 
down so carefully and wasting paper and ink which could not have been cheap for him? 
 Scholars studying old ships today want to see the kind of proof—the kind of 
supporting evidence—that comes out of a modern laboratory. We want to see test results, 
computer analysis computations—or their equivalents. In the 18th century, though, there 
were no such equivalents. There was experience—inherited and adapted—and there was 
the eye of the artisan. The proportions so carefully listed in the treatises, and the 
calculations necessary to come up with specific dimensions that remained faithful to 
those prescribed proportions—offered an accessible means of transmitting inherited 
knowledge to those who wished to inherit that knowledge. They do not give us the 
information we need, because their intended recipients did not need that information—in 
fact, it would never have occurred to them. 
                                   
79
 David Lowell Account Book, MSS 1229.1, PEM-Phillips. 
175 
 
 British naval historian Brian Lavery, who did the research behind the 1990-1991 
replica (currently operational) of the small English galleon Susan Constant at Jamestown, 
Virginia, and who published a book on her based on that research, also edited a modern 
edition of the Doctrine of Naval Architecture by Sir Anthony Deane, Master Shipwright 
of two naval dockyards under Charles II, who knighted him. Lavery sums up Deane’s 
Doctrine—written for Deane’s friend Samuel Pepys—by saying that Deane's 
calculations, while "impressive" in number,  
are purely geometric, giving a means of forming the shape of the ship. 
With the exception of the calculation of the draught of water, they give no 
indication of the likely performance. He also attempts to impose a series 
of proportions on his design. ... This is, of course, not a truly scientific 
system, for it depends entirely on the experience or prejudices of the 
builder, and often it would have to be modified in practice.
80
 
 
The laboratory may yield answers the treatises cannot. In the next chapter, we will 
discuss how laboratory analysis can help us understand the ramifications of certain 
aspects of the design of actual vessels on hydrodynamics, and investigate the effects, if 
any, of changes in hull form on hydrodynamics over the period.  
Unlocking the shipwright’s secrets—some of them, at least… 
In a fairly recent study of sea power during this period, Richard Harding observed, “How 
far shipwrights contributed more generally to design and quality improvement is, 
currently, unclear. It is also unclear how theoretical sciences contributed to design and 
longevity.”81 Considering as a whole the extant archaeological literature on colonial-
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period American shipwrecks, it is clear that construction was accomplished by different 
builders using a variety of techniques and materials to achieve roughly the same end.
82
 
This lends credence to Nick Burningham’s notion that “[s]omeone could decide that ships 
ought to be designed in some theoretical way. It would make no difference to the many 
shipyards scattered around the Netherlands on muddy shores and river banks.”83 There is 
no reason to think Burningham’s view would not have applied just as well across the 
Atlantic. H.H. Holly, writing for the Pilgrim Society of Massachusetts in 1969 on the 
remains of the early 17
th
-century vessel called Sparrow-Hawk, wrote of the treatises that, 
while they give us valuable information about the construction of naval vessels, we have 
no reason to think that the shipwrights building the craft we are considering “adhered 
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closely, if at all, to these ideas. Then, as now, small vessels were built in a large number 
of small construction yards scattered all along the seaboard. The various builders 
naturally developed their own ideas….”84 Archaeologists like VanHorn have been 
investigating that opinion since, and the evidence they have uncovered and interpreted 
tells us that variation, not uniformity, was the rule for ordinary merchant ships. At first 
glance, that may not be apparent, but examining how different shipwrights put together 
their vessels makes it clear. VanHorn compared the keels of the six wrecks in her study to 
the prescriptions for keels in the Mungo Murray treatise, one of the best-known of the 
18
th
-century English treatises, to see if any of them matched his prescriptions. None did.
85
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Chapter Five: Analyzing Ship Design 
 
The previous chapter on shipbuilding, based on the documentary records left by 
shipbuilders and their clients, and supplemented heavily with a discussion of artisanal 
craft, raised questions about ship design that it could not answer. Now, we need to add 
the insights of interpretive archaeology, and its attempts at hypothetical reconstructions 
and design analysis, and what computer modeling and testing can tell us about design and 
performance characteristics. Much of the information we will consider in this chapter 
would be intellectually dangerous to work with, though, had we not already considered 
the issue from those perspectives. Once we delve into technical analysis—and especially 
once we start discussing the use and results of computer modeling—we risk presentism 
and anachronism as we have not thus far. With risk, though, comes the chance for 
reward—undertaking such an effort promises insights we would not otherwise obtain. 
 The danger is built into the questions we are pursuing. What can technical 
analysis with modern tools tell us about the inherent performance characteristics of these 
vessels—their speed potential, their hydrodynamic resistance, the efficiency of their 
shapes as watercraft, their stability? How can modern technical analysis weigh in on 
period debates over ship design? To be safe, we have to add the following questions right 
away. Why do those things matter to us? Did they matter to them? If so, why? If not, why 
not? If we are going to compare a 17
th
 or 18
th
-century hull form to any set of modern 
standards, we had better take great care not to assume, unconsciously, that those modern 
standards are the standards and thus what we are doing is measuring the older designs 
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against those standards, and evaluating them the same way we grade students’ papers. 
That will teach us no history whatsoever. 
 This is not to suggest that we start off with a sort of relativism so complete as to 
be absurd. Of course the laboratory can tell us that a certain design has an inherent 
stability of X, and that another design has an inherent stability of either greater-than or 
less-than X. It is what we do with that information that requires historical responsibility.  
 Comparing and contrasting designs widely separated by time compounds the 
danger, of course. Assuming that the same standards and priorities governed ship design 
in 1620 and 1780 will not do. We would be obliged to demonstrate that. The information 
that follows will make it clear that we would be sorely tried to do so. 
 Asking the questions, mindful of the dangers, should yield some factual 
information on design, and it is difficult to ponder the how’s and why’s of something 
without the what’s. As we know from Chapter Four, we need more what’s. For that, we 
can use the same computer analysis programs today’s naval architects and marine 
engineers use to design vessels and test those designs before actually building anything. 
We can do this by digitizing plans—either of originals or replicas. The computer makes a 
3-D model based on those digitized plans, and it can then measure such things as block 
coefficient, stability, and hull form resistance. Ship archaeologists are doing this now—
after bringing together everything they know from their archaeological finds with 
everything the historical record can tell us to hypothetically, virtually reconstruct a period 
vessel from partial remains. 
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First: considering the written record on ship design 
We already know about the “glory of proportion.” For the 17th century, this is so much 
bigger than ship design. It gets at the cultural centrality of understanding natural reality 
geometrically. So much of what we would call "scientific," they understood in terms of 
geometry and proportion, including the cosmos itself. This was the age of Kepler, trying 
again and again to figure out how to reconcile the heavens to a set of interlocking 
geometric forms. This is the larger cultural milieu, the direct tie of technology to 
ontology.
1
 
 This is not to suggest that an aesthetic sensibility predisposed 17
th
-century 
shipwrights to design their ships to an abstract concept rather than practical 
considerations. Jon Adams turns that on its head when he rejects the idea that “hulls were 
designed by methods of some geometrical elegance which had little to do with 
performance….” He counters “that the geometric procedures developed to generate the 
complex underwater body was elegantly simple.”2 All that we know about this culture 
and its shipwrights would suggest that, to them, they were designing for both—they 
would have assumed that “geometrical elegance” and “performance” were to be found in 
the same place. That is the cultural milieu. 
 As the age of Kepler gave way to the age of Newton, did the centrality of 
proportion begin to give way as well? If so, to what? If so, did that “what” have 
something to do with Newton? We do know, for what it is worth, that Newton himself 
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was interested in maritime technology. His invention of a sextant is fairly well known. 
Much less so is the discovery of a shipbuilding treatise he copied in his own hand—that, 
we did not find until 1994.
3
 That was an important find, aside from the association with 
the most important scientific mind of the age, for it contained tables of proportions 
specifically labeled for merchantmen. We learned from it that the design interpretations 
of William Baker and Stan Potter,
4
 Brian Lavery and Eric Speth, executed in the replicas 
of 17
th
-century ships operating on the U.S. east coast, fit within the parameters of 
proportion provided by those tables, even though none of those experts had access to this 
information when they did their work.
5
 So we have more reason now to trust their 
insights, and whatever we can learn from studying the designs they produced. 
 Newton, though, did not write that treatise—he just copied it, around 1700. His 
profound innovations in scientific thinking only made themselves widely felt in the 18
th
 
century. Did they make themselves felt in ship design? 
 Larrie Ferreiro’s book, already cited, is called Ships and Science: The Birth of 
Naval Architecture in the Scientific Revolution, 1600-1800. Unpacking that title and its 
relationship to the contents of the book will tell us some things we need to know. First, 
the word “science” as we use it, and as he uses it in the title, is contemporary. In the early 
modern European world, “natural philosophy” was the common term. What they called 
“naval architecture” did not coincide with what we call it now until the end of the period. 
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As far as “birth” goes, Ferreiro is being precise. Naval architecture as we practice it was 
born during this period, as he thoroughly demonstrates, but that is about the extent of it—
as he also thoroughly demonstrates. The great European scientific minds identified the 
principal mathematical problems of the discipline, and worked hard to solve them. 
 Probably the most important success in that endeavor in our period was the 
calculation of the metacenter by Pierre Bouguer, the central character of Ferreiro’s book.6 
The natural philosophers pushed their understanding of fluid dynamics well beyond 
where it had been, but the application of their insights to the design and construction of 
ships in their own time was minimal: "Ultimately, the invention of the metacenter did not 
have any practical effect on ship design during the 1700s," Ferreiro concludes.
7
  
 So, again, what of Newton? As it happened, Newton came up with a form of least 
resistance for ships. Ferreiro demonstrates, as only a trained naval architect could, that 
Newton was wrong.
8
 The French Navy, the most committed of Europe’s navies to the 
new naval architecture, was interested. However, despite the partial adoption by the 
French Navy of the bow of least resistance concept, leading to the opinion “both inside 
and outside France” that the French navy was superior “in using theoretical 
hydrodynamics to design fast ships,” Ferreiro shows that “this was an inaccurate 
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conclusion at best,” because other conditions were more important in determining the 
speed of a ship than hull form, particularly “the sail plan and material, the condition of 
the hull (clean or barnacle-encrusted), and most important, the skill of the commanding 
officer and his crew.”9 
 The Royal Navy, too, took Newton’s concept seriously enough to experiment 
with it, but in 1778 Frederick II, King of Prussia, wrote a letter to Voltaire remarking that 
the "English have built ships with the most advantageous section in Newton's opinion, 
but their admirals have assured me that the ships did not sail nearly so well as those built 
according to the rules of experience." A similar account was repeated by John Charnock 
in his history of marine architecture.
10
 
 It may be surprising to learn that such a singular genius as Newton could get 
something wrong that probably seems more pedestrian a matter to us than, say, correctly 
figuring out why the moon rotates around the earth, what light is made of, and the basic 
laws of bodies in motion. No other example could more plainly point out something of 
central importance to all studies of this subject: it is devilishly difficult stuff. Nothing else 
could better clarify the importance to the history of technology of making sure that the 
theory of the singular genius/heroic inventor remains properly buried. Not even Newton 
could do what would take an unknowable number of mostly unknown people a couple of 
centuries to do, and only a serious shift in technological need—a need that did not exist 
in this period—would provide the impetus for the incorporation of the new naval 
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architecture into shipbuilding. They would be building new kinds of ships then, and 
without a long record of successful precedent to base those on, they would need 
something else—something that would help them predict what would work and what 
would not. A major advantage—perhaps the major advantage—of today’s technical-
analysis capability over a period shipwright’s is predictive power. Naval architects can 
predict performance characteristics without building anything. The greater the financial 
and human risk undertaken in the building of that something—the bigger the ship, the 
more expensive she is to fit out, the more people she carries—the more compelling such 
predictive ability becomes. So it should not surprise us that the hardest push for “naval 
architecture” was from naval quarters. 
 There is a cultural dimension to the struggle of naval architecture to make itself 
relevant in this period. Ferreiro titled his first chapter “’Mere Carpenters,’” introducing 
the deep prejudice held by some of the educated elite against artisanal shipwrights. The 
title comes from a translation of Spanish constructor Jorge Juan y Santacilia’s 1783 
Examen maritimo, in which he claims that “[t]oward the end of the last century…[t]he 
Construction of Vessels was abandoned to mere Carpenters; and it was not considered 
that NAVAL ARCHITECTURE was based on a constant application of Mechanics and 
Geometry…”11 Ferreiro notes that the French constructor Pierre Lévêque, who loosely 
translated Santacilia’s treatise, “added the notion that constructors were incapable of 
applying theory to design” and, more broadly, that “[m]any contemporary observers of 
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the field also held the opinion that constructors who built ships without having a 
theoretical basis for their designs were somehow inferior to other naval professionals.”12 
 In England, this later 18
th
-century frustration with traditional shipwrightry was 
also deeply rooted in fear of the French. Victory in the Seven Years War gave the British 
psyche no respite from anxiety about its chief imperial-naval rival. Those who worried 
most about the French maritime threat surely, if grimly, felt vindicated by the disastrous 
War of American Independence, and of course after the French Revolution, the British 
Empire poured all the resources it could into the Royal Navy, which would find itself 
fully deployed for most of a 25-year period, with the very survival of the Empire on its 
shoulders.
13
  
 Yes, but why would the British naval establishment fret so much about a French 
maritime threat when British forces were usually victorious at sea? Ferreiro suggests that 
British shipwrights would have shared that puzzlement, given the overwhelming success 
of its warships against their enemies—Royal Navy vessels captured “five times as many 
enemy ships as its nearest rival, France—all without the benefit of the metacenter or the 
calculus.” So, he speculates that a British ship constructor’s response to “the 
new theoretical developments coming from France, or on the system of rigorous technical 
schooling for French and Danish constructors” might well have been “’So what?’”14 Here 
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we have that cultural divide between those attracted to the promises, however vague, of 
the new thinking we call the Enlightenment and those who did not feel the need to be 
Enlightened to do a proper job. There is an instructive irony here: The French—and the 
Danes, and whoever else was open enough to the tenuous promises of theory-based naval 
innovation to employ it in their yards—were looking for any leg up that might narrow the 
gap between them and the British.
15
 None of them could hope to match British numbers 
and sheer force. Perhaps technical advantage would help compensate for that. This is the 
military-technological thinking of the underdog—of the Confederates with their ironclads 
and submarine, of Hitler with his wonder-weapons. The irony turns on British paranoia. 
The supreme maritime power of the day, Britain, feared for that supremacy, paying close 
and anxious attention to any threats, real or imagined. The British did not need the bow of 
least resistance or the metacenter or natural philosophers in their dockyards. They saw the 
French using these things, though, and it only exacerbated their fear of being overtaken 
technologically by their archenemy. So they took comfort in embracing the promise of 
scientific shipbuilding as a matter of what we would call national security—a promise 
that would, as Ferreiro points out, prove chimerical.  
 That the fear was real, regardless of what else was, is made amply clear by the 
formation and publications of the Society for the Improvement of Naval Architecture in 
1791, as the threat of Revolutionary France loomed dark and low. Contributors wasted no 
time in reminding subscribers of the long-held British fear that French ships were faster 
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than their own. In the Preface to the Society’s proceedings for that year, reprinted in 
European Magazine, the author recalls a discussion in a British shop during the Seven 
Years War, when it was going badly for Britain, lamenting the lack of "Science" in 
British shipbuilding and contrasting it with the French who had schools and institutes to 
study it.
16
 Four pages later, he writes:  
The candid Ship-builder will readily confess there is not one improvement 
in our Navy, that did not originate with the French...every officer in the 
service coveted the command of [captured and refitted French ships] in 
preference to those built in England.
17
 
 
Ferreiro might suggest that this author would have had some trouble finding a “candid 
Ship-Builder” who would express such an opinion. In the concluding essay, though, we 
have it again: "...the French, actually surpassing us in this most important art, have 
derived many advantages from this superiority in time of war."
18
 Ferreiro states flatly that 
there is no evidence that French ships were inherently faster than British ships. He 
attributes the bulk of a naval vessel’s performance to the performance of the crew and the 
upkeep of the ship.
19
 The perception was real, though, and the perception was strong. The 
rest of the papers and letters in this collection, ranging from thoughtful commentary on 
technical matters by experienced captains, to an essay by no less a person than Benjamin 
Franklin, to short rants by disgruntled amateurs, take British ship design and construction 
to task, questioning, and in some cases railing against, the most basic elements of period 
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ship design—the bluff bow and tapering stern, or “cod’s head and mackerel’s tail”, 
Hutchinson’s dicta on the prevention of hogging, and revisiting bow form and resistance. 
There was a restless spirit in the naval establishment as Britain considered the doings 
across the Channel with growing alarm—and this was, to be sure, the naval 
establishment—the head of the Society was the Duke of Clarence, naval officer and the 
future William IV, and the roster of members is title-heavy.
20
  
 At this point, the reader may be wondering why we have ventured so far into 
Whitehall and the naval dockyards and away from William Stevens, David Lowell, and 
Charles West—and their counterparts in, say, the northeast of England. This “naval 
architecture” subject, though—and the written record of debate and discourse on ship 
design in this period—is so heavily naval in its orientation that such a side trip was 
unavoidable if we were to familiarize ourselves with it. To understand the cultural 
context of ship design and construction at the time, and to place the published primary 
sources in proper context, we needed to have a look at what the literate were thinking and 
writing about the subject. This material is the fount of the view that artisanal shipwrightry 
was a reactionary, hidebound traditionalist’s petty fiefdom—that this technology, so vital 
to the survival and prosperity of the Empire, was dangerously constipated, and that 
leaving it in the hands of ‘mere Carpenters’ would not do. The previous chapter claimed 
that late 18
th
-century British propaganda would have us believe that here was a 
technology in dire need of rescue by modern, enlightened, educated men with the wider 
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interests of the state at heart. This is the propaganda referred to—these articles were 
published—the Society saw to that. The likes of David Lowell were not publishing 
articles in European Magazine. 
 Our ultimate purpose here, though, is to explore what the tools of naval 
architecture can teach us about ships not designed by naval architecture but built by 
people dismissed and disparaged by the advocates of naval architecture, so we now need 
to turn our attention to design criteria and problems in ordinary merchant ships—which 
are related, but not identical, to those of warships.  
Capacity and displacement 
It was noted in Chapter Three that merchants wanted the greatest capacity they could get 
for the size ship they were building or buying, without compromising sailing ability “too 
much.” The ideal was “the Connection of Swiftness and Capacity, the great Objects to be 
pursued in Ship-building.”21 Capacity is generally expressed in tons. What “tons” meant 
where and when is almost as byzantine a subject as ship-type-name etymology, and a 
subject about which we would probably be completely at sea without John McCusker, 
who not only explains the different types of “tonnage” to us, but ties the evolution of ship 
measurement (in tons) to an evolution in ships.
22
 
 Three parties, with some conflicts of interest, were interested in the tonnage of a 
ship—the owner, the builder, and the taxman. The owner wanted the most capacity he 
could get—the most cargo he could fit into the ship—but the owner was paying the 
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builder by the ton, so when it was time to pay the builder’s bill, he could wish for the 
vessel’s tonnage to be less. The taxman charged the owner duties based on tonnage, so 
again, the owner could wish the tonnage to be less when duties were due. There is an 
analogy here to the valuation of a house. The homeowner wants the appraised value on 
the low side, to minimize property taxes. When it is time to sell, though, the seller wants 
that appraisal on the high side, to increase the selling price. Tax appraisal values are 
lower than private appraisal values and selling prices.  
 McCusker defines the three types of tonnage for our period. Cargo tonnage is 
how many tons of cargo the ship could carry. It does not equate to "tons burthen/burden" 
as that term was "often applied in situations where the terms were only a legal fiction".
23
 
Measured tonnage—also called "shipwright's" or "carpenter's" tonnage—was an actual 
measurement taken during construction which the owner had to agree to and could verify 
if he wanted. The builder's charges were based on this figure.
24
 Registered tonnage was 
legal tonnage—the figure written on all official documents pertaining to the vessel 
including Customs and Navy Office Shipping List records. Taxes and duties were based 
on that figure.
25
 
 In the 17
th
 century, as McCusker explains, the formula for calculating cargo 
tonnage used length, breadth, and depth, but did not take into account block coefficient. It 
was noted earlier that the shape providing the greatest cargo capacity for a given length, 
                                   
23
 McCusker, “The Tonnage of Ships,” 26. 
 
24
 McCusker, “The Tonnage of Ships,” 26-27. 
 
25
 McCusker, “The Tonnage of Ships,” 26-27. 
 
191 
 
breadth, and depth is a rectangular box—a block—but that of course will make a terrible 
sailer. Any ship’s hull will just fit inside an imaginary block defined by her length, 
breadth, and depth. The proportion of that block’s volume actually taken up by the ship is 
her block coefficient. So the sharper she is in the ends and the more deadrise she has—
the steeper the angle from her keel to her topsides—the less of that block she will take up, 
and the lower her block coefficient. A vessel designed for speed will have a lower block 
coefficient than one designed more for capacity. Everyone knew, of course, that a ship 
did not actually carry what she would carry if she were a box defined by her length, 
breadth, and depth, and so the long-established custom was to discount the measured 
tonnage for taxes and duties. As the years went by, though, the general trend was for 
block coefficients to increase—for cargo ships to carry more cargo for their dimensions. 
Before 1700, Parliament recognized that this was costing revenue, and disallowed the 
discount, but that was ignored by owners and builders and overlooked by officials. If it 
had not been, McCusker says, taxes and duties would have increased by up to 50%. By 
the mid-18
th
 century, cargo tonnage was greater than both measured and registered 
tonnage, and that was no secret at the time.
26
 This means hull design had changed in a 
way that increased capacity without costing speed. If we can explain that change, we will 
have explained a significant contributing factor to the productivity of the merchant 
shipping fleet in the British Atlantic. If merchants could ship more goods at the same 
speed in the same size ship, they did not necessarily need a bigger ship with its increased 
costs in construction, manning, and maintenance. They could respond to population and 
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market growth much more efficiently, and merchant ship technology could thus keep up 
with the changing demands of the world it served at the least possible cost. The early 
evolution of the round ship into something closer to the box form, mentioned in Chapter 
Two, carried on. Can a laboratory analysis of reliable plans, whether original or 
reconstructed from reliable specifications, and archaeological remains, for a comparison 
of block coefficients, provide support for McCusker’s assertion?  
 We might well ask whether shipwrights, with their obviously sophisticated skill 
set, could not have come up with a more accurate way of measuring the capacity of a 
rounded vessel than by using the dimensions of a box. The answer is yes, but it was 
complicated and time-consuming. Among the most noteworthy features of Deane’s 
Doctrine of 1670 are two methods Deane presented for doing that.
27
 He does not claim to 
have invented either method—though Pepys claimed it for him—but said that both 
methods were available to anyone who had the skill and was willing to take the trouble. 
Brian Lavery, who edited the current published version of the work, says the methods 
“developed slowly over the years.”28 That should sound familiar by now. So shipwrights 
were trying, and by Deane’s day, they had largely succeeded. It is worth pointing out 
what they were after, though, and what they were not.  
 When we speak of the size of a ship today in terms of volume, we use 
displacement in tons. That is based on Archimedes’ Principle: The upward buoyant force 
that is exerted on a body immersed in a fluid, whether fully or partially submerged, is 
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equal to the weight of the fluid that the body displaces. Ferreiro, however, says that the 
principle was “often poorly understood in practice” and had to compete with an incorrect 
Aristotelian theory of floating and sinking “due to the relative weight of the material or 
the shape of the body.”29 What practical shipwrights wanted to predict was the load 
waterline of their vessels when laden. If the vessel did not swim at her ideal load 
waterline, but sank too deep or floated too high, that would adversely affect her 
performance and her stability—perhaps critically. Deane’s calculations were not for 
displacement—they were for calculating interior volume and thus capacity, which would 
allow for calculating the load waterline. This required a painstaking series of 
measurements involving the imaginary partitioning of the ship’s interior into small 
sections, and adding the volumes of those sections together. Given the difficulty, and 
given that time is money, we may have here yet another impetus to reproduce the “bones” 
of a proven design for a given size and purpose. 
 It took an Act of Parliament to change an Act of Parliament, so legally prescribed 
formulae for these calculations changed glacially. As we have seen, however, those 
formulae meant money either in or out of the pockets of the owner, and so they 
influenced design. The influence of arbitrary rules externally imposed on a technology is 
inherently problematic. It imposes a selective pressure on the technology that can alter it 
in ways that are detrimental to important aspects of its function.  
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The stability problem: introduction 
We know that it was not uncommon for 17
th
-century English merchant ships to be girdled 
after construction to increase stability. Girdling (or furring) involved nailing an extra 
layer or two of planking just above, at, and just below the waterline.  
 To cite one example: Captain John Narbrough, in command of the flagship Prince 
in the Third Anglo-Dutch War in 1672, commented on her: 
I do believe the ship will bear a good sail, for she stands at her bearing. 
Girdling the ship would make her one of the finest ships in the whole 
universe, for it would make her much more floatier and carry her guns 
higher, and she would bear the better sail and be a better and securer ship 
to receive shot, and I believe it will not prejudice her sailing.
30
  
 
Smith’s Sea-man’s Grammar mentions the technique as a solution for a “crank-sided 
ship”—a ship that will bear no sail.31 William Baker, the naval architect and ship 
historian who designed Mayflower II and other 17
th
-century replicas, found from his 
extensive research that “during the period in question more English ships were furred 
than those of any other nation.”32 Mainwaring said the same thing 300 years or so earlier, 
but he was not so detached about it:  
I think in all the world there are not so many ships furred as are in 
England, and it is pity that there is no order taken either for the punishing 
of those who build such ships or the preventing of it, for it is an infinite 
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loss to the owners and an utter spoiling and disgrace to all ships that are so 
handled.
33
 
 
Ferreiro says builders did not know why the technique worked, but they knew that it 
did.
34
  
 That brings up one of the major themes to be discerned from this study and one of 
the keys to understanding this technology. One does not have to know why something 
works to know that it does. Much of what we know about the aerodynamics of sailing, we 
learned from aviation—we learned well after the fact. The development of successful 
steam engines—and the quest for more efficient ones—led to the science of 
thermodynamics, not the other way around.  
 Girdling was a drastic solution to poor stability. The preferred first solution was 
adding ballast. Recall, though, the note about load waterline. If the ship needed so much 
ballast that she floated too deep, especially if that meant her point of maximum breadth 
was below the waterline, that carried negative consequences for stability and 
performance.  Ferreiro says that stability problems were not usually inherent to the 
design, but due to loading and seamanship issues.
35
 It is certainly true that, as we 
discussed in Chapter Three, proper loading and ballasting were critical to the ship’s 
stability. The evidence we have already cited, though, will not allow us to have done with 
this by citing Ferreiro’s generalization. We have too many complaints about the 
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deleterious effect of the 1694 English tonnage calculation rule on design, and we have to 
deal with the earlier 17
th
-century English method of determining the midship bend.  
Stability: Tonnage, taxes, and English merchant ship design 
In 1694, the English adopted a rule by which the official capacity of the ship was to be 
calculated using length, breadth, and half-breadth instead of depth in hold. That was a 
matter of convenience, as it would be quite difficult to measure the depth in hold of a 
loaded cargo vessel. The reason for the substitution of half-breadth was that, at the time, 
half-breadth was seen as roughly equivalent to depth in hold for most merchantmen.
36
 As 
soon as such a rule was adopted, though, it created an incentive for rule-beating—
specifically, an incentive to increase either height or depth in hold, and thus capacity, tax-
free. These people we are studying, though, were right to hold proper proportion in the 
esteem they did. One cannot increase one major dimension of a ship and not alter the 
others accordingly without risking the ruination of the ship’s performance and/or the 
ruination of the ship, her cargo, and her crew.  
 For the complaints against the practice, we can start with the accomplished half-
English, half-Swedish ship constructor Frederik Henrik af Chapman, author and 
illustrator of the priceless Architectura Navalis Mercatoria (1768), who attacked the rule 
for not taking into account height or depth, and opined that it led buyers to buy ships too 
broad for their length, thinking it would save them money, when actually it would not.
37
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He dismissed the idea that anyone would build a ship too deep just to beat the rule, 
because that would be too great a folly for him to consider at all likely.
38
 
 William Hutchinson’s comments on the matter focus on excessive height:  
…[I]t is known from experience that many a fine bottom has been spoiled 
for sailing fast, by having too great a top built upon it, which, I have been 
told by ship-builders, is owing to that unfair and erroneous method of 
calculating their tonnage for measurement by half the breadth for the 
depth, for payment, instead of the whole depth they are built; which latter 
practice ought in justice to take place between the builders and owners, to 
be a check upon owners who want unproportional height, in order to gain 
more stowage and accommodation for people and passengers, &c. by 
which their ships are made defective in those important points 
abovementioned.
39
 
 
The “important points abovementioned” are that, first, a ship built too high will be crank, 
and that because she is crank, she will have to be over-ballasted and/or over-loaded, and 
thus her sailing and speed will be compromised. Note, though, that Hutchinson is 
decrying excessive height, not excessive depth. The only mention found of period ships 
actually being built excessively deep in response to this tonnage rule was a citation by 
David Moore of an article by Sir George C.V. Holmes written in 1907.
40
 Excessive depth 
(draft) carries with it the significant drawback of limiting what harbors a ship may use. 
 Did the 1694 tonnage rule have a stultifying effect on the designs of English 
merchant ships until the 1770s? If so, if block coefficients were generally increasing, as 
McCusker tells us, how bad could that have been in terms of overall fleet efficiency? Was 
the chief cost the failure to attain what might otherwise have been a gain in average 
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speed? If so, would that have made any ultimate difference in passage times? These are 
questions we now have the background to ask and to explore. 
 The 1694 rule cannot explain any stability problems with English ships of 
Mayflower’s vintage. We can trace stability questions in English ships, though, all the 
way back to Elizabethan naval constructor Matthew Baker. This becomes a midship bend 
issue—the second major design aspect we need to consider.  
Stability: The Mystery of the Midship Bend 
The midship bend refers to the principal frame of the ship’s skeleton—the frame that 
determines her maximum beam (breadth), and thus the overall shape of the hull—since 
breadth and length are related by rules of proportion. After the keel was laid, this frame 
would be the next piece of the ship to be raised and attached. How shipwrights arrived at 
the shape of the midship bend is a principal interest of ship archaeology.  
 The midship bend is a compound curve. No matter what precise shape the 
shipwright had in mind, the goal was to produce a “fair” curve—with no bumps or 
angles. The trick to that is to join the smaller, single curves that make up the entire shape 
in a way that ensures a smooth flow of one into the other. There are basically three ways 
the shipwright could do that. They were not mutually exclusive.  
 First, he could simply join together the component pieces of the frame—five 
would be a typical number—to form the approximate shape and dimensions he had in 
mind, and then fair the joint areas with tools. Second, he could use flexible battens—long 
strips of wood—to define the curves. Neither of these methods required drawing anything 
or using mathematics or geometry. It was entirely done by hand and by eye, based on 
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experience and rules of thumb. This is how Ab Hoving, formerly of the Rijksmuseum in 
Amsterdam, and well-published expert on 17
th
-century Dutch ships, presents early 17
th
-
century Dutch building techniques. 
The Dutch method was ad hoc, executed by men who used old rules of 
thumb and never used compasses to draw a circle, only to measure (take a 
foot in a pair of compasses and run it point over point along a long plank 
to count the feet). There is no real trustworthy quote in Dutch literature 
even suggesting predefined main frame shapes existed in the Dutch 
method.
41
 
 
That brings us to the third method—defining the midship bend by drawing arcs of circles 
with a drawing compass—either full-size on the ground or to scale, on paper. This 
method allows the translation of prescribed proportions and dimensions to an actual 
shape before actually building the frame. The mathematics required to do that are 
rudimentary, provided one has access to a treatise or at least tables of dimensions and 
proportions, and tutelage by someone who knows the method.
42
 In the literature, and in 
the ongoing discussion based on it, we refer to this method as the “tangent-arc method,” 
as it relies on arcs of circles and lines tangent to those to define the fair compound curve. 
There is, however, more than one tangent-arc method, and the resulting shape is 
determined by which one the designer uses. The debate is over who used this method, 
who did not use it, and which specific method they used, if they used it at all. That cannot 
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be resolved here. The issue is still at the leading edge of research. We can consider a 
summary of what experts know about it, and tie the issue back to that of the stability of 
17
th
-century English ships.  
 We start with a three-sweep tangent-arc system described by Matthew Baker 
(1530-1613) in the earliest known English treatise on ship design and construction, 
“Fragments of Ancient English Shipwrightry,” held by the Samuel Pepys Library at 
Magdalen College, Cambridge. The provenance of parts of it is somewhat cloudy, but it 
is clear that Baker did write much of it, in the late 16
th
 century. William Baker used the 
earlier Baker’s method for drawing the midship bend for Mayflower II, as his research 
indicated that is how it would have been done originally.
43
 Indeed, all evidence indicates 
that, in England at least, Matthew Baker’s prescriptions for ship design were influential 
for at least a century after his death.
44
 The problem, as far as Nick Burningham is 
concerned, is that  either a three- or four-sweep tangent-arc method produces a hull form 
featuring “a midsection with narrow floors and little initial stability--the arcs will not 
reconcile except when the floors are very narrow ....” He points out that such a hull, 
extant today in the replica Mayflower II, could not “stand up without ballast and could 
not safely take ground in drying harbours....” Using the replica Mayflower as his 
example, he points out that she “...[was] so heavily ballasted that the main deck was at 
the waterline and the gun ports were too close to the waterline to be opened at sea.” 
While acknowledging that the tangent-arc system as he describes it led to some 
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successful warship designs, he finds “its application to English merchant 
ships…puzzling.”45 
 William Baker’s diagrammatic representation of a three-arc method based on 
Matthew Baker supports Burningham’s observation—about fairly narrow floors, at 
least.
46
 Brian Lavery’s midship-bend diagram of the current Susan Constant replica also 
depicts a hull with narrow floors, but not shaped the same as Mayflower II or 
Burningham’s diagram of the Matthew Baker three-arc method.47 By the time we get to 
Dassié’s L’Architecture Navale of 1677, we see fourteen diagrams of midship forms, 
varying significantly, and those with similar construction lines—the dotted lines 
indicating the method for deriving the curves—to Baker’s show hulls with much broader 
floors and reduced height relative to beam.
48
 Deane’s Doctrine also shows a tangent-arc-
derived midship bend with broader floors than what Burningham drew.
49
 Like Dassié, 
though, Deane wrote in the 1670s.  
 Did English merchant ships use Matthew Baker’s three-arc system to form their 
midship bends in the early 1600s? If so, did that produce hulls whose initial stability left 
something to be desired, leading to over-ballasting, which in turn compromised other 
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aspects of performance and utility? If so, did shipwrights move away from such a 
midship bend by the 1670s?  
 It is clear that one can produce a variety of midship bends using different tangent-
arc methods. The tangent-arc method per se does not inevitably produce a Matthew 
Baker-esque midship bend, and thus does not necessarily introduce an inherent 
instability—if indeed Baker’s method does carry that fault with it, which the evidence 
strongly suggests it did.  
 The way out of this thicket combines a thorough familiarity with the period 
manuscripts on ship design and construction, some archaeological remains and the 
training and experience to analyze and interpret them, and access to a marine engineering 
computer lab.  
Analyzing ship design: Archaeology and the computer lab 
Jon Adams worked on the remains of Sea Venture, the English galleon wrecked on the 
Bermudan reefs in 1609, and then set out to reconstruct her hull—digitally—from all the 
available evidence. Then he would be able to analyze that virtual hull.
50
  
 Adams took data from all the English manuscripts from 1545 to 1670. Because 
Sea Venture was a typical Atlantic wreck—only her bottom timbers survived—the only 
data from her wreck that Adams had access to were her flat of floor and the floor sweep 
radius. 
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Figure 13 Flat of floor and floor sweep radius 
 
Adams needed to look at the relationship of the wreck’s flat of floor and radius of floor 
sweep and compare that relationship to the relationship between those dimensions 
prescribed or described in the period manuscripts, and see how close a match he could 
find. Then, because of the centrality of proportion, he would be able to extrapolate the 
other important relationships and reconstruct the major lines of the hull.  
 Adams drew four midship sections to a common scale and superimposed them. 
Each was based on a different source—two from Baker—one three-arc and one four-
arc—one from Wells, c. 1620, and one from Deane, 1670. The chronology shows a 
“progressive drift in the principal design criteria.”51 It also shows that “the curvature they 
produce is not dramatically different.”52 
 Adams graphs the two dimensions from 1545 to 1670 and shows a fairly linear 
increase in the flat of floor as a percentage of breadth, and a corresponding, also mostly 
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linear decrease in the radius of floor sweep as a percentage of breadth over the same 
period. So, judging by the manuscripts, English floors grew wider and thus the 
percentage of the total breadth made up by floor sweep radius decreased concomitantly. 
The overall shape of the curvature of the midship bend otherwise remained quite 
consistent, the most obvious change being from more of a wedge shape to the hull early 
on to a more rounded shape. We see an increase in that round-shape tendency as we 
move into the 18
th
 century, though Adams points out that the change in the flat of floor to 
floor sweep radius trend leveled off after Deane (1670).
53
 
 Locating Sea Venture on that time continuum, Adams then extrapolated all the 
dimensions needed to come up with a hypothetical midship bend of which he could be 
confident, and then of a complete set of lines for the hull.
54
 The latter he generated by 
putting the data into “an industrial lines-fairing package” called Wolfson Shipshape. The 
provisional results he reports from the performance analysis are most important for us 
here. They prove that the virtual model of Sea Venture is “very stable.” Adams tested the 
model using different heights for the center of gravity, to represent different lading 
scenarios, and found that the righting moment—the force trying to bring the hull back 
upright—got stronger as the angle of heel increased. Properly battened-down, he says, the 
hull “would recover from an angle of heel well past 45 degrees. This indicates a 
considerable sea-keeping ability for Sea Venture and ships of her general form.” Adams 
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reminds us that what sank Sea Venture was leaking from grounding damage, not 
instability. She had ridden out a hurricane for four days prior.
55
 
 Adams used Admiralty Library MSS 9 (c. 1620-1625), anonymous but attributed 
to John Wells, for Sea Venture’s midship bend and thus the basis for her hull lines, 
because the dimensions it specified worked most closely with Sea Venture’s recorded 
tonnage of 300. So this model was not based on Matthew Baker and thus cannot help us 
evaluate the stability of Baker’s design specifications. Adams does not fault William 
Baker’s use of Matthew Baker’s model for Mayflower II. He seems to consider William 
Baker’s reasons sound—for one thing, Mayflower was considerably smaller than Sea 
Venture, so it is reasonable that her builder would have used a different set of proportions 
for her.
56
 So an important task of doing a hypothetical reconstruction like this is being 
able to decide what manuscript source or sources to use as a basis. That requires being 
able to compare real data—archaeological, and/or recorded data on the specific vessel—
to what is in those manuscripts. Using one source will give much different—perhaps 
wildly different—results than will using another.57 
 So it would seem—so far—that we have no contradictions here— that it is 
reasonable to say, as Burningham did, that ships based on Matthew Baker’s 1570s model 
would have less inherent initial stability than alternatives. Adams is telling us that early 
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17
th
-century English ship design was moving away from what Burningham criticized 
about Baker’s model—indeed, that it had been moving away from that already when 
Baker came along. Archaeologists like Adams and naval architectural historians like 
Brian Lavery and William Baker discuss and debate significant changes taking place in 
time spans as short as 20 years. This technology was not static. 
 Adams’ work is current (2013). Such efforts, though, using more or less the same 
body of source material we have now, minus the important addition of current 
archaeology, go back at least to William Baker in the 1950s. While most similar efforts 
by archaeologists on ships of this period have originated from the other side of the 
Atlantic, there are exceptions.  
 Twenty-seven years ago, David Moore
58
 undertook a hypothetical reconstruction 
of a c. 1700 Atlantic slaver, the Henrietta Marie, based on her remains in the Marquesas 
Keys, for a master’s thesis project.59 His report on the methodology he used, the 
assumptions he made, and how he weighed the disparate sources at hand clearly describes 
the process, not only for undertaking an archaeological reconstruction, but for designing 
an accurate replica of a 17
th
-century vessel—or any vessel for which we have no plans or 
detailed specifications. The necessary source-use strategy for such efforts we could sum 
up as “take what you can get and make the best of it.” Summarizing how he arrived at a 
full set of lines from a scattered pile of evidence, literally and figuratively, reveals much 
about how we can and cannot clear away the mist shrouding the secrets of design. 
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 We should not overlook the fact that even knowing the name of this vessel gave 
Moore a vastly better chance of accomplishing his goal. Positive identification allows for 
a much more focused and reliable search in the historical record. We will see in the 
following summary how much advantage he took of this. 
 Moore’s first assumption was historical. Slavers were not purpose-built at the 
time, so he was free to consider other contemporary merchantmen comparatively. His 
second was also historical. He would not assume that a small merchantman would have 
the same hull form as a similarly sized warship. That supports the position taken in this 
study that, while warships and merchantmen were certainly related, we should be 
skeptical about any assumption of similarity between them; such an assumption carries a 
burden of proof. Moore’s work was too early to use the manuscript copied by Newton c. 
1600, discovered in 1994, which listed separate specifications for naval and merchant 
vessels. The issue may well be related to that of trends in arming merchant ships; the 
possible connection should be investigated. 
 Moore also assumed that slavers would be on the faster end of the merchant ship 
continuum. This would certainly not be universally applicable. As Moore himself 
acknowledges, slavers were not purpose-built, and we know that it was routine for 
owners to modify interior arrangements for a slaving voyage and then re-convert the ship 
for general cargo use for the return voyage.
60
 Moore justifies this assumption by noting 
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that slavers seem to have been popular with pirates. He only cites two examples—Sam 
Bellamy’s Whydah Galley, captured in 1717, and Blackbeard’s Concorde, captured 
around the same time and re-named Queen Anne’s Revenge. He is stretching himself a bit 
in claiming that "Slave traders … tended to adopt suitable technology more quickly than 
the normal cargo carriers. As such, slavers could be considered as 'state of the art' 
merchant vessels of a particular period."
61
 Neither Moore nor anyone else, though, can 
get around the paucity of such evidence as he has here, and someone unwilling to stretch 
that evidence as far as it will go will never make it to a hypothetical reconstruction. That 
is why such reconstructions are only useful if one knows the assumptions that went into 
them. Knowing what went into those assumptions is knowing what we know about these 
ships. 
 Moore used iconography—artwork—as an important source—this is typical. 
Using it requires evaluating the likelihood that the artwork is technically accurate, and 
interpreting it accordingly. Usually, the presence of ordinary merchant ships in period 
artwork is coincidental— they are part of the general scenery, as in the print of the 
London Custom House c. 1714 Moore uses, which shows three ships anchored in front of 
the building. The depiction of the vessels checks out against what we know from other 
sources. There are no obviously unrealistic details, as is frequently the case given that 
most illustrators did not have nautical backgrounds and were not interested in such detail. 
This print depicts two types of small ship—two are ‘galley-built’ and one is ‘frigate-
built.’ Moore knew from the archaeological and documentary record that Henrietta Marie 
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was ‘frigate-built,’ and he knew from scale that these vessels are of similar size, so he 
could use details of topside hull form, deck arrangements, and rig from the print in his 
reconstruction.  
 He brought together the records of seven vessels of similar age, size, and purpose 
whose plans either happened to be in museum collections or were reconstructed by 
museums from rare documents. Moore believed, from her name and from the historical 
record, that Henrietta Marie was French-built, like Concorde/QAR. She left on her final, 
fatal voyage from Jamaica, and by the Jamaica register, she was "foreign-constructed." 
Her namesake was the French queen of Charles I. In King William's War, the English 
took 1,279 French prizes.
62
 One of those could well have been the Henrietta Marie. So he 
looked for features he could identify as distinctly French.
63
 One of his seven vessels had 
been analyzed by Chapelle in The Search for Speed Under Sail—the Advice Prize, a 
French prize taken into the Royal Navy in 1704—which as usual is the only reason plans 
of her survived—for which we have a very early foreign-built Admiralty draught. Moore 
believed this vessel would provide "the only detailed structural characteristics of French-
origin … [she] was reputed to be fast and was more sharply ended than comparable 
English ships."
64
 
 From Deane’s Doctrine, Moore took the Roebuck, a 6th rate (smallest-class) 
warship of 129 tons. His justification for using a warship was that this one was 
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approximately 20 years older than his subject, and he accepted Brian Lavery’s opinion 
that merchantmen in this period were roughly 20 years behind warships 
technologically—an opinion that cries out to be held against the archaeological record as 
the latter continues to grow. 
 The next task was for him to go through all the considerations dictated by the 
tonnage formulae and rules we went over earlier in the chapter—all the stuff McCusker 
explained and the considerations dictated by the 1694 tonnage rule. Otherwise, the fact 
that Moore knew the registered tonnage of Henrietta Marie at 120 would have been at 
best rather useless to him and at worst led him widely astray. He used the 1694 formula 
to determine the “unknown major dimensions of keel length, breadth, and hold depth….” 
With keel length to breadth, breadth to depth, and tons burden, he could manipulate the 
formula “in reverse to reveal these measurements.” Not knowing exactly which formula 
was actually used for the Henrietta Marie "should be a moot point in view of the 
approximate similar values of hold depth and one-half breadth exhibited during the 
period.”65 So Moore could now posit the major dimensions of the vessel. Then he 
returned to his French-built theory and hung more assumptions on that. This gives us a 
good idea of the kinds of convergences and divergences we would find between 
shipbuilding practices of the different European maritime powers. 
 “Available evidence suggests a convergence of naval technology between 
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England and France during the late 17
th
 century.”66 We know Deane "conducted naval 
intelligence...around French ports...between 1668 and 1671." The king even ordered him 
to build warships based closely on French designs, which they then had access to. The 
French were also directly observing English design and construction. It is possible, then, 
that a 1690s French merchantman could exhibit characteristics shared by both nations in 
the 1670s, going back to Lavery's assumption about the 20-year warship-merchantman 
technology gap. Rigging and ship expert R.C. Anderson examined the possible English-
French convergences and divergences in a series of article in Mariner's Mirror on 
comparative naval architecture, 1670-1720, using Deane's Doctrine and Dassié's 
1677 L'Architecture Navale.
67
 Moore quotes Anderson's summary of the numbers 
comparison, according to which French ships were somewhat shorter for their beam, and 
deeper than English ships, and shared or diverged in other specific characteristics of 
design.
68
 Anderson discusses two French reports from 1670 and 1672, which indicate, 
according to Moore, that “English vessels were ‘…far more ‘fregates’—lower in the 
water—than French….”69 Anderson gave Moore plenty here to look for when he went 
back to the archaeological record. 
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 Turning to that, Moore demonstrates the good archaeologist’s knack for 
extrapolating important information from creative observation—in this case, making 
clever dimensional extrapolations from artifacts recovered.  He could ascertain timber 
thickness in the vicinity of the weather deck by the width of the surviving lead scupper 
liners that had to exactly fit those timbers, and by the surviving through-hull fasteners—
"miscellaneous forelocked ringbolts and chainplate bolts." "The angle of the bottom link 
on several deadeye chain assemblies also provides a clue to the amount of 'tumblehome' 
present on the Henrietta Marie."
70
 
 Moore assumed Henrietta Marie to have been a three-masted ship based on two 
of the comparative ships on his list and Custom House ships from the print. Davis tells us 
that from 1680 to 1720, ships normally went from two-masted to three-masted at around 
50 or 60 tons, and that this was true for both English and foreign vessels.
71
  
 Moore then presents eight columns of dimensions for the ship, each column 
derived from a different written source. How he came up with that reveals how we can 
use those proportions discussed in Chapter Four.  
 He derived the figures for one column by applying a “correction factor” to a set of 
rigging component proportions in Deane’s Doctrine for a 6th rate warship, and noted that 
doing so gave him scantlings measurements that came “very close to those measured on 
the Henrietta Marie….72 He computed the dimensions in another column from other 
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 Moore, “Anatomy,” 138. 
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proportions in Deane's Doctrine, based on calculated length of mainmast. Both those 
columns “apply to warships and can therefore be associated with the Deane/Dassié 
analysis and perhaps subject to Lavery's twenty-year lag period," Moore writes.
73
 The 
next two columns are based on rules in the 1711 treatise The Seaman's 
Speculum.
74
 Selecting proportions from the treatises and from the records of the seven 
ships he judged appropriate rough analogues, and comparing all of that to the 
archaeological record of the Henrietta Marie, brought Moore to his reconstruction, which 
is quite detailed. She would be drawn “as a small ‘frigate-built’ ship.” Moore includes 
features such as the shape of her bow, transom, stern with quarter galleries and cabin 
windows, the size of her cabins and the heights of their ceilings, and a hull incorporating 
both French and English specific design characteristics. He notes that all three of the 
main treatises he used give very close measurements for sternpost rake and length, stem 
rake, and transom width. He concludes that French design was incorporating Dutch 
characteristics as well by the time his ship was built, and speculates that such a vessel had 
become “a  'frigate'-built' ship with Dutch 'fluyt'-design influences, i.e., deeper, fuller 
body with 20-25 year old naval lines and rig. This is only an observation based entirely 
on preliminary investigation, however,” he notes, “and will require additional research to 
verify.”75 It will be important to remember this hybrid “'frigate'-built' ship with Dutch 
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'fluyt'-design influences” for our last archaeological-reconstruction case study, for it will 
show up again there. 
 That takes us through the process of a hypothetical reconstruction based on all the 
types of evidence available to us. Moore did not take the step Adams did of conducting 
performance analysis on his virtual model, but he could have. He had gotten that far in 
the process.
76
 Note all the assumptions made, how they fit together, and how much detail 
Moore was able to incorporate into his model based on those assumptions, the educated 
guesses they led him to, and the archaeological record. With all our records on such 
vessels so incomplete, putting together enough evidence to push an analysis this far 
requires putting all the pieces from different types of sources together, somewhat akin to 
completing a dinosaur skeleton from fragments found all over the world.  
 We also get a clear sense from the Moore case of the interplay between 
technological inputs from rival powers in the Atlantic World. Those powers did have 
some distinctive tendencies and traditions, but they inevitably blended as ships were 
captured and studied, foreign agents visited their rivals’ dockyards, like Ollivier, and 
Deane, and shipwrights emigrated. 
 The way forward with analyzing ship design is by doing what Adams and Moore 
did. The next chapter is about what we can learn from replicas, but building and 
operating replicas is seriously expensive, and much of what we can learn about the 
behavior of different hull variations, we can learn in the lab—which also affords us the 
luxury of quickly and easily making modifications to those forms and testing what-if 
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scenarios. What if we do stability calculations as Adams did on Sea Venture, using 
various centers of gravity to represent different lading scenarios, on a progression of hull 
forms using midship bends from all the sources Adams looked at? How significant would 
the differences be? 
 Another basic aspect of watercraft design we could test in the lab is resistance—
resistance to the water presented by the ship’s hull. The less the resistance, the less effort 
or energy is required to propel the ship. 
Resistance and the fish-form hull 
At this point, we have already paid proper attention to the problem of speed, based on log 
books, passage times, the importance of capacity, structural dictates of wooden 
construction, and even the concept of hull speed.
77
 We have also noted Ferreiro’s 
comment that, in this period, surface friction from roughness and fouling was more 
important to ship speed than hull form resistance. That does not mean no one paid any 
attention to hull form resistance. Ferreiro’s book is full of discussions on the subject. We 
know that Newton worked on resistance, and thought he had come up with a hull form of 
least resistance. The French navy partially adopted that, as mentioned earlier.
78
 The 
treatises focus much attention on the matter.
79
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 We know that mariners and shipwrights of the time paid proper attention to the 
flow of water by and under the hull. Most contemporary sources mention the importance 
of getting a smooth flow of water to the rudder, and not creating strong eddies—what 
they called “dead water”—behind the stern.80 Some English ships from the beginning of 
our period—such as Mayflower and Susan Constant—may seem to give the lie to that, as 
they carried their flat transoms to the waterline, presenting an un-fair angle to the water 
and creating just such turbulence at the stern, but that was a compromise that allowed the 
carriage of guns low in the stern, with their opening ports. Much more common in most 
of our period was an upswept run aft intended to provide fair flow and clean water for the 
rudder, as seen in Figure 14 below.  
 
Figure 14 Upswept after section.
81
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 Opinions varied on specific aspects of hull design vis-à-vis resistance. Attempting 
to treat that subject thoroughly would constitute a thesis in itself. One chief aspect of 
design, though, was consistent throughout the period, and any study of ship design needs 
to ask why. That is the fish form—the cod’s head and mackerel’s tail, so famously 
illustrated—some say for the Queen herself—by Matthew Baker. Fish-form hulls have 
disappeared from commercial shipping, but we still see them in airplanes, submarines, 
torpedoes, and modern touring kayaks. The idea that modern hydrodynamics could not 
support a fish-form hull must be rejected. We must assume, as we do with any other 
aspect of ship design, that they offer pros and cons relative to alternatives, and then set 
about trying to determine what those are, keeping in mind as always that we are more 
interested in our subjects’ ideas of pros and cons than in our own. 
 Summing up the concept of the form reads something like this. The bluff bow 
provides buoyancy. It rides up on the waves rather than burying itself, and it pushes the 
water aside. The rest of the underwater hull then allows the water to flow cleanly back to 
the rudder. Tapering the hull aft encourages the water’s swift travel.  
 We are already familiar with factors selecting for the bluff bow—buoyancy, 
capacity, the fight against hogging—to which we can add that room in the bow provides 
for the stowage of long, heavy anchor cable and a number of anchors.
82
 Does it knife 
through the water like a yacht’s? No, but these were not yachts.83 Laying all other 
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 Jim Graczyk, Drew McMullen, and Joakim Severinson all made comments indicating that a modern 
sailor on a period replica will notice how differently the bluff bow behaves in the water than a modern 
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considerations aside, we are always left with speed versus capacity. We cannot, however, 
dispense with the bluff bow in a short paragraph. Think of the sharp concave prows of the 
great 19
th
 century clipper ships—why did those dispense with the bluff bow, and what 
was the cost/benefit balance?  
 It is not necessary to leave the period to question the feature—contemporaries 
were happy to do it, especially late, when that “restless spirit” swirled around elite British 
maritime circles. Naval constructor Marmaduke Stalkartt wrote a treatise in 1781, 
dedicating it with permission to His Majesty, with the hope that it could advance the 
interests of the Empire. Stalkartt set out from the beginning to defend the bluff bow, the 
placing of the maximum beam forward of amidships—the traditional shape.84 Ten years 
later, though, a contributor to the Society for the Improvement of Naval Architecture’s 
proceedings cited French experiments that, he claimed, proved that bow form was 
immaterial to resistance.
85
 In a letter to the Society of 26 June 1791, Charles Gore 
claimed to have done experiments proving that the fish-shape theory was wrong, and 
advocating further experiments to corroborate that. If Gore is the source of the 
"Observations on the resistance of fluids..." that follows the letter, which is unclear, 
though the content is consistent, he described model experiments showing that the solid 
of least resistance had its maximum breadth amidships, and a sharp entry, and the fish 
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shape did not do as well.
86
 Earlier in this collection of letters and essays, we find an even 
stronger dismissal: 
The idea that ships ought immediately to taper or become narrower from 
the midship bend or frame, that the closing of the water behind them may 
push them forward, is a vulgar error; that the shape of fishes ought to be 
copied in ships, is another; as the analogy does not hold good. Yet those 
two ideas have occasioned great blunders in naval architecture.
87
 
 
It is worth pointing out, though, that one need not subscribe to the above justification for 
the tapering-aft to support such a feature. 
 Fluid resistance theory was still an elusive quarry in this period. What is worth 
investigating is whether well-designed ships made some sacrifice in resistance inherent to 
the fish-form hull. If so, how much? We have seen how unlikely it was for small gains in 
a ship’s speed through the water to make a practical difference in her passagemaking. 
Were the advantages ascribed to the tapering-aft from amidships real? If we find in the 
laboratory that there is little or no resistance penalty for this form, that could support the 
notion that long experience—a form of evolution in human technology—had worked. If 
we find that there was a resistance penalty, we will be required to weigh that against 
other pros and cons of the fish-form hull. It would be worthwhile to test different known 
hulls, all of which offer some version of the fish-form, comparatively.
88
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 The more confident we can be in how “known” our “known hulls” really are, the 
more confident we can be in the information we extrapolate from them. Moore and 
Adams were limited there by the limitations of their archaeological remains. They had to 
rely on the treatises for their reconstructions—as did William Baker, and Brian Lavery. If 
there is enough of a ship left that the archaeologist can discern her actual, rather than 
hypothetical, dimensions and proportions, though, then we can turn that on its head. We 
can come up with the design methodology through what is called ‘reverse naval 
architecture,’ and hold that up to the surviving manuscript sources. This is our best 
chance to shake free of the tyranny of the treatises—and to understand how prescriptive 
vs. descriptive they were, and clear up some of the mystery of the connection between 
naval and merchant ship design.  
‘Reverse naval architecture’: Warren Riess and the Ronson ship 
 The most promising work on deciphering the design technique used to build an 
actual ordinary Atlantic merchant vessel is Warren Riess’ on-going ‘reverse naval 
architecture’ analysis of the Ronson ship, unearthed in Manhattan in 1982, which Riess 
eventually concluded was the Princess Carolina, built at Charleston c. 1717 for local 
owners.
89
 As is almost never the case with American underwater archaeology, enough of 
the hull was intact for Riess to make measurements that, after thirty years of head-
scratching and on-again, off-again work, he was able to match to a design technique 
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involving simple circles and proportions that do not match those specified in the treatises 
for naval vessels and other ships deemed important at the time. Riess sketched out the 
preliminaries of his discovery in his first book on that ship, and he is currently working 
on a more thorough technical analysis and explication of the technique, which he expects 
ultimately to publish as a sequel.
90
  
 The Ronson ship did not sink—she was deliberately buried as landfill. That 
accounts for her state of preservation. The archaeologists were able to determine that she 
was about 100 feet overall, 82 feet on deck, 65 feet on the keel, 24 feet in the beam, 9 feet 
in the hold, and about 11 feet total draft fully laden. She carried her maximum beam 
about 30 feet aft of the bow, carried that 24 feet aft, and then slowly tapered toward the 
stern. Her floors were relatively flat. She was built more for capacity than speed. She 
would have been 130-200 registered tons depending on the local formula used. He would 
later determine she was ordered as a 200-ton ship.
91
 
 Recall how much work David Moore had to do just to determine some of those 
hull characteristics. This thing was a ship archaeologist’s dream. Riess, though, might 
say, “Be careful what you wish for.” The Ronson ship bedeviled him for so long because 
he knew he had enough that he should be able to find the solution to the design, but that 
solution kept eluding him. Riess kept trying different arc radii, but could not get the 
centers of arc to quite match up well enough that he could be sure he had found the 
correct radius. He realized that to some extent he was being thwarted by hull distortion—
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an effect of the massive weight of earth bearing down on the ship’s hull for almost three 
hundred years. Once that was factored out, it became possible to proceed. Eventually, 
Riess was able to determine that the builder had used the simplest of fractions, based on 
the ship’s beam of 24 feet. He discovered that an arc with radius of 12 feet (1/2 breadth) 
fit perfectly, and from there determined that he could match the ship’s dimensions to 
simple straight lines and arcs with radii of 4, 8, 12, and 16 feet.
92
 It was clear that this 
South Carolina shipwright had used much simpler fractions in his design than those set 
out in any of the contemporary treatises.  
 That is not to suggest that his ship was crude. On the contrary, Riess found 
distinguishing details of construction that struck him and others as highly skilled 
craftsmanship—and certainly labor-intensive. Most of the hull was re-buried on-site, and 
a skyscraper built over it. The bow section, at least, was recovered, and may be 
appreciated as an example of successful construction outside “the published rules.”93 Her 
bow did not use cant frames,
94
 as would have been expected, but square frames—an older 
form of construction, so far as we know. To fit the planking properly over these frames, 
the shipwright had to bevel and shape them very carefully, with great skill. Riess calls 
them “extraordinary pieces.”95 Cant frames absorb wave shock better than square frames. 
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A bow built with the latter requires more frames, "massive breast hooks," chocks, and 
hawse pieces between the frames, such that the bow becomes almost solid. This is 
heavier and uses more wood for the same strength. The Ronson ship is a late example of 
the use of square frames in the bow.
96
 This varies from 18
th
-century warship construction, 
but supports Lavery’s idea that merchant ship techniques tended to be more conservative. 
"It is not clear whether this was because of strictly traditional forces or because the 
availability of greater amounts of timber in America made square frames more practical 
for this ship,” Riess writes. 97 As discussed in the last chapter, both the availability of 
materials and the predilections of individual shipwrights had much to do with the variety 
of finished vessels we actually find in the mud. “The care with which the shipwright had 
built the ship was impressive,” Riess writes. “We saw no indications of any labor-saving 
shortcuts taken.” He did notice that not every piece used for a structural timber was 
“perfect,” and “the spacing of frames was not as systematic as we expected” from 
studying naval vessels and plans. They had strong evidence, though, that the ship had 
made more than once transoceanic voyage, and that the builder had been “resourceful in 
using what curved timbers he could obtain and shifting their position a bit when 
necessary to build a properly shaped, strong ship.”98 
 We established in Chapter Four that any attempt to separate “design” from 
“construction” with these ships is arbitrary. We have to pay particular attention to those 
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aspects of construction that strongly influence design, such as the availability of compass 
timbers. What Riess mentions here about the shipwright’s “using what curved timbers he 
could obtain and shifting their position a bit when necessary” connects us to the 17th-
century Dutch design-to-construction nexus explained so well by Ab Hoving, who built a 
large model of a Dutch fluit to understand the construction method indicated by the 
archaeological record. These famous Dutch cargo vessels were known throughout the 
European world to be cheap to build and cheap to operate. Hoving shows that the quick 
and dirty framing method certainly contributed to the “cheap to build” side of that.  
 The Dutch method Hoving describes involved a partial frame-first, partial plank-
first technique. The bottom was planked after the keel was laid but before the floors and 
lower futtocks were installed. Alternating planking and framing continued up the sides. 
Hoving describes this as “not a very neat process. The builders simply took curved grown 
pieces of wood into the ship and fitted them wherever they matched the hull’s shape.” In 
the archaeological record, he says, we can recognize Dutch ships by these “arbitrarily 
placed and untidy looking frames.” This was fast, cheap construction, making best use of 
materials and saving labor by allowing a “quick fit.”99 
 Hoving is not saying they were unsound ships any more than Riess is saying that 
about the Ronson ship. It is worth pointing out here, though, that this method would have 
been problematic to execute in a ship intended for a full complement of guns. Framing 
had to be heavy and regular to accommodate gun ports and gun weights. The fluit was, as 
is well-known, unarmed.  
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 We should also note that VanHorn describes similar rough, improvisational 
framing techniques in her wreck sample, discussed in the last chapter. It may be that, with 
no top-down control over the builder of such vessels, they were freer to improvise than 
those working in larger, more hierarchical yards or, certainly, in naval yards. Burningham 
posits an important plausible connection to a wider 17
th
-century Dutch cultural and 
socioeconomic context when he opines that “the Dutch, because of their less hierarchical 
society and artisanal ship design could adapt most quickly and successfully.”100 Based on 
the archaeological evidence in toto, we can widen the geographic scope of that theory 
beyond the Netherlands. Recall what Burningham wrote. “Someone could decide that 
ships ought to be designed in some theoretical way. It would make no difference to the 
many shipyards scattered around the Netherlands on muddy shores and river banks.” 
Warren Riess is showing us the same thing for South Carolina. Kellie VanHorn pointed 
out how difficult it is to find consistent tropes in the framing of ordinary British 
American merchant ships. When asked if we might apply his comment to the North 
American eastern seaboard, Burningham said “Yes, in truth we have little idea how the 
great majority of ships were designed.”101 
 We will know more, though, once we have done with Riess and his Princess 
Carolina. Riess compared the basic shape of his ship with those presented in period 
works—particularly Chapman’s Architectura Navalis Mercatoria, whose plates are 
famous for their stunning detail. By superimposing the profile of the general cargo area, 
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analogous to the midship bend, of the Carolina, Chapman’s profile of an English 
merchant frigate, and Chapman’s profile of a Dutch flyboat (vlieboot), a common 
contemporaneous merchantman, Riess clearly shows that the Princess Carolina is a 
combination—whether deliberately or not—of the two forms—just as Moore concluded 
the Henrietta Marie probably was. Considering Riess’ comments on the ship’s design, we 
can appreciate how significant it is to have this depth of hard evidence on an ordinary 
Atlantic merchantman of 1717. 
 The stem profile, or side-on view of the curve of the bow, was a “true arc of 16-
foot radius” at the notch of the main structural member, the stem, where the plank ends 
were joined to it. The bluntness of this traditional bluff bow “did not allow for a fast 
ship….” “The stern … was a familiar square tucked stern of an English merchant 
frigate…providing “a long keel structure for speed and sailing ability.” Riess then makes 
his most important claim—that the design of this ship “may answer Ralph Davis's 
question, raised in The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, about how British ships 
became more efficient in the 18
th
 century.” Davis surmised that British shipwrights 
studied Dutch and French ships captured in the War of Spanish Succession (1702-13). He 
also suggested—though he cautioned that this was conjectural—that “the main technical 
development in English shipbuilding of the early 18
th
 century was the adoption…of the 
hull forms used earlier by the Dutch which made possible a high carrying capacity in 
relation to the ship’s main measurements.”102  
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 Riess suggests that the “development or trial of this type of ship in the early 18th 
century appears logical in retrospect. British merchants and shipwrights alike knew the 
qualities and drawbacks of their frigates as well as those of the flyboats.” If a hybrid were 
successful, it would “retain much of the frigate’s speed, agility, and defensive fighting 
ability, while being able to carry more cargo into shallow areas.” By fitting a longer keel, 
the builder could somewhat counter the poorer windward ability of the flat bottom. “In 
addition, the flat bottom required less ballast because the shape of the hull lessened its 
tendency to heel.”103 
 The Carolina coast is a perennially shifting maze of sandbars and shallow inlets. 
Although Charleston is the best and most important regional harbor, and thus the site of 
the most important port city of the region at the time, the bar at its mouth restricted the 
draft of ships that could use it. For any other port in the area, such depth restrictions were 
more severe. So there certainly would have been good reason to adopt design and 
construction techniques that allowed for shallower draft while retaining capacity and 
seakeeping ability—trademarks of Dutch merchant ships, as the Dutch coast is similar. 
 Can the other noted advantage of Dutch cargo ships Riess notes here—capacity 
for size—push McCusker’s argument that block coefficients increased in British Atlantic 
merchant ships into the 18
th
 century—and support Ralph Davis’ conclusion that merchant 
ships became markedly more efficient as the 18
th
 century wore on? Once Riess can fully 
3-D model the Ronson ship in the computer lab, can he establish comparisons between 
                                                                                                        
most nautical terms of the time, and could apply to vessels with varying hull forms. So, while flyboats 
typically had pink sterns, so did other vessels, and Davis freely acknowledges he is on speculative ground 
here. This is a perfect example of why he was so keen to have nautical archaeology pursue these questions. 
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her performance and her capacity and those of comparably sized vessels built for similar 
purposes throughout the period? How close will that get us toward being able to go back 
to the maritime economic historians with new information? If any project stands a chance 
of achieving the kind of breakthrough in technical understanding of Atlantic merchant 
ships Ralph Davis hoped for fifty years ago, this is it. Modeling studies of this hull will 
go a long way toward answering the question of whether changes in merchant ship 
technology had anything to do with the growth of shipping productivity—and if so, how. 
They will suggest further such modeling studies on remains we have not yet found. 
From the lab to the water 
 Our computer modeling applications are powerful and sophisticated, capable of 
synthesizing and analyzing complex physical data. Nevertheless, we still do not 
understand everything about all the forces at work in the ocean and in the air. We should 
be skeptical about the ability of our models—which we program—to reproduce with 
complete accuracy the behavior of a ship on the sea, and of the sea on a ship. The ease 
and economy of studying ships through digital modeling is irresistibly compelling for a 
host of good reasons, and we should pursue it with gusto. We would do well, though, to 
think of our weather models, and the wide disparities they produce when meteorologists 
ask them to predict the track of a hurricane. At that point it is the human meteorologist 
who has to step in and interpret the information from the models to make a forecast—an 
educated guess. The limitations of the models reflect the limitations of how well we 
understand the natural forces at work.  
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 So we should not be prepared to concede that a virtual ship sailing on a virtual 
ocean can represent with complete accuracy a real ship sailing on a real ocean. For that, 
we can build real ships and sail them on real oceans.  
230 
 
Chapter Six: The Time Machine? How Can Replicas Help Us Understand the 
Originals? 
 
In this chapter, we will venture out of the British Atlantic at first, and then return to it. 
The critics of Atlantic World history as a field—most prominently Peter Coclanis—
remind us to take care that we do not conceive of the Atlantic as a discrete system, 
because it was not.
1
 Ship technology went everywhere in this period. 
 In 1606, the year before the first English settlement attempt on the James River in 
Virginia, the VOC jacht
2
 Duyfken (“little dove”) scouted and charted the coastal waters 
of what is now the Cape York Peninsula of Australia, becoming the first European vessel 
known to have explored there.
3
 Duyfken was built in 1595, so she was already nine years 
old when she was sent to the other side of the world—see the discussion of ship longevity 
in Chapter Four. She was already a veteran of VOC service when she went to Asia. Ships 
like Duyfken—and Henry Hudson’s, and the ships that went to Jamestown—were small 
but hardy, maneuverable, were lightly armed to provide some defense—or offense, 
depending on adversary—and reasonably quick for their size. They were ideal for 
exploring unfamiliar waters, where getting themselves into danger was a high risk, and 
the ability to get themselves out of it again would be a high priority. There would be no 
supporting infrastructure where these ships were going. They needed to be self-
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 The word, whether in the original Dutch or in the Anglicized ‘yacht’, always meant a fast, maneuverable 
sailer, and it still retains that meaning, among others. 
 
3
 For a detailed chronology of the original Duyfken, see the Duyfken 1606 Replica Foundation’s website: 
http://www.duyfken.com/original/brave-ship  
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sufficient—the crews aboard had to operate, maintain, and repair them unassisted. When 
a ship like Duyfken operated as the scout for a fleet, the larger ships stayed offshore 
where it was safe, and sent the scout vessel in close for in-shore reconnaissance. Duyfken 
survived her exploration of Australian waters. She was judged irreparable at Ternate in 
the Moluccas in 1608, after participating in a battle with the Spanish. She was thirteen 
years old. 
 On 24 January, 1999, in Fremantle, Western Australia, a new Duyfken settled into 
the water—not from wooden slipways, but from a diesel-powered Travelift®. She may 
not be one of the largest or most famous replica ships from our period ever built, but in 
important ways, she may be the most ambitious yet attempted. She was designed based 
on the latest archaeological, iconographic, documentary, and modeling findings, and the 
Dutch have much to work with from all those sources. The Australians imported 
European oak from Latvia for her hull. They brought together an international team of 
shipwrights and advisors. They set themselves the task of teaching themselves how to 
build the ship the way they knew she would have been built originally—with the 17th-
century Dutch combination of plank-first, frame-first construction—a sort of hybrid 
between the two construction methods that we tend to conceive of in our linear thinking 
as separate, with the latter having succeeded the former in European construction by the 
15
th
 century. Duyfken’s shipwrights also had to learn to shape bow timbers using charring 
over an open fire—a technique no commercial shipwright in the West had used in, 
literally, ages.
4
 This proved slow and frustrating until they figured it out, but they did.
5
 
                                   
4
 Steam-bending, in a steam chest, as we do now, was a 19
th
-century technique. 
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We have as much reason to be confident in Duyfken’s accuracy as we are ever likely to 
have in a speculative replica based on multiple sources. 
 
Figure 15 Duyfken replica.6 
 
 Duyfken’s sails are flax, her rigging hemp.7 Never intended as just a floating 
dockside approximation, Duyfken re-enacted her namesake’s scouting voyage from the 
Spice Islands to Cape York, and then she sailed from Western Australia to the 
Netherlands. The experiences of those seasoned mariners on that ship on those voyages 
can teach us much about operating these vessels.
8
 To that, though, we must add the 
caveat that, as we go aboard reconstructed vessels, hoist sails, and get underway—or talk 
                                                                                                        
5
 See Nick Burningham and Adriaan de Jong, “The Duyfken Project: an Age of Discovery ship 
reconstruction as experimental archaeology,” International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 26:4 
(November 1997): 277-292. 
 
6
 Photo by Rupert Gerritsen, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Duyfken_Replica_Under_Sail.jpg 
 
7
 On the other hand, she has two diesel engines with feathering props and fuel tanks. 
 
8
 Nick Burningham, “Learning to Sail the Duyfken Replica,” International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 
30:1 (April 2001): 74-85. Burningham was aboard. 
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to those who do that—we would do well to keep in mind Ole Crumlin-Pedersen’s 
caution. "Modern day social and mental constructs and limited relevant knowledge and 
skills, will inevitably impede our ability to replicate ancient vessels."
9
 Crumlin-Pedersen 
should know. He was a leader of the successful effort to reconstruct and test the 
recovered wrecks of Viking ships. It is safe to assume that by “replicate” he is not only 
referring to design and construction, but to techniques of operation. The challenges and 
opportunities of such an endeavor should become apparent in the ensuing discussion of 
actual experiences afloat. 
 This chapter examines working replicas designed and built from all the evidence 
we have—the documentary record, archaeological record, and iconography— inspired by 
experimental-archaeology efforts of the last few decades—based on the conviction that 
the experience of designing, building, and operating such replicas could teach us more 
than all these sources alone.
10
 What can we learn by talking to the people who design, 
build, and sail these vessels?
11
 How do their experiences jibe with what we read in our 
                                   
9
 Crumlin-Pedersen, “Experimental archaeology and ships—principles, problems and examples,” in Blue et 
al., Connected by the Sea, 3.  
 
10
 This use of the term “replica” is as a blanket term of convenience. It can be useful to distinguish between 
a replica, which is based on near-complete data on a specific vessel and the materials and techniques used 
to build it, and a reconstruction, which is based on incomplete evidence gathered from whatever source 
material about similar vessels might be available, augmented by experiment and educated conjecture. For a 
concise introduction to these concepts, see Seán McGrail, “Experimental Archaeology: Replicas and 
Reconstructions,” in Bennett, ed., Sailing Into the Past, 16-23. By necessity, all 17th century vessels 
considered here are reconstructions, as complete data for none of them are available. Some, though, are 
based on more, and sometimes better, evidence than others. See Nicholas ]Nick] Burningham, 
“Experimental Maritime Archaeology,” in Claire Smith, ed., Encyclopedia of Global Archaeology (New 
York: Springer, 2014), 2717. For a recent precedent using replica and reconstruction experience to study 
problems in technological continuity and change in sailing vessels, see Whitewright, “Technological 
Continuity and Change, 1-19. 
 
11
 Note on interview sources: This chapter relies heavily on the firsthand experience of period replica 
masters, crews and shipwrights, relayed directly to me either in written form or during recorded phone or 
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history books—or not? If the received wisdom is second- and third-hand, what might we 
learn first-hand, by analyzing performance capabilities using on-the-water human 
experience? If we can understand how these vessels work by working them, then we can 
not only compare what we learn to what’s in the books. We can use that understanding as 
a yardstick to compare vessels across time and space in ways otherwise impossible. We 
can examine a certain type of vessel—say, a middling-sized transatlantic merchantman—
from 1600 with the same type vessel from 1750. Whatever the results, they should help 
us better understand the core duality of technological history—continuity and change. 
When technology does not change, why? When it does, why? When it changes, why does 
it change in some ways and not others?  
 The published literature on building and sailing replicas suggested a series of 
questions as a basis for interviews. The resulting questionnaire is included as an 
Appendix. The observations of the people who operate these replicas on questions raised 
by the historical literature focused on six specific technical issues: the mizzen sail, 
steering systems, headsails, topsails, hull design, and crew—the human component of the 
machine. These are all interrelated, of course, and that comes through in what follows. A 
discussion of all six will suggest further questions, and experiments to investigate them. 
As an aid to readers less familiar with the sail plans of these ships, I have included a 
labeled copy of Barlow’s Mayflower sketch, on the following page (Figure 16). 
                                                                                                        
VoIP interviews. I contacted most current working period replicas. The materials used for contacts and 
interviews, including both protocol and subject matter, may be found in Appendix 1. All of the transcripts 
and recordings remain in my possession, and may be shared upon request, contingent upon the consent of 
the subject(s), as per the guidelines of Memorial University’s Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in 
Human Research (ICEHR). 
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Figure 16 Barlow’s Mayflower, with labels 
 
First technical focus: the mizzen sail 
We read in history books that lateen mizzens were clumsy and eventually, logically 
replaced by gaff spankers, but not before an intermediate stage where the ships retained 
the lateen yard but the sail was cut back to the mast—a stage which at first glance seems 
puzzling.
12
 (See Figure 17, following page.)  
                                   
12
 For a traditional account of the evolution of lateen mizzen to gaff spanker, see G.S. Laird Clowes, Sailing 
Ships: Their History and Development (London: HMSO, 1952), 67-68, and Gilfillan, Inventing the Ship, 
60-61. Gilfillan attributes the major changes in our period to the old methods’ being “sometimes harmful” 
and “rather useless.” Clowes does not offer an explanation for the retention of the full yard with the cut-
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Figure 17 Lateen mizzen sail to gaff spanker  
 
Captain “Chip” Reynolds, master of the replica Half Moon in New York has a reasonable 
explanation for it, because he has spent a lot of time commanding a vessel that actually 
has a lateen mizzen, and he was forced to un-learn what he had been taught as a modern 
sailor in order to unlock the secrets of an older technology. Reynolds wrote:  
…[Lateen mizzens] are so fundamentally different from other types of 
more modern sails used for tacking and maneuvering, that until one 
                                                                                                        
back sail, but John Harland does, in his indispensable Seamanship in the Age of Sail, 75-76. Thanks to Nick 
Burningham for pointing that out.  
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experiments with them, they seem cumbersome and ungainly. In fact, they 
are quite handy, elegant in their engineering, and practical in use.  
 
Reynolds speculates that the full-length mizzen yard was retained after the sail was cut 
back because it was easier to trim, as the yard “could be warped over with better leverage 
(especially in high winds), than by trimming the sheet.” (See Figure 17.) That could be 
done forward of the quarterdeck area reserved for the officers, he says. The hierarchy on 
a ship was certainly strong enough to serve as a social factor selecting for a technological 
preference. “The full-length yard also balanced the weight” of the sail, making it easier to 
attach the yard to the mast with simpler, cheaper fastening methods.
13
 
 Almost sixty years ago, William A. Baker wrote that tacking the mizzen was 
simpler than expected on the new Mayflower II.
14
 Nick Burningham wrote that “…on 
Duyfken …the mizzen was nearly useless, but would have been helpful in a few specific 
circumstances had we not been able to use the engines. The iconography shows very 
strongly that the lateen mizzen was hardly ever set.”15 Captain Eric Speth, perhaps the 
most experienced master of 17
th
-century replicas working, agrees with Reynolds that the 
mizzen is “handy,” comparing favorably to the later gaff spanker, though he adds that it 
requires considerably more manpower to use on Mayflower II, a larger ship, than it does 
                                   
13
 Reynolds, personal e-mail, 5 February 2015. Parrels and halyards are made of wood and hemp rope, 
materials and devices already familiar and already aboard.  
 
14
 Baker, The New Mayflower, 117-118. 
 
15
 Burningham, personal e-mail, 4 May 2015; and see Burningham in Bennett, ed., Sailing Into the Past, 
116. 
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on Godspeed or Discovery, the two smaller Jamestown replicas.
16
 The Duyfken 
experience at sea with the mizzen makes sense to him, and he confirms that the sail is a 
balancing and maneuvering sail, and would be furled for downwind sailing—which is 
most of the sailing these ships did, Duyfken included—as it would move the center of 
effort of the entire sail plan too far aft otherwise, making it more difficult to steer the ship 
on a steady track.
17
 To Speth, the most sensible explanation for the retention—and then 
eventual abandonment—of the full lateen spar once the sail itself had been cut back to the 
mast is that the spar lent itself to counter-bracing to tack a ship in light winds or to tack a 
ship that did not tack well—a technique Speth has used often, and an explanation that 
jibes with Reynolds’. (Again, see Figure 17; consider the leverage of that forward-
protruding yard.) Once staysails came into use, says Speth, that forward—projecting yard 
would have gotten in their way. Adding sails to a rig usually means making significant 
adjustments elsewhere so that those sails may be properly handled and so that they—or 
other sails near them—receive clean wind, unblocked by neighboring canvas.18 
                                   
16
 Eric Speth, telephone interview, 14 August 2015. Capt. Speth has been Maritime Program Manager, 
Jamestown-Yorktown Foundation, Virginia, for 26 years. Before that, he was in charge of the replica 
Maryland Dove at St. Mary’s City. He has extensive experience on at least nine early 17th century replicas 
and more on replicas representing later periods, including service as master of Mayflower II. 
 
17
 See following discussion of tiller and whipstaff steering; Speth says the tiller and whipstaff are difficult 
to use if the sail plan is not correctly balanced. That is true of a modern wheel system on a modern yacht, 
so it stands to reason that it would be more true of these larger, heavier vessels (Speth, telephone interview, 
14 August 2015). Center of effort of the sail plan refers to the focal point of the wind’s force on the sail 
plan as a whole. If it is too far aft, the wind will tend to push the ship’s stern to one side or the other, so the 
ship will slew rather than track straight downwind. This is not only potentially dangerous, as it could cause 
a broach in heavier seas. Broaching is coming broadside to the waves, so that they can roll the ship. It is 
also worth noting that the corkscrewing motion of an unbalanced vessel sailing deep downwind is literally 
sickening to human beings. 
 
18
 Speth, telephone interview, 14 August 2015. Staysails—fore-and-aft (triangular) sails hoisted on the 
stays—the standing rigging that holds up the masts—became increasingly common in the 18th century until 
they were ubiquitous on ships, brigs, and snows. 
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 Captain Sharon Dounce of the Kalmar Nyckel, a larger ship than Reynolds’ Half 
Moon or Speth’s Jamestown ships, writes that the mizzen on her ship “balances the sail 
plan forward when sailing close hauled.” She too notes that it is not useful off the wind. 
They use it for tacking, but not wearing (jibing). The balance it provides for maneuvers 
greatly assists with steering the ship. As for handling it, she writes that the sail on its yard 
would likely have been shifted from side to side of the mizzen mast. [T]his 
is a pain in the neck, but with Vasa researchers, we practiced and timed it, 
as it fit into a tack. Got it down to about 90 seconds, and with available 
personnel of a normal size crew. It’s our easiest sail to set, by far.19 
 
We can say, then, that the lateen mizzen functioned well on 17
th
-century ships as a 
balancing and maneuvering sail, and that its long yard was manageable given the rest of 
the sail plan. Speth’s suggestion that this yard would have been incompatible with 
staysails reminds us to assume that changing one element of the ship will have more 
wide-ranging ramifications than merely changing how that particular element functions. 
Recall our discussion in Chapter Two of the law of unintended consequences, and think 
of pulling a thread in a rug. That perspective will prove helpful when we are puzzling 
over the time it took to make a technical change whose desirability seems obvious to us. 
Second technical focus: steering systems 
Ship historian Alan McGowan ties the adoption of the wheel to the adoption of the jib 
(triangular headsail—see diagrams of snow, brig, sloop, and schooner in Chapter Three), 
                                   
19
 Dounce, personal e-mail, 24 April 2015. Fred Hocker is the head of those “Vasa researchers,” and credit 
goes to Sharon Dounce for making the personal connection to him. Hocker insists on pointing out that, 
while it may well be possible to execute some maneuvers without the helm, it’s clear from contemporary 
sources (Smith’s Seaman’s Grammar and Mainwaring’s Sea-mans Dictionary) that other maneuvers 
required the helm, especially those that involved using the helm in opposition to the sails (Hocker, personal 
communication, 18-19 August 2015). 
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claiming that the wheel provided precise enough steering to allow maintaining control 
while sailing as close to the wind as the jib allows. Losing control while sailing close-
hauled could result in an accidental tack, damaging or destroying the rig, and probably 
wounding or killing crew, or cause the vessel to come to a sudden stop and lie helpless. 
McGowan’s interpretation seemed reasonable, but Nick Burningham, who is in an 
exceptionally good position to comment on it, disagrees. “McGowan’s jib-wheel 
connection doesn’t impress me at all. Duyfken steers just as precisely as a wheel-steered 
ship with a good helmsman at the helm and just as badly with a poor helmsman.” On the 
critical importance of good helmsmanship, he writes from his own experience at sea:  
The challenge is to prevent square riggers from tacking themselves when 
sailing on the wind. If you luff up aggressively, or the wind shifts 
significantly, and the sails on the foremast get aback, the ship will be 
heading round to the new tack before the watch officer can [splutter 
expletives].
20
  
 
 We read that wheels replaced tillers and whipstaffs for steering after 1700 because 
wheels were so much easier and more effective to use, and authors muse about why it 
took so long to make that transition. However, replica masters report that actually the 
tiller and whipstaff method works fine.
21
 Technical ship history tells us that the 
technological impediments in the way of developing effective wheel steering were 
daunting and took a long time and many failed attempts to overcome. With a satisfactory 
system in use and difficulties in the way of adopting an alternative, the tiller and 
                                   
20
 Burningham, personal e-mail, 4 May 2015. When this happens suddenly due to a wind shift, it is called 
being “taken aback,” hence the origin of that expression. 
 
21
 A tiller is, simply put, a stout stick attached to the top of the rudder with which to move it. On ships, this 
tiller had to be below decks, so a whipstaff—vertical pole attached to the tiller and run up through holes in 
the lower deck(s), allowed a topside helmsman to move the tiller. 
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whipstaff were under strong selection to persist. That point does not seem to have made it 
into general academic maritime history. Steele cites John Harland and Alan McGowan on 
this subject—strong sources on such matters—but he does not mention the technical 
difficulties Harland discusses in his Mariner’s Mirror article.22 Also, while it is doubtless 
true, as Steele writes, that wheel steering “dramatically increased rudder control on larger 
vessels”23 due to increased mechanical advantage—provided the system was functioning 
properly
24—it is important to know how much larger those vessels needed to be for that 
advantage to manifest itself, all other things being equal, if we are to understand the 
relationship between wheel steering and ship size. The wheel offered advantages beyond 
the mechanical. Mounted on deck rather than below, it offered a less-restricted view for 
the helmsman, especially of the sails. With no deck over his head, the helmsman on a 
wheel-steered vessel could look up and see what the sails are doing while he steered. 
Hocker gives specific examples: 
The limited view problem is acute in both Vasa and Kalmar Nyckel. In the 
former, the helmsman cannot see the horizon, so cannot judge if he is 
holding a straight course except by the compass, which is problematical 
due to the lag in compass movement. In KN, the helmsman cannot see the 
sails, so cannot be given a course such as “full and by”.25 
To what extent did that issue select for the adoption of the wheel? 
                                   
22
 See John Harland, “The Early History of the Steering Wheel,” Mariner's Mirror 58:1 (1972): 41-68.  
 
23
 Steele, 49-50. 
 
24
 Samuel Kelly recounts that he once had to cut the steering rope when it took a riding turn over another on 
the drum, jamming the steering as a pilot was maneuvering the ship through some rocks, and use the tiller 
to steer the ship (in these systems the wheel actually drives a tiller belowdecks). He says it is the only such 
incident he was ever aware of, though. Samuel Kelly, Samuel Kelly: An Eighteenth Century Seaman, ed. 
Crosbie Garstin (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), 265-266.   
 
25
 Hocker, personal communication, 18-19 August 2015. 
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 Discussion of steering issues continues among replica sailors. One view holds that 
seventeenth-century vessels did not rely on their rudders as more modern vessels do, and 
as we assume vessels must. Sail trim, as Chip Reynolds of Half Moon pointed out to me, 
is the primary means of directional control, with the rudder serving more as a trim tab for 
fine-tuning.
26
 Eric Speth also uses the term “trim tab” to explain the rudder’s role to new 
crew on his ships.
27
 Sharon Dounce of Kalmar Nyckel concurs: “We play around with our 
sail plan from time to time, and we can get it balanced enough that we don’t need to use 
any helm to drive the boat…we can just shove the helm in the strap and not touch it at 
all.” This would have greatly increased ease of operation on a voyaging vessel with no 
automatic self-steering. Dounce says the rudder is for starting a tack but after about 15 
degrees, the sails take over the whole process. Speth notes of his largest Jamestown 
vessel, Susan Constant, that she only has 12 degrees of rudder throw, so proper sail 
balance and trimming are critical.
28
 Of the whipstaff, Dounce says “it’s so easy to know 
how much helm you have” unlike with a wheel, where all you know is how many times 
you have turned the wheel—even a new helmsperson can tell how much rudder angle 
they have with a tiller and whipstaff.
29
 That advantage might be offset by decreasing 
mechanical advantage of the tiller and whipstaff as rudder angle increases, if the forces 
involved are great enough. Fred Hocker points out “that the mechanical advantage of the 
                                   
26
 Reynolds, Skype interview, 8 January 2015. 
 
27
 Speth, telephone interview, 14 August 2015. 
 
28
 Speth, telephone interview, 14 August 2015. 
 
29
 Dounce, telephone interview, 23 April 2015. Also see Steele, 49-50, and 332, note 39; Harland, “The 
Early History of the Steering Wheel,” 41-68; and McGowan, The Century Before Steam, 16.  
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wheel is constant at all rudder angles, while the advantage of the whipstaff decreases as 
rudder angle (and thus force) increases, regardless of rudder size.”30 Hocker cautions that 
replica captains’ anecdotes  
[tend] to maintain an older fiction that pre-wheel ships were steered with 
the sails rather than the rudder, but I believe that this is a 
misunderstanding. You CAN tack a ship with the sails alone, but that was 
equally possible in the 19
th
 or 20
th
 century. Both the primary literature 
(handbooks and ships’ logbooks) from the 17th century and the practical 
experience [show] that the narrow rudder and whipstaff [are] more than 
adequate to steer a ship, and some operations (tacking and heaving to) 
require the rudder to operate in opposition to the sails. What is important 
is sail and helm balance (in ANY sailing ship) – choosing the right sails to 
set makes a large difference in the workload at the helm and course 
stability.
31
 
So the issue is more complex than the historical literature might lead us to believe, and 
warrants further investigation, because if we truly understand specific examples of 
continuity and change, then we stand to gain a better understanding of the overall 
relationship between technology and the society that used it. If we keep passing down a 
simple explanation uncritically, that understanding eludes us without our even knowing 
it. 
 Much of the evidence points toward increasing vessel size as the imperative 
driving the installation of wheel steering for mechanical advantage. Captains Dounce and 
                                   
30
 Hocker, personal communication 18-19 August 2015. 
 
31
 Hocker, personal communication, 18-19 August 2015. Hocker and others involved with Vasa are 
working on a report on steering systems and what they have learned from the recovered Swedish wreck and 
from replica trials.  
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Reynolds pointed out, respectively, though, that the Swedish flagship Vasa and the great 
Dutch East Indiamen of the period were tiller-and-whipstaff-steered.
32
 Hocker says  
Manwayring believed that the whipstaff was not useful on large ships, but 
the historical and archaeological evidence does not bear this out. Our 
calculations show that the whipstaff on K[almar] N[yckel] should take 
MORE effort to handle than that on Vasa, yet KN can be steered in a storm 
by a small woman in her 70s….33 
We have no reason to think that the steering of these larger ships was ineffective, but 
what if wheel steering on later, larger ships allowed for larger rudders? Burningham 
disposes of that question. “[I]n general large sailing ships had small rudders irrespective 
of the steering system.”34  That supports Hocker’s comment that what was true of 17th-
century ships was true of 18
th
-, 19
th
-,  and 20
th
-century ships as well in that regard. So did 
wheel steering make larger vessels easier to steer than tiller-and-whipstaff systems? 
Hocker complicates it further by presenting a caveat to the “conventional wisdom … that 
bigger ships require bigger steering effort and more mechanical advantage.” While 
generally true, the problem is actually “governed by tiller size…the larger vessel will 
probably not have a tiller proportioned as well to its length.” 
By careful choice of geometry, it is possible to cheat a little. Vasa gets 
away with relatively small steering effort due to a narrow rudder and a 
very long tiller …. Nyckel has higher relative steering efforts because it 
                                   
32
 Dounce, telephone interview, 23 April 2015; Reynolds, Skype interview, 8 January 2015. This issue is 
still under investigation. 
 
33
 Hocker, personal communication, 18-19 August 2015. This comment also brings up the interesting 
complication of how to trust expert primary sources. Mainwaring (or Manwayring) was one of the most 
experienced and accomplished seamen of his day. As Hocker put it, “[t]his shows that there are areas where 
replica sailing may not only challenge the received wisdom of the secondary sources, but may reveal errors 
in perception in primary sources” (Hocker, personal e-mail, 20 August 2015).  
 
34
 Burningham, personal e-mail, 4 May 2015. 
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has a proportionally wider rudder and much shorter tiller. This also means 
that it gets away with a much shorter and more manageable whipstaff….35 
What Hocker is getting at here is that we have another issue of one component getting in 
the way of others. Look at any accurate model of a square-rigged sailing ship and you 
need know nothing at all about how any of it works to be struck by how complicated and 
crowded it is. A large ship cannot have as proportionally long a tiller as a smaller one. 
There is no room for it. This brings us back to considering size as the primary—but not 
exclusive—imperative toward wheel steering in its early years.  
 We have established that multiple factors always exist for any specific 
technological continuity or change on these ships. Given that, is there any merit to 
McGowan’s idea that we must consider the wheel and the jib together? If so, is there a 
correlation between increasing size and the triangular jib? Or is Burningham entirely 
correct to dismiss that connection? 
Third technical focus: headsails 
Speaking of triangular jibs, we read that their adoption improved windward ability and 
ease of sail handling over the clumsy spritsail and sprit-topsail of earlier vessels (see 
Figure 16—Barlow’s Mayflower had a spritsail and sprit-topsail for headsails). Yet 
replica crews report that, once they learned to use those earlier sails, they served to 
control the head of the ship and assist the rudder in steering her quite handily. This goes 
back to Alan Villiers and his transatlantic voyage in Mayflower II in 1957—the only 
insight from a period replica found in a maritime history secondary source. John Harland 
                                   
35
 Hocker, personal communication, 18-19 August 2015. 
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refers to Villiers’ experience in Seamanship, as well as in a Mariner’s Mirror article.36 
Villiers’ experience is corroborated by Burningham from his experience aboard Duyfken. 
Of Kalmar Nyckel’s spritsail, Sharon Dounce says it is difficult to balance the sail plan 
without it.
37
 
 It is clear that much of the specific skill set used every day on a 17
th
 and early 
18
th
-century vessel was lost even before the end of commercial sail. John Harland tacitly 
acknowledges this when he makes a refreshing break from the dismissive presumption 
regarding 17
th
-century designs and rigs that creeps into ship history by rejecting the idea 
that the sprit-topsail remained in use as long as it did for reasons other than usefulness. 
To him,  
…it is inconceivable that the seamen and shipbuilders of the day, as 
practical men, would have tolerated the consequences of poor design 
unless they saw, or thought they saw, some immediate advantage in so 
doing. However that may be, the old-fashioned spritsail topsail remains, in 
my view, pretty much an enigma.
38
  
 
Only experimental archaeology is likely to solve that enigma at this point—if anything 
can. Kalmar Nyckel has a sprit topsail, and Dounce reports that it does contribute to fine-
tuning sail plan balance in light air (light wind), but that, while they have experimented 
with different ways to rig it, it is skill- and labor-intensive to use and requires care to set 
                                   
36
 Harland, Seamanship, 85; and “The Early History of the Steering Wheel,” note 9, p. 65. Both pieces refer 
to Villiers’ Give Me A Ship To Sail (New York: Scribner, 1959), 298. Also see Villiers, “How We Sailed 
the New Mayflower to America” National Geographic 92:5 (1957): 632. 
 
37
 Burningham, “Learning to Sail the Duyfken Replica,” 78-79; Dounce, telephone interview, 23 April 
2015. 
 
38
 Harland, Seamanship, 89.  
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and douse, and that they do not use it very often.
39
 Burningham wrote that the sprit-
topsail was rarely set, and that it would have “probably contributed almost nothing to 
speed through the water under any circumstance.”40 Burningham would no doubt agree 
that, if the sail were intended as a balancing and/or maneuvering sail, a contribution to 
speed might not have been expected.  
 Dounce thinks Kalmar Nyckel’s sprit-topsail is undersized, as they have been able 
to bend a larger sail to the spars in an experiment. A larger sail would more effectively 
accomplish the purpose. While Kalmar Nyckel makes daysails and short coastal trips, the 
original was a large, heavy voyager, and prolonged light winds can be just as dangerous 
to a voyaging ship as storms, for different reasons. Any sails that allowed a ship to take 
full advantage of a light breeze to move a little faster, wallow a little less, or be easier to 
steer could have been valuable to a voyager carrying fatigued humans and limited stores. 
 Crews of vessels like Australia’s Duyfken, New York’s Half Moon, and 
Mayflower II of Massachusetts, coming out of formative experiences with later sailing 
rigs, had to figure out how these earlier ships worked through trial and error. Chip 
Reynolds, for example, said that when he first reported aboard Half Moon, having come 
out of an early 20
th
 century topsail schooner, he was appalled by her rig, assessing it as 
“sloppy” and “inefficient,” and wanted to re-rig her, but soon came to appreciate the 
machine for what she was.
41
 Half Moon, though, was designed to be efficient as a long-
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distance sailer. Captain Walter Rybka of U.S. Brig Niagara came out of an 1877 iron 
three-masted bark,
42
 a cargo carrier designed and rigged for economy of operation, and 
when he reported aboard the replica War of 1812 brig, he guessed that, with her tall rig 
and light purchases intended solely for speed, power, and maneuverability for short-term 
emergency service, she would be about 30% more work to sail, even though the two 
ships shared some basic dimensions. “I was absolutely dead wrong,” Rybka says. “It was 
200% more work.” This is a good reminder of the sharply different imperatives for 
merchant and naval vessels. The latter do not place any priority on economizing crew—
they have very large crews, as cost of labor is no object, so they can have highly labor-
intensive rigs that optimize speed and maneuverability without regard for workload. The 
lighter purchases on Niagara—with two-to-one mechanical advantage rather than three-
to-one, as those on Elissa have, are much harder to work, but work much faster, as less 
rope has to go through the blocks to get the spar or sail to move. So the Niagara can 
maneuver faster—but only because she has the human power on board to do so.43  
 The aggregate of what they have learned is that it is not helpful to think of the 
earlier ships as better or worse than their successors. Pros and cons, advantages and 
disadvantages—those concepts only have meaning in the specific context of the vessel’s 
operating time and place. Early ships do not always strike their compromises in the same 
places as later ships, but they were well-suited to do what they did when they did.  
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Fourth technical focus: topsails 
This is not to suggest that we should avoid comparisons across those space and time 
contexts. We cannot avoid them, if we are to understand why some things changed and 
others did not. Both Burningham and Reynolds reported positively on half-hoisting 
topsails in heavy weather, a technique that involves letting the topsails belly in a stiff 
breeze—utterly counter-intuitive to a modern sailor—the exact opposite of what we 
would think to do. They discovered it by trial and error. When they struck the topsails, 
the ships could not make proper way, but when they flattened them, as we do with 
modern sails, they were overpowered.
44
 Eric Speth reports that he routinely employs this 
method of ‘reefing’ on the two smaller Jamestown replicas, and that it works well “from 
off the wind to a beam reach”—any point of sail where the wind is from perpendicular to 
the centerline of the ship to dead astern.
45
 
 Sharon Dounce of the Kalmar Nyckel, though, is not as sanguine about the rig of 
her vessel vis-à-vis that which would offer more versatile options for sail combinations. 
She remembered an experience in heavy weather in which they half-hoisted a topsail, but 
it was not a stable set—there was too much chafe, the sail blew around too much, the sail 
would fill and spill, contributing to the rolling and jerking the ship was enduring in the 
quartering sea. A smaller lower topsail, as would be found on an 18
th
-century ship, would 
have been better than the baggy half-hoisted larger topsail, she says. She was concerned 
about the topmast breaking the whole time. She attributes the later division of sails both 
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to making it easier to handle, which she thinks it would be, and also to offer more options 
for setting sail in different conditions. She did say, though, that half-hoisting the topsails 
definitely gave the ship more power forward—just at a significant cost.46 Her assessment 
of this experience on a ship larger than Duyfken, and thus with larger sails, might support 
Burningham’s view of the merit for split lower topsails for larger ships—he calls double 
topsails “a great improvement for big ships.”47 The caveat here is that we need to take 
into account any changes in the cut of the sails themselves. Burningham himself has 
found an account of an early 19
th
 century French vessel “lowering the deep-reefed 
topsails to the cap in very fierce squalls when trying to keep off a lee shore,” but he did 
not mention the size of the vessel.
48
 
  If the later split topsails were adopted primarily as a labor-saving modification, 
did handier sail-shortening in heavy air come along as a bonus benefit, as increased 
capacity for nutrient delivery came along with increased capacity for oxygen delivery in 
Kinsey’s example of the circulatory system? Or was more flexibility in shortening sail 
the driving factor behind the change? At least for smaller vessels, Burningham suggests 
we also consider fashion: “The adoption of double topsails in the 1860s is a good 
example. Double topsails were a great improvement for big ships, but by 1875 nearly all 
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topsail schooners had fitted double topsails for no obvious reason. I strongly suspect the 
desire to look up-to-date was at play.”49 
 If replica analysis cannot support the idea that some technologies were 
intrinsically superior to others in terms of performance, then we have even more 
motivation to look for other reasons why specific technologies gained favor for use in 
specific situations.   
Fifth technical focus: hull design 
The biggest challenge to understanding the design side of this replica business is that 
posed by the nature of artisanal craft, explored in Chapter Four. We established there that 
one cannot build an ordinary merchant ship from the treatises alone and have any 
confidence that it will be accurate—that the overwhelming majority of merchant vessels, 
especially the smaller ones, were built by people who did not need or use a treatise to do 
it. They could do it because they had learned how to do it as apprentices and journeymen 
and masters. They might have known some basic math and some basic geometry, or they 
might not have, but an experienced builder had a highly tuned visual sense based on 
experience of how closely the complex shapes of the vessel matched what he knew from 
that experience constituted proper design. Eric Speth recounts that, when experienced 
builder Jim Richardson was building the Maryland Dove replica on the Chesapeake Bay 
to a William Baker design, he would try to make changes to the design based on what his 
builder’s eye was seeing as the ship took shape, and when Baker would visit for 
inspections, Baker would protest the changes. The eye of the experienced shipwright is 
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still compelling in our age of plans and computer models.
50
 Building replicas, and 
considering that process from an anthropological perspective, can help us understand the 
process as it took place in the early modern period, just as observing working 
boatbuilders can, as we established in Chapter Four.  
 We also discussed castling in Chapter Four. When William Baker designed the 
Mayflower II in 1955-1957 (see Figure 18, following page), he took pains to reduce 
weight in the scantlings of the stern castle, and he expected significant windage from it. 
David Thorpe, one of her crew on her transatlantic crossing in 1957, remembers that “the 
sterncastle acted like a weathervane but only enough for the ship to take the seas forward 
of amidships such that she lay comfortably."
51
 Her master, Alan Villiers, learned in heavy 
Atlantic storms that the stern castle and the other characteristics of the ship’s hull design 
allowed her to lie a-hull easily. Lying a-hull is stopping at sea by putting the helm over 
with no sail up, so that the vessel makes minimal forward or sideways progress. It is a 
way to ride out storms when continuing to sail becomes too dangerous. Most modern 
sailing vessels will not do that. They must heave-to, which requires setting some sail 
against the rudder. That is potentially dangerous to crew, sails, and rig when the weather 
is violent.
52
 All evidence touching on the subject notes the ease with which one of these 
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ships could lie a-hull in a storm, to ride just like a duck with her head tucked under her 
wing, as the old simile goes.
53
 
  
 
Figure 18 Mayflower II.54 
 
 Chip Reynolds, master of the Half Moon, an operating replica intended to 
represent Henry Hudson’s vessel Halve Maen, recounted his first experience of sailing 
that vessel out of a protected harbor and into high seas. The swells outside were high 
enough that he feared burying the bow—an anxiety heightened by the height of the poop 
deck—the deck built on top of the stern castle. As he stood on its steep downward slope, 
he felt almost vertical going down the waves. He was worried about losing the forecastle. 
The bluff bow, though, was so buoyant that she rose up the other side of the swell 
without "one splash of water on the deck of the ship." There is no question, as far as 
Reynolds is concerned, that the bluff bow slows the ship down relative to a sharper one, 
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but "it has such buoyancy that it's nearly impossible to bury that bow in a sea." The 
speed sacrifice is "immaterial" in comparison. In 36 hours, they had "one splash of water" 
come aboard. With high rails and dry decks, he permitted the crew to move about without 
jacklines.
55
 "It was almost inconceivable to think of getting knocked off."
56
 Reynolds’ 
anecdote reminds us again that no design aspect exists independently of others, and 
changing one means the list of pros and cons of the others will change too. The bluff bow 
provided enough buoyancy to keep the forecastle protected from boarding seas. The 
stern, too, would need to be buoyant to support the weight of the stern castle, and the hull 
would need to be stable enough to resist the higher center of gravity and the windage of 
the protruding upper works. So moving toward a leaner, sleeker hull would create an 
imperative to reduce that superstructure considerably. Was there any such trend in hull 
design in the period? Yes, and we should experiment to get data on the relationship 
between that and reducing superstructure. 
 The problem of hull design historical accuracy for the 17
th
-century replicas is 
compelling and instructive. Differences in design approaches reflect different opinions 
about how the originals were built—opinions which have evolved over time but have not 
completely coalesced into consensus—and the different approaches throw into stark relief 
the challenges of interpreting the evidence, especially when the written evidence—the 
treatises on naval architecture—does not tell us all that we wish it would. Because 
replicas are not usually built for experimental archaeology, historical accuracy of hull 
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form is not always a high priority, even if the designers have a good idea of what that 
accuracy entails, and even if the regulatory apparatus allows such accuracy. Fred Hocker 
was “the naval architect of record for a sailing replica—a medieval cog in Malmö, 
Sweden—and … found that the coast guard is often more accommodating in this respect 
than the customer.”57 William Baker had to make Mayflower II’s decks much stronger—
and thus heavier—than he knew the originals’ would have been, because the replica 
would have to withstand hordes of dockside visitors on her decks for decades.
58
 Still, a 
design that does not accurately represent what it is supposed to may still offer valuable 
experimental data. Kalmar Nyckel has a hull that is “nothing like a Dutch pinnace of the 
1620s,” says Hocker. “[I]t is much more like an English frigate of the 1700s, with 
substantial deadrise, long entrance and run, etc. It thus does not handle like a pinnace.”59 
We are lucky that we know enough about Dutch pinnaces of the 1620s for Hocker to be 
able to say that, and we are also lucky that we can still use Kalmar Nyckel as a floating 
laboratory for learning about sail handling with 17
th
-century rigs and the handling 
characteristics of English frigate hulls of the 1700s. The replica may not be ideal, but she 
is still quite useful as long as we are responsible about interpreting what it is she has to 
teach. 
 We have at least two important issues to work on with the 17
th
-century vessels. 
The first is the questionable stability of the English ships. Indications are that it was an 
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original issue. If so, that should explain why it has been a replica issue as well. Stability 
comes up in almost every discussion of replica vessels. In almost every case, 
modifications to replicas have been made to increase inherent stability to meet current 
expectations for safety.
60
 Those modifications, though, are not all the same, and have 
been most extreme on the replicas of early 17
th
-century English ships. To some extent, 
that supports what Adams taught us, discussed in Chapter Five.  
 Vessels throughout the period depended much more on the stability created by 
loading and trimming. Our regulatory authorities demand that the stability they stipulate 
be built into the vessel. There is more to it than that, though. We are replicating machines 
built by people who had starkly different notions of acceptable risk, and who took very 
different things for granted than we do. They did not carry life jackets, and that is just a 
token example of the gulf between 17
th
-century concepts of “safety” and ours. "…[O]ur 
seafaring people,” mused Benjamin Franklin, “are brave, despite danger, and reject … 
precautions of safety, being cowards only in one sense, that of fearing to be thought 
afraid."
61
 
 We are on much surer footing if we assume that the standard for vessel stability of 
1620—if that notion in this context is indeed anything but an anachronism—would have 
been significantly different from those recommended by today’s marine engineers and 
imposed by the regulatory authorities of modern industrial states. Sharon Dounce says 
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that the replica Kalmar Nyckel’s designers deliberately departed somewhat from the 
original in order to increase inherent stability.
62
 Eric Speth reports that Stan Potter, naval 
architect for the current Susan Constant replica at Jamestown, did the same, and that 
Golden Hind in England has “blisters” on her hull for increased stability, as does Stan 
Potter’s Elizabeth II replica.63 These are the “most extreme” modifications mentioned 
earlier.  
 Captain Walter Rybka of U.S. Brig Niagara reports that his ship, with its shoal 
draft, tall Navy rig, and 20 guns, would have been “terrifying” to sail originally, and that 
they have heavily ballasted the replica both externally and internally and would not be 
sailing her otherwise. The Niagara is an extreme example of another sort. She was a 
warship built to contradictory imperatives—shoal draft, heavy armament, speed and 
maneuverability, and accelerated construction—for emergency use, but her case adds to 
the aggregate evidence suggesting that original “standards of stability” are generally 
unacceptable to us—as are so many risks routinely taken by 17th and 18th-century 
mariners. 
 We are making progress on the issue of stability in 17
th
-century English ships and 
replicas, as outlined in Chapter Five. Burningham wrote: “I believe William Baker 
correctly and faithfully followed his namesake Matthew, and other sources in designing 
Mayflower II, which seems to tell us that the tangent-arc design techniques cannot be 
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used to design a useful merchant sailing ship.”64 He goes on to recount the serious 
stability problems the replica experienced upon launch—stability problems that did not, 
however, prevent a successful transatlantic crossing. Nonsuch experienced similar 
problems in 1968, and was deemed unfit to cross the Atlantic, though she accomplished 
extensive work in North American coastal waters.
65
 All the evidence supports 
Burningham on Baker’s thoroughness, including Baker’s own book on designing the 
replica, which details his process and acknowledges the problems.
66
 Our best hope for 
more accurate replica hull designs in the absence of plans for the originals, though, is 
archaeology—and the permission of funding sources and regulatory agencies to build 
accurate hulls based on that archaeology. That, however, is a tall order, and barring that, 
we will need to take Timm Weski’s advice and rely more on modeling for learning what 
we need to learn about the performance ramifications of variations in hull design.
67
 
Sixth technical focus: the human component of the machine 
When we consider the other mechanical force on the ship besides the wind and the 
water—the humans setting and dousing sails, pulling on ropes, and moving the rudder—
we open another enlightening discussion. Indications are that the number of trained crew 
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required to work the vessel is comparable for replica and original, though original crews 
frequently would have been larger in the earlier ships to meet defensive needs and to 
provide a cushion for casualties to disease and armed conflict. While one might assume 
that the original crews were tougher and more inured to hardship than we are, we should 
remember that they were also much more likely to be malnourished, sick, and exhausted. 
What conversations with replica operators have to teach on this is that the skill and 
experience of the crew are every bit as central to vessel performance as the primary 
source literature indicates. As Chip Reynolds of the Half Moon put it, referring to the 
difference in rudder design between earlier and later ships, “you’re not going to be able to 
use the technology to compensate for lack of skill.”68 On the other hand, Sharon Dounce 
pointed out how much useful work could be done on Kalmar Nyckel with unskilled or 
semiskilled labor. With the simple rig and simple direct steering system, even untrained 
passengers can haul on a line to move a sail, and even a new helmsperson can feel what 
the whipstaff is doing to the rudder angle. Her experience with this has helped her 
understand how the original vessel could function with conscripted landsmen, which they 
know she carried.
69
 Given the perpetual shortage of skilled seamen in this period, 
lowering the required aggregate skill set would have been advantageous in that respect. In 
terms of expertise, it may well be that modern replica crews, if they are experienced 
enough, have better-developed skills in general than their original counterparts. From his 
experience on the Kalmar Nyckel, Hocker writes that the replica crew gets far more sail-
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handling and maneuvering experience than the original crew would have, because they 
“complete a passage once or twice every day of the sailing season,” whereas the original 
crew would have spent most of their time either in port or on long passages with less sail 
changes.
70
 
 That is not to suggest that the original sailors did not know how to do things that 
we no longer know how to do the same way. That is what much of the on-board 
experimentation is about—trying to figure out how best to perform operational tasks, 
assuming that the original sailors would have figured out the same things over time. What 
replica experience can teach us is how many able-bodied adult humans it takes to operate 
a certain vessel rigged a certain way in certain conditions. If we are confident in the 
accuracy of a replica, we can compare that number to the number of crew known to have 
served on a similar vessel originally, and if there is a difference, begin to explore why 
that might be. Was there a shortage of hands on board? If so, why might that be? Local 
economic conditions may be at work, or the master’s—or the ship’s—bad reputation may 
have preceded the vessel to port. If she carried more than she needed for operation, that 
cost money. Was her master concerned about the aggregate skill level on board, and 
thought to compensate with more muscle? Was he nervous about encountering predatory 
vessels?  
The method and the problems: Experimental archaeology in the real world 
The way we are analyzing information from these replicas is a makeshift form of 
experimental archaeology. Experimental archaeology has a history and a methodology, 
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both inside and outside the maritime world, going back to the 1960s.
71
 According to a 
large group of co-authors from archaeology and history who wrote an article for the 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 20 years ago, the ideal first step in using a 
replica vessel for experimental archaeology is to build it exclusively and specifically for 
use in experimental archaeology.
72
 This is the real world, though, and in the real world, 
multi-million dollar replicas
73
 are not ever built exclusively for experimental 
archaeology
74—though they may be, and have been, built with the declared intent of 
being used for that purpose—among others.75 Nick Burningham writes that, despite the 
unusual dedication to the research aspect of the Duyfken replica project, that aspect alone 
would never have justified the expense. Commemoration, sail training, and the sailing 
ship’s “ability to capture the popular imagination” are among the chief reasons such 
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vessels are built.
76
 Replica ships have to be able to represent their world and function in 
ours at the same time. Like every ship ever built, every replica is a set of compromises.  
 Replicas are built primarily for education, and in order to pay their bills, they need 
to carry paying passengers and support the weight of crowds of dockside visitors. In 
order to do that, they have to meet stringent modern governmental safety standards that 
were unheard-of when the originals were built. They also need the ability to 
accommodate these visitors and passengers—none of whom will be eating wormy 
hardtack, drinking fetid warm water from a barrel, or defecating through a hole in the 
forepeak into the ocean. Replicas carry auxiliary power, so they can go where they are 
scheduled to be regardless of the wind’s caprice, and they carry fuel tanks for their 
engines and have propellers sticking out of their sterns.
77
 They are not ballasted the way 
the originals were—they carry water tanks, fuel tanks, waste tanks, engines—all heavy, 
and all down low, out of sight. Weight is not spread vertically as it would have been in 
the original vessel.
78
 Replicas do not carry cargo the way the originals did.
79
 Some use 
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synthetic materials and in most cases modern construction techniques so they will last far 
longer than the originals did, providing a much-needed return on investment for the non-
profit organizations who build them, and because the timber used in the originals is no 
longer available.
80
 Fred Hocker points out that synthetic sailcloth and rigging are 
“stronger and more aerodynamically efficient” than their organic original counterparts—
that today’s synthetic sailcloth is “smoother in finish and tighter in weave, so it has 
significantly higher aerodynamic performance, harnessing more wind energy per square 
meter.” Because such sails can be set flatter, they are more efficient as airfoils. “Overall, 
this means more speed and better weatherliness.”81 Those qualities will last longer in 
service than those of natural-fiber sails. On the other hand, replica masters agree that 
natural-fiber sails could perhaps provide a safety factor that modern sails do not. If a 
vessel is overpowered by the wind, and her sails blow out or some of her running rigging 
parts, she is protected to some extent from losing her major spars or, worse, being 
knocked down. Modern synthetic sails and rigging are much stronger, and if in good 
condition, might resist strong gusts well enough to permit a knockdown or sprung mast 
that might have caused a blowout on an original vessel in the same conditions. When it 
happened, some wondered whether the knockdown that sank the original Pride of 
Baltimore replica in 1986 in a microburst, with the loss of four of her crew, might not 
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have happened with synthetic sails and rigging. Daniel Parrott points out, however, that 
neither the replica record nor the historical record provides any consistent evidence on 
difference in resistance to failure between natural and synthetic rig materials; that as far 
as those records show, whether or not such failures occurred in extreme events was 
“happenstance.” The Pride had an older canvas mainsail up when she was knocked 
down, and it did not blow out. Neither did her new, synthetic foresail.
82
 Still, for 
experimental-archaeology investigations of performance, we would do well to either 
equip our replicas with natural-fiber sails and rigging as close to the originals as we can 
get, or at least take into account the differences between the performance of the originals 
and synthetic reproductions in any evaluations of vessel performance. Like Duyfken, the 
Swedish Ship Götheborg has hemp rigging and flax sails, so that the experience of sailing 
her would be as close to the original as possible. Joakim Severinson, her master 
shipwright, reports that the hemp standing rigging “moves more than … wire rigging. But 
we also noticed that this type of rigging is more adjustable than … wire rigging with 
fixed yards.”83 So there is a specific advantage and disadvantage. The more of those we 
discover, the easier we can discard simplistic assumptions about what is “better” and 
what is “progress.”     
 Götheborg’s propellers fold, like Duyfken’s, and she too was reconstructed based 
on extensive archaeological evidence from the wreck of the original, as well as the other 
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usual sources. Her speed and handling are likely to be very close indeed to a clean-
bottomed original.
84
 All of these differences between original and replica have to be 
considered if we’re to have any hope of making apples-to-apples comparisons. 
 Regardless of their historical accuracy relative to each other, though, these 
replicas are not Disney props. Each one considered here represents years of research, 
years of traditional wooden shipbuilding experience, and in some cases, a determination 
to remain as faithful to the original vessel as possible. In important ways, the history of 
the design, construction, and operation of these vessels is a history of what we have 
learned about the originals. The clearest example of this is probably the Jamestown fleet, 
three sets of which have now been built and operated, beginning in the 1950s with the 
latest vessels built in 2006-2007.
85
 There is nothing like having to recreate the thing to 
force all the questions we might otherwise miss into the fronts of our brains, to weigh 
sometimes-contradictory evidence, and to justify to other people the judgment calls we 
make to get the project done. Here the dovetailing between experimental archaeology and 
shipwreck archaeology is an elegant one. A shipwreck archaeologist like David Moore, 
trying to reconstruct on paper a small late 17
th
-century slaver from scattered and battered 
remains, uses a very similar investigative and interpretive process to that used by naval 
architect William Baker in designing the replica Mayflower. The two projects only 
diverge when Baker has to make concessions to legality, safety, and practicality in order 
to have his vessel built. Moore does not have to worry about that. It is those differences—
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as well as our own judgments about how closely the design adhered to what we know or 
think we know about the original type—that we focus on to determine how much we can 
rely on a built replica as a historical source. What is clear is that, were we to take some of 
the “makeshift” out of “makeshift experimental archaeology,” and conduct some 
methodologically defensible, planned experiments on board these replicas—as Fred 
Hocker is doing on Kalmar Nyckel—we could rely on replicas as a historical source that 
much more. The remainder of this chapter elaborates on that thought. 
An experimental control? 
It should be clear by now that these replicas are never going to provide an ideal 
controlled laboratory setting for analyzing vessel performance. It should also be clear by 
now how much we stand to learn from them anyway, if we take care. If we are thinking 
in terms of laboratory experiments, it may be possible to establish a useful control for 
replica experiments, using a replica based on extensive historical information. HMS 
Sultana is a prime example, and indeed the ideal scenario for a replica.
86
 Benjamin 
Hallowell, a noted Boston shipwright, built the schooner on speculation in 1767-8, 
hoping to sell her to the Royal Navy. To that end, he had her sailed to London when she 
was finished, and the Navy did indeed buy her. Lucky for us, since only the Navy would 
have ever bothered to survey such a run-of-the-mill small merchant vessel, take her lines 
off, and make a detailed inventory of her original rig and equipment, as well as her new 
high-performance Navy rig, and armament. The Navy sailed her back to America to use 
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her as an interceptor, enforcing the tightened Townshend Act customs duties, but by 1773 
the burning of the Gaspée in Rhode Island and other hostile incidents convinced the Navy 
that they needed more powerful vessels for this duty, and they brought Sultana back to 
England, sold her, and she faded from history.
87
 Fortunately, the records left by the Navy, 
and all the ship’s logbooks, survived. So we know how she was originally designed and 
built, how she was rigged and re-rigged, what she carried, and how she performed in use 
configured as both a merchant ship and a small makeshift warship. That depth of 
knowledge and treasure chest of information made her a perfect candidate for a replica, 
and we can compare her speeds and performance characteristics with those recorded for 
the original. Sultana provides a rare opportunity to cross-reference replica performance to 
original performance. That in turn could take much of the speculation out of doing the 
same with other replicas we have reason to be confident are accurate, such as Duyfken 
and Götheborg. The relationship between replica and original performance of Sultana 
might serve as an otherwise-unattainable rule of thumb for hypothesizing that 
relationship in cases where the historical record is nowhere near as complete. 
 In order to accomplish that, though, we have to consider all the actual and 
possible differences between replicas and originals described above. In Sultana’s case, 
this especially means loading, trim, and differences in drag that take into account the 
propeller on the replica and what was sure to have been a much fouler bottom on the 
original, as well as issues related to synthetic sails and rigging already discussed. In this 
case, though, we might have the opportunity to quantify those differences. 
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 Burningham says of Duyfken’s two folding props that they caused “…very little 
drag and [required] no alteration to the stern. We did trial sailing before even the folding 
props and engines were fitted.” Ferreiro, the historian and naval architect, wrote: “At the 
slow speeds of 18
th
-century ships most of the significant resistance was due to viscosity 
resistance not to wavemaking resistance, so skin friction was the dominant factor for 
sailing ships, as would be proven in the 1830s.”88 According to archaeologist Colin 
Palmer, who has tested period reconstruction sailing performance and published on the 
subject, “the fouling of a hull after one season in tropical waters can more than double the 
frictional resistance of the hull…”89 Samuel Kelly relates in his memoir that a grass-
fouled bottom of a ship he was in made it “impossible for her to beat to windward”—a 
dangerous limitation.
90
 Propeller drag does not offer anything like that kind of resistance.
 It is safe to assume that the replica’s cleaner, smoother bottom would more than 
offset propeller drag—and introduce another difference between replica and original to 
take into account when making comparisons. Given what we know about synthetic sails, 
we can assume that a suit of the replica’s sails will out-perform the originals of similar 
age and condition. This is testable. Sail trials could generate hard numbers for the 
performance of period-accurate sails versus synthetic sails, as long as they were done on 
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the same vessel in the same condition and in the same operating conditions. We have the 
capability to quantify the difference in performance in sails and in hull resistance due to 
fouling and propeller drag. Of course, making a complete suit of cotton or flax sails using 
period-accurate techniques is expensive, and can only be justified for research purposes, 
for a vessel that already has a perfectly serviceable suit of synthetic sails. Nevertheless, 
given the funding and the willingness—and spare time—of the vessel’s owners and crew, 
these experiments could be carried out in such a way as to provide the sort of benchmark 
proposed here. Such efforts have been undertaken in Europe. They have not been 
undertaken on this side of the Atlantic, except recently on the Kalmar Nyckel, as 
mentioned. 
 Differences in internal distribution of weight—and changes in ballasting—affect 
motion and affect stiffness—how much the ship resists being heeled by the wind. That in 
turn helps to determine how much sail she can carry in a given wind on a given heading 
and sea state, and thus her speed and windward performance. We cannot expect a 
working replica like Sultana to rip out her engines, fuel and water tanks, and belowdecks 
accommodations to load an authentic 18
th
-century complement of stone ballast and mixed 
cargo. Barring the construction of a replica more specifically intended for research than 
any yet built for our period, we would need to rely on calculations by naval architects to 
determine what differences to take into account between the replica’s lading and 
ballasting and the original’s.  
 All of this is to say that only when we carefully factor in the differences between 
replica and original can we use the former to learn about the latter. To proceed with 
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experimental archaeology based on existing replicas, researchers would need to contrive 
a checklist of all differences likely to affect the outcome of experiments, agree on how to 
factor in those differences, and perform the necessary calculations to complete the 
checklist. 
For further investigation… 
Collecting and comparing accounts of experiences on replica vessels raise questions, and 
hint at answers, that challenge received wisdom and, by pulling us into the nitty-gritty of 
real-world tangible detail, make it more difficult for us to make the sorts of sweeping 
generalizations about technological continuity and change that we are so prone to. To 
move closer to answers—and to raise more questions—we need to devise actual 
experiments—conduct research using these vessels, as medieval and prehistoric 
archaeologists have been doing in northern Europe and the Mediterranean for decades. 
An example would be using Sultana to establish comparative performance data between 
the replica and what is reported in her original logs, as proposed. That could provide a 
rule of thumb for comparing the performance of an accurate replica to its original 
counterpart in cases where the historical record was not nearly as complete as it is for 
Sultana. Further proposed experiments for each of the six technical foci of the chapter 
follow.  
First technical focus: the mizzen sail 
1. To confirm Speth’s idea that the adoption of staysails would have selected for the 
abandonment of the lateen mizzen yard might only require manipulating a model fitted 
with both.  
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2. Replica sailing can give us an idea of manpower requirements for using similarly sized 
lateen mizzens, cut-back lateen mizzens, and gaff spankers, which might provide insight 
as to why they occurred in history in that order.  
3. We could compare labor requirements for the same sail on different-sized vessels, to 
advance the investigation of the implications of vessel size for design and rig. Speth 
reports that more labor is required to use Mayflower II’s lateen mizzen than on his 
smaller ships. How much more? If we could conduct such experiments in similar wind 
and sea conditions, we could add to our understanding of actual manpower requirements 
for working the vessel, as opposed to the number of crew a vessel actually carried.
91
 
Second technical focus: steering systems 
Hocker’s observations about tiller length make the wheel vs. tiller-and-whipstaff issue 
more complex. Given that the earlier system was employed on some of the largest ships 
of the entire period, the choice of one or the other cannot be explained by size alone. 
Given also that tillers remained in use on smaller vessels into our own time, size was 
clearly a factor. We may do no better than a comparative study of the operation of both 
systems on a variety of trustworthy replicas in real-world conditions, compiling 
experiences and observations on the advantages of one system on a particular vessel and 
how the other system might perform comparatively. The goal would be to better-
understand the imperatives driving the ultimate ubiquitous adoption of the wheel system 
on middling and large vessels. 
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Third technical focus: headsails 
1. Further experiments of the kind Sharon Dounce described on the Kalmar Nyckel with 
the sprit-topsail can only add to the little we understand about this mysterious device. If it 
was tricky to rig and trim, and labor-intensive, why did it persist so long when triangular 
sails mounted on headstays were already in use?  
2. It would be useful to compare how the same vessel performs with and without 
triangular jibs. Those sails were contemporaneous with the older spritsail throughout the 
period, so it is unlikely that they superseded that sail entirely. We do not need 
experiments to know that a triangular jib would be more useful for going to weather than 
a sprit-topsail. We could, though, use experiments to help determine how much that 
really mattered. 
Fourth technical focus: topsails 
1. The first experiment was inspired by Nick Burningham’s account of  sailing Duyfken 
on ocean passages, where he recounts the discovery of half-masting topsails in stronger 
breezes to keep the ship upright without losing driving force—the concept behind 
reefing.
92
 Did the type of topsail on those earlier vessels—tall, relatively narrow, cutaway 
foot—lend itself better to this technique than the later topsails we find on 18th-century 
rigs? What if the crew of an 18
th
-century replica tried that technique in similar 
conditions? Burningham thought this would be worth doing.
93
 Is it the case that the 
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technique works much better with smaller sails on a smaller vessel? Is that why Sharon 
Dounce found it unsatisfactory on Kalmar Nyckel, or is there another explanation for 
that? 
2. Did split topsails replace single topsails to save labor, and if so, in what way? By 
making easier work for the same number of crew, or by making the same work for a 
smaller crew? Maritime economic historians can tell us much about what maritime labor 
cost in a certain market at a certain time. We know that in general the ton-per-man ratios 
on British Atlantic merchant ships went up over the course of the period. If split topsails, 
then, do require fewer crew to handle safely and effectively, that is a promising 
explanation for their adoption, given the historical record—especially when we consider 
that increasing size was a major—if not the major—factor in that increasing ton-per-man 
ratio. If not, then what is at work there? Easing the crew’s burden and increasing their 
safety, as with footropes? Eric Speth attributes split topsails to size increases, and relates 
their adoption to that of footropes, which he considers an improvement—he believes both 
were more labor-efficient than lowering sails to the deck or having crew try to go aloft 
without them.
94
 How can we test the question aboard replica vessels by actually having 
real humans use both set-ups and report the results? That could only strengthen 
reasonable speculations like Speth’s, or send us looking for alternative—or additional—
explanations. 
 Before leaving the subject of rig, it is worth noting that all of the major changes in 
typical rigs took place contemporaneously with the tendency for the dividing line in 
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tonnage between two-masted and three-masted vessels to rise.
95
 Are the two tendencies 
connected? If so, how? 
Fifth technical focus: hull design 
1. Unless we make some truly miraculous archival find, we can only make progress in 
our understanding of hull design through archaeology. The written record does not give 
us enough, and iconography rarely depicts anything below the waterline. Duyfken and 
Götheborg, both based extensively on substantial archaeological remains, among other 
things, are promising. We can trust what they have to teach us about stability, resistance, 
maneuverability, capacity, and seaworthiness if we take into account differences in lading 
and ballasting. Government regulations are less strict for vessels that do not carry 
passengers for hire. Any opportunity to load and ballast a vessel authentically for 
experiments, crewed by volunteers, would be worth seizing.  
2. The stability problem discussed earlier is as compelling as any raised in this study. 
How much of the stability issue with replicas of period vessels is due to our correct 
reproduction of unstable original designs, and how much of it is attributable to our loss of 
the invisible process by which a “design” was translated into a ship—a process the 
treatises cannot accurately convey to us? Analysis of actual archaeological remains, and 
methodologically valid experiments, whether with models or replicas, based on those, is 
the way forward. At the same time, it is worth remembering that cultural history has 
already offered us something invaluable here. The standards, expectations, and values of 
a different culture than our own would surely guide the production and use of a different 
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sort of machine than what we would make. In fact, we would do well not to lose sight of 
the forest for the trees. We would never build nor use the ships we are studying here at 
all, except for the specific purpose of reconstructing and understanding a relic. 
3. Side-by-side sailing trials of vessels with different hull designs allow us to sidestep 
time. While it is exceedingly difficult to isolate individual factors contributing to 
differences, if we can actually experience how two very different vessels from different 
times compare in the same conditions, we can at least dispel common tacit assumptions 
and move on from there toward more useful apprehensions of comparative reality. While 
conducting sea trials with the current Godspeed in Penobscot Bay, Maine, Eric Speth 
took some of the builders and shipyard staff out. They were accompanied by some of the 
similarly sized late 19
th
- and early 20
th
-century schooners still common in those waters. 
People were surprised, he remembered, at how Godspeed sailed, how she carried sail, and 
how weatherly she was, with the qualification of course that she was a square-rigger and 
thus could not stay on a windward tack as long as a schooner. They were surprised that 
she could tack. It is common to assume that square-riggers do not tack, but always wear 
(jibe). “I do find them to be quite handy,” Speth said, speaking of both Godspeed and the 
smaller Discovery, “probably because of its size and its two-masted rig, the Discovery is 
delightful to sail and is very, very maneuverable … I can sail it backwards at times. … 
and Godspeed, there are times I can sail it backwards if the wind and the conditions are 
right.” He once had Maryland Dove out in the Chesapeake Bay and sailed her with the 
extreme schooner—‘Baltimore clipper’—Pride of Baltimore, and in the right conditions 
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could keep up with her, even with 30-40% less waterline and much less sail area.
96
 These 
early 17
th
-century ships are full-bodied, capacious carriers, intended to load as much as 
possible for their size without compromising sailing ability too much.  That “too 
much” is the hard part for us—what does that mean, for those people in that time? Sailing 
these ships together helps us answer that question. It seems to mean that performance was 
at least roughly comparable to ships with much sharper lines, much less capacity, and 
much more labor-intensive and damage-prone rigs. If Maryland Dove could keep up with 
Pride of Baltimore in some conditions, that also helps us to understand why we see as 
little variance in passage times in the age of sail as we do. What these vessels could do 
was, generally, dictated by conditions, rather than by their own intrinsic qualities.
97
 Those 
qualities, indeed, are best shaped to give the vessel the best chance of surviving those 
conditions and getting her crew and cargo where they are going. 
 The more such side-by-side sailing of vessels with different hulls we do, the 
better. We can carefully set about trying to isolate variables such as load and sail area 
when comparing their performance, but the more obvious differences are just as 
important—how close to the wind can each one get? How close are their speeds on the 
same broad reach? How is the motion? One day of such trials can generate so much 
information to consider, as nothing else can. 
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Sixth technical focus: the human component of the machine 
1. How many able-bodied adults does it take to trim the lateen mizzen on a beam reach in 
20 knots of wind? How about the same trial on a vessel similarly rigged but X% larger or 
smaller? How about one equipped with a lateen mizzen yard but with a cut-back mizzen 
sail? How about one with a more modern gaff spanker? 
2. Can we compile data on the number of crew it takes to actually operate a vessel on a 
voyage from port to port with and without defensive capability? We know how to work 
those ships and we know how to work those weapons. We could then do the same for a 
number of vessels, and cross-reference those numbers with the numbers Ralph Davis 
compiled and re-enter the discussion of how much the increase in tons-per-man ratio over 
time was attributable to increased security—the point that so compelled Shepherd and 
Walton. 
 Jim Graczyk, speaking from his experience on the replica Armed Sloop Welcome, 
gives us a clear idea of how precisely we can do this. The replica Welcome, now retired, 
needed a crew of ten or eleven to “man her under sail.” She carried seven guns—three 
deck-mounted swivel guns and four deck guns. “For us a full compliment in the gun crew 
was four gunners, two powder monkeys, one Linstock holder and a master gunner. Under 
good conditions some of the sail crew would man several guns.” Research in the records 
of the original ship revealed that when operating as an ordinary merchantman she carried 
a crew of five or six. When taken into the Provincial Marine, her minimum crew was 
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eight. On military sortie, “she had twelve sailors and twelve soldiers of the King’s 8th 
regiment of foot.”98 
3. The human component is a core component of all the experiments proposed above. We 
are unlikely to find any one factor guiding continuity and change in ship technology in 
our period more firmly than labor requirements, with the possible exception of capacity-
for-size. The two are related through ton-per-man ratios.
99
  
 In the final chapter, we will consider these questions in the context of what we 
may conclude, at least provisionally, about these ships from all aspects of the study 
considered together. 
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Chapter Seven: ‘A Very Good Sailer’? Conclusions and Further Questions 
 
What is a ship? At first, a ship is what we see when we look at one. The hull shape, the 
rig, the sails, the gear—what is reproduced so painstakingly in miniature by modeler 
August Crabtree, whose creations seem to float in air in their glass cases under jeweler’s 
lights in a quiet black gallery, like stars in space. 
 
Figure 19 Crabtree Gallery, The Mariners Museum
1
 
 
 There is much we can learn about ships from accurate modeling. The exhibit design of 
the Crabtree Gallery allows the viewer to appreciate the detail as close-up as possible 
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without exposing the models to possible damage. There may be no more accessible venue 
for being taken aback by the beauty of these machines.  
 Without detracting at all from any of that, this study has sought to consider “what 
is a ship?” in the opposite direction—by contextualizing the question as much as 
possible. The ship, as presented here, is also the slime and barnacles on her bottom, the 
leaky seam above the garboard strake, the slightly out-of-tune foremast, the crew on 
board as individuals and as a collective, what water she is floating in, or beach she has 
been abandoned on. How is she loaded and with what? Where is she going? Where has 
she been? Who owns her? Are they making or losing money on her? Did they build her 
or buy her? What laws is she subject to? What laws does she evade? How is she like 
older ships and later ships? How is she different? Why?  
 The questions we ask here, and the answers we are looking for, could very well 
help the next August Crabtree build more accurate models of the ships we are studying. 
That would be a fine thing. That, though, is not why we are asking them. We pursue these 
questions in the hopes that doing so will teach us more about the world these ships sailed 
in—the people who sailed them. We are not studying ships to learn about ships, really—
we are studying ships to learn about people, and how they were similar to and different 
from us, and in what ways, and why, so that we can better understand ourselves and our 
own world. That is why we do history. 
Doing technological history with these old ships: overview 
The overarching methodological challenge has been to understand continuity and change 
without teleology—to stay between teleology on the one hand and the denial of any linear 
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evolution whatsoever on the other. While teleology is fallacy, though, progress is not. 
Progress is real. Human knowledge can and does accumulate, and find its way into 
technology. What, specifically, constitutes “progress”? In the history of technology, the 
onus is always on the investigator to make a strong case for why we should accept 
something as “progress”—and that case had better avoid presentism and unintentional 
anachronism. It is not difficult to point out ways in which a 1770 ship is different from a 
1650 ship intended for the same general purpose. Our task at that point, though, is to 
avoid falling into the common trap of unconsciously looking for ways to show that those 
differences constitute an overall improvement—progress—from 1650 to 1770 ships. We 
like to think that we learn from experience and apply what we have learned to make our 
lives better. What we tend to overlook is that conditions change, and that the only way to 
understand technology is in the context of the conditions that produced and used it. The 
British Atlantic in 1650 was not the same as the British Atlantic in 1770. That may seem 
patently obvious, but what is not so obvious is the connection between that truism and the 
distinctive traits of the technology. That is not to suggest that we can never make the case 
that, for example, split topsails are more effective technology for a 300-ton ship than 
single topsails for the following X-number of reasons, which handily outweigh the < X-
number of advantages of single topsails. The trick, though, is to make the case for an 
anachronistic counterfactual—anachronism, like poison, can serve a useful purpose if 
carefully and intentionally applied. Can we show that, if larger 17
th
-century ships had had 
split topsails, they would have worked better on those ships than the single topsails they 
actually had? That exercise hinges on the best possible understanding of what those needs 
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were. That is the rub. That is what this is all about. Conveniently avoiding it makes for 
facile comparative technological history. 
 We could make a strong case that a 2015 Buick would have met the wants and 
needs of 1949 North American drivers better than a 1949 Buick. That argument, though, 
would be complicated by all the absurdities we would have to agree to accept—no 
computer technology, alloys that were not available or were not cost-effective then, etc. 
We stand to have an easier time with the kind of comparative technology proposed here. 
The materials were the same, the building techniques were largely the same, the 
infrastructure around the vessels was materially the same. The pace of technological 
change was, of course, much slower. Doing that right requires keeping that Vessel 
Analysis Map close by, and making sure to take into account everything on it. 
 We have to return to the questions raised throughout the study and sum up what 
answers we have, or may have, or do not have. Ultimately, we need to bring all that to 
bear on the following questions, suggested by the above methodological recap. Can we 
make any comparative technological assessments? If so, what does that tell us? If not, 
what more must we know before we can? 
Doing technological history with these old ships: hull form 
The 17
th
-century vessels are the most challenging, simply because the records are so 
sparse. Be that as it may, understanding them will also help us understand their 
successors better. So what can we say about the distinctive characteristics of the earlier 
ships—especially the earliest ones? The two most obvious of those characteristics are 
those most evident in the early English galleons (Mayflower, Susan Constant, Sea 
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Venture)—tumblehome and castling. Does tumblehome sacrifice stability? If so what 
kind? How much? What advantages does it offer?  
 The first response to those questions, as with any other aspect of ship design, is, 
“How much tumblehome are we talking about?” 18th-century ships had tumblehome—
just nowhere near as much as ships a hundred years older. It would be so easy to say that 
the general presence of pronounced tumblehome on the earlier ships was an inferior 
design characteristic. That is not helpful. None of the evidence we looked at in Chapters 
Five and Six support the idea that tumblehome was a significant stability problem. 
Replica experience and ship history tell us it has advantages at sea. It could be instructive 
to conduct computer modeling trials in which we analyze the same hull with varying 
degrees of tumblehome, but if we do that, we should take care to take into account all the 
possible structural imperatives selecting for and against tumblehome. A ship is made of 
wooden parts, not pixels or 1s and 0s. 
 If we keep in mind that the merchant owner’s number-one priority for hull form 
was capacity-for-size, then it seems more than reasonable to use that as our primary 
hypothesis for the decrease in tumblehome—that it increased capacity-for-size, and thus 
block coefficient. In that case, the primary factor selecting for the decrease in 
tumblehome is the one that supports McCusker—block coefficients were increasing 
because capacity-for-size was increasing. 
 We should consider tumblehome and castling together, because they tended to be 
found in proportion to one another. Is there more to the devolution of castling than a de-
escalating arms race? We are certainly safe in assuming—as we already do—that to a 
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significant extent, castling was vestigial. Again, though, replica experience shows that it 
has some advantages at sea—or at least that stern castling did, and we find pronounced 
stern castling after pronounced fore-castling has disappeared. Again, we can do 
laboratory analysis with different configurations of castling, and we are sure to learn 
something from that. We should focus those tests on this question: Does decreasing 
tumblehome without decreasing castling present a problem of top-heaviness that would 
serve as a compelling pressure to reduce castling concomitantly? It stands to reason that it 
would, and this is what Jon Adams was getting at. Sea Venture, as modeled and tested by 
Adams, was stable. Would she be with straight sides and the same castling? It is doubtful. 
Even if she were, she might well prove structurally problematic. We should not forget, 
too, the possibility that fashion played a role in the retention of the stern castle. Looking 
at that from the perspective of 17
th
-century aesthetic history, as suggested in Chapter 
Four, would be worthwhile. 
 Speaking of stability—did English merchant ships use Matthew Baker’s three-arc 
system to form their midship bends in the early 1600s? If so, did that produce hulls 
whose initial stability left something to be desired, leading to over-ballasting, which in 
turn compromised other aspects of performance and utility? If so, did shipwrights move 
away from such a midship bend by the 1670s? The evidence points to the answers to 
those questions being yes, yes, and yes. From experience with the Mayflower II and the 
return of the Nonsuch to the graphing of flat of floor versus floor sweep radii by Adams, 
what we have tells us that the early English galleons were not ideal in this respect, and 
that English shipwrights were moving away from the earlier midship bend in response. 
285 
 
All of our replicas from that period have modifications to increase their stability. We 
should do comparative computer modeling, like Adams’ comparative analysis, to 
quantify the inherent stability differences from c. 1600 to c. 1670. It may well be that 
here we have one of the advantages of Dutch commercial ships in this period—remember 
Duyfken, built in 1595, whose carefully researched replica had no such issues. The 
evidence strongly supports Burningham on this point. 
 How much of the stability issue with replicas of period vessels is due to our 
correct reproduction of unstable original designs, and how much of it is attributable to 
our loss of the invisible process by which a “design” was translated into a ship—a 
process the treatises cannot accurately convey to us? For most of the replica research 
phase of the study, this was the most nagging and compelling question on the list. By 
now it should be clear that advanced interpretive ship archaeology à la Adams and Riess 
is our best hope for answering this. The question is not as compelling as it once was, 
given the points made in the preceding paragraph. The evidence encourages us to agree 
with Burningham that William Baker did his job well and the resulting fault lay with the 
original design. The history of replica design found in Peter Wrike’s research—and Eric 
Speth’s comments on it—makes it clear how well we can do a replica when we approach 
it the right way—and how well we have done it. 
 Also related to stability is the question of whether the 1694 tonnage rule had a 
stultifying effect on the designs of English merchant ships until the 1770s. If so, if block 
coefficients were generally increasing, as McCusker tells us, how bad could that have 
been in terms of overall fleet efficiency? Was the chief cost the failure to attain what 
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might otherwise have been a gain in average speed? If so, would that have made any 
ultimate difference in passage times? We cannot answer those questions without clear 
evidence that ‘rule-beating’ ships were built consistently to cheat the 1694 rule and 
suffered technological detriments accordingly. The only evidence we have for that so far 
is anecdotal. What seems to be a compelling reason to look for such evidence goes back 
to Davis—we know that the British Atlantic shipping industry was more robust after 
1750, and Davis was convinced that had something to do with ships. Is that the correct 
context for considering the ramifications of the adoption—and then abandonment—of the 
1694 rule? Probably so.  
 When ship historian Alan McGowan wrote that “[h]ull design per se is not a 
factor in [the] evidence of greater economic efficiency…,”2 that seemed reasonable—as it 
did when presented in Chapter One. The evidence presented subsequently tells us that, as 
an assumption, it is now obsolete. 
 As we follow ship design through the period, did the centrality of proportion 
begin to give way? If so, to what? The evidence indicates that the centrality of proportion 
did not give way. The rules of thumb, the accepted proportions and dimensions of 
different vessel types, continued to define what went down the slipways. Meanwhile, the 
mathematical and scientific minds were hard at work trying to apply new concepts to old 
technology. Some of those minds sat on the shoulders of men who actually spent time in 
shipyards. For the most part, what they came up with remained experimental in our 
period, but the calculations and tank tests and modeling they did, encouraged by the 
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unease of the British establishment at the end of the period, laid the keel for 19
th
 and 20
th
 
century naval architecture. In our period, though, artisanal shipwrightry carried on as it 
always had, with its practical balancing of tradition and innovation, adherence and 
adaptation. The phrase “carried on as it always had” is not a euphemism for “languished.” 
 One obvious way in which it “carried on as it always had” throughout our period 
was with the fish-form hull. Did well-designed ships in our period make some sacrifice in 
resistance inherent to this hull form? If so, how much? Were the advantages ascribed to 
the tapering-aft from amidships real? If there is little or no resistance penalty for this 
form, that could support the notion that long experience—a form of evolution in human 
technology—had worked. If we find otherwise, we will be required to weigh that against 
other pros and cons of the fish-form hull. We obviously need computer-lab modeling 
tests on this issue. Again, we have to keep in mind structural considerations as we 
conduct those. The results of those tests should help us understand why the standard bow 
form changed in the 19
th
 century, so that we can do a cost/benefit analysis of that change 
in the context of the specific conditions in which it took place. 
Doing technological history with these old ships: sails and rigs 
Both computer modeling and replica-based experimental archaeology can advance our 
understanding of how sails and rigs worked and why improvisation with those sometimes 
led to wholesale changes in ships of our period. We should devise and conduct real-world 
experiments, such as those presented in the last chapter, on real ships as much as 
possible. Computer modeling can give us access to experiments that would be impractical 
to conduct on a real replica. What if we change the rig on this vessel from a three-masted 
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ship to a two-masted brig? What does that do? We can only do that in the lab. It would be 
worth doing in the lab, since we know from Davis that more and more mid-size Atlantic 
merchant vessels were two-masted rather than three-masted after 1750. We can evaluate 
performance comparatively, and we certainly have the archival evidence from that time 
period to evaluate relative cost and relative crew sizes. 
 Can we explain the evolution of the mizzen sail from lateen to cut-back lateen to 
gaff spanker? Does it have to do with manpower requirements? Vessel size increase? 
Both of those? The adoption of staysails, as Speth suggests? These questions, too, present 
opportunities for both experimental archaeology on replicas and for model testing—either 
in the computer lab or the old-fashioned way. The same applies to investigating the 
persistence of the spritsail and sprit-topsail. 
 To understand the evolution of topsails—primarily from taller, narrower single 
topsails to shorter, wider double topsails—we need to look at cost, complexity, labor 
requirements—both in terms of humans required and workload on those humans—and 
any relationship we can point to between those factors and vessel size. Can we prove Eric 
Speth’s attribution of split topsails—and the adoption of footropes—both of which, he 
says, are more labor-efficient than lowering sails to the deck or having crew try to go 
aloft without them—to size increases? We should also remember the importance of 
adjusting sail plan for heavy weather. If we compare the technique of half-hoisting 
topsails on 17
th
-century ships and make the comparable adjustment on 18
th
-century ships 
with split topsails, considering the results vis-à-vis the difference between the two in how 
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the sails were cut, how will that contribute to an explanation for the change? Finding 
written accounts in the archives could well prove helpful here too.  
Doing technological history with these old ships: steering systems 
Recall from the last chapter that Alan McGowan tried to connect the adoption of the 
steering wheel to the adoption of triangular jibs. Can we establish a connection between 
sails and steering systems? Or is that coincidental? We may be best–off here attempting 
to rank—and show relationships between—factors selecting for the adoption of wheel 
steering—or the retention, as the case may be, of tiller steering, including increasing 
vessel size, taking into account Fred Hocker’s comments about tiller length, helmsman’s 
visibility, viability of wheel steering technology, and the adoption of jibs, if that indeed 
can be shown to be relevant. We cannot switch out a replica’s steering system. What we 
can do is compare notes on the experiences of using both systems in similar conditions on 
different replicas. We can switch out systems on a computer model, calculate loads on 
each, and virtually explore the other factors as well.  
 We need carefully controlled, methodologically defensible experimental-
archaeology trials on replica vessels, to understand and compare different rigs, different 
hulls, and differences in armament with their associated crew requirements. These trials 
permit comparisons and contrasts of technologies separated by time. We can tie what we 
learn from these experiments to what we know about changing trade volumes, labor 
costs, average ship sizes, ton-per-man ratios, and the relative security of trade routes at 
different times. 
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 Computer modeling allows us to conduct tests impossible on replicas—either 
because of the differences between replica and original, or because a replica of the 
specific vessel in question does not exist. We can test relative stability, relative capacity-
for-size, hydrodynamic resistance and relative inherent speed. That will give us a better 
idea of what continuity and change actually meant for vessel performance in the period. 
 What we learn from both approaches—experimental archaeology and computer 
modeling—gives us information to add to the archaeological record, and then to go back 
to the maritime economic historians like Davis and McCusker and Shepherd and Walton 
and add something to their attempts to explain the broad trends and underlying realties of 
the British Atlantic as it developed. 
Making the study of these old ships relevant to maritime economic historians 
Was technological change in merchant ships a factor, however minor, in the established 
growth of shipping productivity in the British Atlantic in this period? If so, how? 
 The Shepherd and Walton thesis is still intriguing—they were too quick to 
dismiss technology but that was not fatal to their argument. It is still as good a starting 
point as any for working on the major questions. Is what Shepherd and Walton lumped 
together as one thing actually two things—related but not the same? Shepherd and 
Walton ascribe all of the growth in British Atlantic shipping productivity to 1) an 
increase in security due to the suppression of piracy permitting a decrease in manpower 
and armament; and 2) more efficient business networks and loading practices shortening 
turn-around times. The second of those is well-established. It is the first that has always 
seemed problematic. For one thing, the frequent wars with their cruising and privateering 
291 
 
were a far greater threat to merchant shipping than pirates ever were. “But, what about 
convoys?” is not the answer to that problem. They were not always available, and when 
they were, not always effective.
3
 Merchant ships, we know from the archives, continued 
to be armed during wartime throughout the period. That, though, leaves the question of 
what more we can learn about the connection between armament and merchant ship 
design, especially by considering post-1750 designs. Were the earlier ships designed 
more like warships than the later ships, primarily because they were intended to be 
armed? Did “galleon thinking” persist past the use of ships we actually call galleons? If 
so, for how long? Was there a point in the 18
th
 century when armament was no longer 
driving evolution in design? One way to test that idea would be to perform laboratory 
modeling experiments to determine the effects of armament on merchant hulls that we 
know were not armed. We need to be able to say something about whether there is any 
discernible link between the design imperatives brought to bear by carrying guns and the 
general changes in merchant ship design as we move through the period. This could add 
much to what the data compiled and Shepherd and Walton, Davis, and French have to tell 
us about general armament trends. 
 Can we compile data on the number of crew it takes to actually operate a vessel 
on a voyage from port to port with and without defensive capability for a number of 
vessels, based on a combination of archival sources and replica-based trials? We certainly 
know how to operate the ships and how to operate the weapons. We could cross-
reference those numbers with the numbers Ralph Davis compiled and add that to the 
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 See Unger, “Warships, Cargo Ships and Adam Smith: Trade and Government in the Eighteenth Century,” 
Mariner’s Mirror 92:1 (February 2006): 53. 
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discussion of how much the increase in tons-per-man ratios over time was attributable to 
increased security. 
 We know from Davis that Atlantic merchant ships were getting bigger, and that it 
is a fact of physics that bigger ships are faster ships, all other things being equal. So if 
ships did not make faster passages in 1800 than they did in 1600, what does that mean? 
That all other things were not equal. Much of that goes back to Ferreiro and his pointing 
out that everything from surface friction resistance—from fouling, primarily—to the 
condition of the ship and her rig to the condition and skill of her master and crew had 
more to do with making speed than variations in the design and construction of the ship. 
Another large part of the answer comes from Chapter Three. The winds and seas 
conspired to push down average speeds for passages well below what the ships were 
capable of making through the water.  
 A third part comes from the end of Chapter Five, and Riess’ summary comments 
on the design of the Ronson ship and what that might mean. The overriding priority of 
capacity, and the efficiency it offered by maximizing what a ship of a given size could 
carry, was doubtless worth far more to the average owner of the average merchantman 
than the relatively slight increases in speed he might wring out of the ship at the expense 
of that extra capacity.
4
 Such speed might translate into something useful for, say, a packet 
boat shuttling back and forth between nearby islands, but as we have seen, on an ocean 
passage it was likely to amount to naught—at least within the narrow range of sizes that 
were economically viable. As noted, we need to use archaeology and computer modeling 
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to explore McCusker’s and Davis’ contention that block coefficients were increasing, and 
that we are dealing here with the inverse relationship between capacity and speed for a 
given size vessel. There is little doubt that McCusker and Davis are right, based on all the 
evidence presented in this study, and if capacity increased without costing speed, that 
would have been plenty good enough for these people. It helps explain both why we do 
not see increases in average merchant ship speed in the period, even as sizes increased 
modestly, and why that growth in size was gradual and modest, even as the growth in the 
Atlantic World and its trades was much more robust. 
Full circle: Doing Atlantic World history with these old ships 
How do we correctly relate technological continuity and change in sea-going merchant 
ships to the larger developments that constitute Atlantic World history in this period?  
 Ian Steele subtitled his book An Exploration of Communication and Community, 
1675-1740. He emphasized the connections between the different settlements of the 
English Atlantic, whether separated by an ocean or just an island-hop away. Connections, 
networks, lines criss-crossing the Atlantic and Caribbean between Europe and Africa and 
North America and the West Indies and Central America—that is the stuff of Atlantic 
World history. Almost every one of those lines represents the track of a merchant ship. 
The sea was more highway than wall. Clearly the technology of the merchant ship made 
the whole thing possible. In what ways, though, did it also serve as the primary limiting 
factor of what was possible? For the most part, by limiting the speed of Steele’s 
“communication” and connections between geographically separated members of his 
“community.” The crux of The English Atlantic, though, is that we should set aside our 
294 
 
notions of speed to realize that it was not the impediment to the success of this huge 
endeavor that we would tend to assume. To put that in the terms of this study would be to 
say that to understand the value and function of a technology is to understand it in the 
context of its own time and place.  
 The key to heading off any situation in which merchant shipping could become an 
impediment to the sustenance and growth of a maritime empire in this time and place was 
adequate supply. The earliest Virginia settlement attempts did not receive the support 
from the sea that they needed, so they died out or struggled to hang on until that situation 
changed. The Spanish Caribbean was chronically under-supplied by Spain because that 
kingdom’s resources were stretched too thin and the mainland to the west became much 
more important to the Spanish than the West Indies, so the Spanish West Indians turned 
to Spain’s rivals—and their ships—for sustenance.5 French West Indians turned to the 
British Atlantic Empire—and the Dutch, and the Spanish—for what they needed because 
sustenance from France was inadequate. Again, that has to do with resources stretched 
too thin—France’s constant problem in the Atlantic. Frequent wars with the British 
Empire restricted French shipping. French warships could not remain on station in the 
West Indies long enough because they did not have the infrastructure in place to perform 
necessary maintenance. There was no market for rum in France, so French sugar 
producers had to rely on extra-imperial trade to make any commercial use of that product, 
and that trade was at best penalized by duties and at worst actively suppressed. 
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 None of these problems turn on ship technology per se. We saw in Chapter Three 
that the biggest challenge facing shipowning merchants was access to up-to-date, 
accurate market information. That information could only travel as fast as the fastest 
vessel. These people could and did build fast “advice boats”—couriers, whose main task 
was the speedy delivery of dispatches, newspapers, and agents. That, though, was 
expensive, and while it no doubt helped the situation, it was not something the average 
merchant could afford to do. Most such boats were government vessels doing 
government business. So in that sense, the ship was a limiting factor. It would remain so 
until the telegraph and the railroad and the steamboat, but all those technologies were for 
some time restricted to terrestrial or inland employment, and made it easier, for the first 
time in the Atlantic World, to communicate and build community by land and river than 
by sea. For some time longer, the speed of the ship remained the limiting factor for the 
speed of transatlantic communication.  
 Be that as it may, though, it certainly did not limit the growth of the British 
Atlantic. Steele ends his book in 1740, but the marked economic acceleration of the 
British Atlantic was post-1750. Even in the earlier period, though, growth was real and 
the British Empire was consolidating more and more holdings to the west of its own 
shores.  
 On the shores of each new colony, there was somebody who could set up stocks 
and build a ship if properly motivated to do so. The Sea Venture castaways in Bermuda 
are the most famous and extreme example, but what they did, and the benefits derived 
from it, did not require such dire straits. The New Englanders started doing it as soon as 
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they had learned to survive. Then they built one of the world’s top shipping industries, as 
the flags flying over their courthouses changed.   
 The ships grew as the Atlantic World grew. Some of their costs increased as 
supplies of materials dwindled and a growing merchant fleet competed with the navy for 
an always-inadequate supply of skilled seamen. So their ton-per-man ratios tended to 
decrease. Their rigs and steering systems were adapted in ways that allowed growth in 
size without increasing manpower. They were armed for protection during times of 
conflict and owners dispensed with that burden when they could—or when effective 
convoys were available, later in the period. 
 To frame this period in terms of merchant ships, consider the small English 
galleon, e.g. Sea Venture, on the front end and the snow George—whose voyage from 
Delaware to Ireland in 1806 we considered in Chapter Three—on the back end. Recall 
Adams’ characterizing of the small galleon as a ship that was not ideal in any one sense, 
but taken together, was ideal as a compromise to serve the role for which she was needed 
in her time and place. She was stout, versatile, defensible, affordable, and reasonably 
maneuverable. The early Atlantic World could not afford specialization,
6
 just as most 
denizens of its villages and small towns could not, as noted in Chapter Four. A century 
after Sea Venture—or midway through the period we are considering—we have Warren 
Riess’ Princess Carolina, which clearly shows characteristics of an English-Dutch hybrid 
design much more specialized as a cargo carrier and capitalizing on the appropriation of 
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why, he says, we do not see “shipowner” listed as a trade or occupation of anyone in the directories of the 
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Dutch technology in the late 17
th
 century. Finally, we have the George—which, as a 
snow, was a type of mid-size ocean-going merchantman very popular in the last half-
century or so of the period. Her rig was simpler than Carolina’s ship rig. She may well 
have required fewer crew than a three-masted ship her size. If she were unarmed, as so 
many merchantman were in the latter half of the period, she could have afforded the risk 
of that smaller crew, while avoiding the expense of a larger one. These three 
representative vessels are not intended to suggest a linear progression, but they are 
indicative of broad trends in the development of the British Atlantic from 1600 to 1800.  
 From Sea Venture’s ill-fated voyage to Virginia to George’s routine one to 
Ireland, shipwrights in the British Atlantic built a remarkable variety of craft influenced 
by the building traditions of all the Atlantic European powers—and, close to shore, they 
paddled around in small boats developed by natives and by Africans as well as their own 
ancestors. Those major types we have considered here may show up most often in the 
records, but that must not be taken to mean they comprised anything close to the whole 
British Atlantic merchant fleet. Early in this project, it seemed worthwhile to design a 
relational database to help keep track of vessel types used in the British Atlantic in this 
period. As of now, the number of such types in the database stands at 35, for most of 
which we also find alternate names.
7
  
 All the vessels considered here were built for owners risking their fortunes—
whether meager or substantial—trying to take advantage of volatile markets in a 
frequently violent world. More of those owners grew richer as the Atlantic World 
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developed, and more of those rich owners were colonials too. No matter how wealthy, 
though, an owner had to place a large amount of trust in a ship master to buy and sell for 
him on favorable terms, and to take care of the expensive ship and her expensive crew. 
Whether they were ordering a small schooner from David Lowell, a mid-size transatlantic 
snow from Charles West, or an East Indiaman from the Hackets, they wanted to mitigate 
risk. Contracting with a trusted builder who had acquired a reputation was a way to do 
that. Owners had to trust shipwrights on important technical matters. They could stipulate 
specific matters of build quality and design preferences in their shipbuilding contracts, 
but they had to trust that the builder would abide by those—especially if, like Daniel 
Flexney, they were on the other side of the ocean. There was only so much an owner 
could do to mitigate market risk. One way to mitigate overall risk, though, was to order a 
ship—or buy one already built—by a shipwright who could adapt a proven technology to 
the needs of that owner and produce a vessel capable of performing the intended service 
for a reasonable length of time given proper care and luck.  
 The best of those shipwrights had a knack—a skill honed to an instinct—for 
adapting a prescribed convention to suit specific needs without compromising the basic 
recipe for a good ship. They knew how to vary the spice without ruining the stew. They 
were constrained by the availability of wood and by wood’s limitations, but they also 
took advantage of what it had to offer by improvising construction techniques as 
available materials required. Design and construction were inextricable, so it worked well 
that they were directed by the same person.  
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 Shipwrights could offset the disadvantages of, say, having to scarf together the 
frames out of more pieces than they would have preferred, by adding reinforcements and 
fastenings. All of those shipwrights worked with a sense of proportion—whether learned 
in the yard, as was usually the case, or from a treatise—or from both. The latest 
archaeology, such as Riess’, shows us that those proportions could be quite simple, and 
the resulting vessel would serve well. As for the worst of those shipwrights, it is difficult 
for us now to discern how much of being a bad shipwright had to do with lack of 
knowledge and skill, and how much had to do with being willing to acquiesce to the 
stipulations of an ignorant merchant and build him a bad ship to get paid. William 
Hutchinson would have blamed merchant and shipwright together for that. 
 Laws passed for revenue collection, like the 1694 rule, could indeed exert 
pressure to execute designs with performance and safety problems vis-à-vis alternatives. 
A predilection of some English shipwrights to build smaller merchantmen according to 
twenty-year-old stipulations for warships, as may be the case with the use of Matthew 
Baker’s tangent-arc system in small galleons of the early 17th century, may have led to 
some stability and lading problems. Design adapted to challenges. We do not know that 
ships were built too deep to beat the 1694 rule—a worse fault than building them too high 
would have been. Adams shows that English midship bend convention was already 
moving away from Baker in Baker’s own time, and that the small galleon Sea Venture, 
contemporaneous with Susan Constant and Mayflower, was not designed to Baker’s 
formula. We know that, as size increased, tumblehome and castling decreased, block 
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coefficients could grow, increasing capacity-for-size and thus overall efficiency with no 
loss of speed in the real world of ocean passagemaking. 
 Sailors were always adjusting lines and sails anyway, so of course they 
experimented with different ways of setting up rigs and sail plans. They knew, though, 
that to change something important would require other changes as well, and the ship 
under their feet was the only thing between them and the deep blue sea. Considering 
when and where we find lateen mizzens, triangular staysails and jibs, spritsails, and sprit-
topsails, it seems they were perhaps more apt to adopt something new and proven than 
jettison something old and proven. Such changes had to be approached with caution. 
These people placed a high value on “prudence.” They even used it as a name for their 
daughters.  
 The merchant ship was a nexus of managed risks, like every other commercial 
undertaking then or now. Studying these people’s ships makes it clear to us that their 
risks were different from ours, whether we are talking about their market risks or their 
risks of physical injury or death. We have to understand those risks, and the attitudes and 
values of those who assumed them, before we can appreciate how the technology relates 
to those risks. We cannot just assume, for example, that adopting—or not adopting—
footropes for furling square sails had primarily to do with mitigating, or ignoring, the risk 
to the crew. 
 We would be no more sanguine about accepting any other of their risks than we 
would be about signing on for a voyage on one of their ships. It was a different world. In 
that different world, these ships did what these people needed them to do at a cost they 
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could afford and were willing to pay. That is “good technology”—and that technology 
kept up. It did not impede the major changes in the Atlantic World. We still have much to 
discover about exactly how they went about using and adapting their successful 
technology as operating conditions changed, but we know enough to conclude that these 
people could and did build ‘a very good sailer.’   
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Appendix 1 
 
DOCUMENTS USED IN THE CONDUCTING OF INTERVIEWS 
 
   Informed Consent Form 
 
Title: “Merchant Ship Technology and the Development of the British 
Atlantic Empire 1600-1800” 
 
Researcher: Phillip Reid, PhD student, Department of History, Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 305 N 23
rd
 St, Wilmington NC 
28405 USA, (910) 352-3171, pfr615@mun.ca 
 
Supervisor:   Neil Kennedy, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of History 
and Department of Archaeology, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, St. John’s, NL Canada A1C 5S7, (709) 864-8968, 
nkennedy@mun.ca 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project entitled ““Merchant Ship Technology 
and the Development of the British Atlantic Empire 1600-1800.” 
 
This form is part of the process of informed consent.  It should give you the basic idea of 
what the research is about and what your participation will involve.  It also describes your 
right to withdraw from the study.  In order to decide whether you wish to participate in 
this research study, you should understand enough about its risks and benefits to be able 
to make an informed decision.  This is the informed consent process.  Take time to read 
this carefully and to understand the information given to you.  Please contact the 
researcher,  Phillip Reid, if you have any questions about the study or for more 
information not included here before you consent. 
 
It is entirely up to you to decide whether to take part in this research.  If you choose not 
to take part in this research or if you decide to withdraw from the research once it has 
started, there will be no negative consequences for you, now or in the future. 
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Introduction 
 
As part of my Doctoral thesis, I am conducting research under the supervision of Dr. Neil 
Kennedy exploring the role of merchant ship technology in the development of the 
British Atlantic Empire from the early settlement period until after U.S independence.  In 
addition to archival research and technical analysis of plans and archaeological evidence, 
I want to examine working reproductions of relevant vessels to learn what I can about 
their design, construction, and operating characteristics, and I think the best way to do 
that is to solicit the opinions, judgments, and experiences of those who have significant 
experience working with these vessels.   
 
Purpose of study: 
 
By adding the information from the working-replica study to that gleaned from other 
sources, I think I can add materially to our understanding of how merchant ship 
technology—an under-studied aspect of this period—contributed to, and reflects, the 
growth and change, as well as the continuity, of the British Atlantic.  By accomplishing 
that, I will also make a new contribution to the history of technology, which has in the 
past placed much more emphasis on ship technology in the immediately preceding and 
succeeding periods. 
 
What you will do in this study: 
 
I am asking you to contribute your opinions and judgments—as well as any performance 
data and/or specifications you or I may deem relevant, regarding the vessel(s) with which 
you have experience.  I have prepared a questionnaire laying out the information I am 
looking for, to be used as a rubric; it provides both structure and flexibility to you, and it 
can be used either as the basis for a written response or for an oral interview or series of 
interviews.  That is up to you.  I am asking you to agree to let me use the information you 
provide in my doctoral thesis and in any articles, presentations or books based on the 
thesis or on the research I am conducting for it.  I am asking you to agree to let me 
properly credit you for your contributions through citations—footnotes, endnotes, textual 
references, and bibliographic entries—by name, vessel and/or organizational affiliation, 
date(s) of interview(s), and nature of interview (e-mail, telephone, in-person, etc.), as per 
the conventions prescribed by the discipline of history for referencing source material in 
academic works.  The information provided by you will become public and will be 
attributed to you.   
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Length of time: 
 
How long you spend providing the information requested in the questionnaire is largely 
up to you and determined by how much of the information you have at your command 
and are willing to share.  It also depends on whether or not you and I interact directly or 
not.  I would estimate that the response should take anywhere from one hour to several 
hours. 
 
Withdrawal from the study: 
 
I will share a draft version of anything I produce—thesis, conference paper, article, book, 
or presentation—that includes information derived specifically from the information you 
provided.  If you object to my use of that information in that work, you may direct me not 
to use that information in that work and I will comply.  The opportunity to withdraw 
continues to be available until the work in question is either submitted for publication, 
presentation, or examination.  If I have used your information in a specific work, I will 
inform you when the applicable deadline is for that work.  If you elect to withdraw before 
the deadline, and you wish to withdraw from the study completely, I will return all the 
information you provided to you, including any transcripts of interviews, sound or video 
recordings, or written responses to the questionnaire, and expunge any information 
derived directly from your contribution from any and all works in which I may have used 
that information.   There will be no consequences for withdrawal.   
 
For the thesis, the target date for submission for examination is December 2015.  I will 
provide a more specific date to you as soon as it becomes clear what that date will be.   
 
Possible benefits: 
 
The information I gather from you and other participants in this study is likely to 
materially advance the fields of maritime history and the history of technology—fields 
important to academic history, archaeology, historic preservation, and museum work.   
 
Possible risks: 
 
It is possible that the opinions and judgments provided by the participant are at odds with 
those provided by other participants or with the conclusions reached by the researcher.  It 
is possible that colleagues and/or employers of the participants could take a negative 
view of the participant’s expressed opinions and judgments.  You should consider these 
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possibilities before you agree to participate, and feel free to decline to participate if you 
think that these risks may apply to you if you participate.   
 
 
Confidentiality 
 
It is important to understand that, while any information of a purely personal nature you 
share with me—including personal contact information that you specifically ask me not 
to share—will be kept private and in my sole possession, your name, professional or 
organizational affiliation, professional or organizational contact information, and the 
direct attribution to you of the information you have provided for the study will be 
public.   
 
Anonymity: 
 
If I use the information you provide in this study in the thesis or in any other work 
produced as a result of the study, your contribution will not be anonymous. 
 
Recording of Data: 
 
You and I may decide to use audio recording, video recording, and/or written 
communication to accomplish your participation in the study.  You will always have the 
right to specify which of those methods you are comfortable with.  On the signature page 
of this form, you can specify which of these methods you agree to use. 
 
Storage of Data: 
 
All records (“data”) of your responses to the questionnaire and any other communication 
associated with your participation in the study will be kept in my sole, private, and 
protected possession unless you withdraw from the study, in which case they will be 
returned to you promptly.  Otherwise, all data will be kept for a minimum of five 
years, as required by Memorial University policy on Integrity in Scholarly 
Research.  If an archival institution requests that I donate these records to their 
collection, I will obtain your permission to do that before accepting that request.   
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Reporting of Results: 
 
The information collected from you may be used in a thesis, in journal articles, books, 
conference presentations, and reports to my Department or to another unit of Memorial 
University. The information may be reported using direct quotations and/or personally 
identifying information. 
 
 
Sharing of Results with Participants: 
 
I will inform you of how to access the final results of any work in which I have used your 
information. Theses are now kept in electronic format, so in that case, this will entail 
advising you how to access that on-line. If the final result is an unpublished work, I will 
provide you with a copy myself.   
 
Questions: 
 
You are welcome to ask questions at any time during your participation in this research.  
If you would like more information about this study, please 
contact:  
 
Phillip Reid,  PhD student, Department of History, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, 305 N 23
rd
 St, Wilmington NC 28405 USA, (910) 
352-3171, pfr615@mun.ca 
 
Supervisor:   Neil Kennedy, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of History 
and Department of Archaeology, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, St. John’s, NL Canada A1C 5S7, (709) 864-8968, 
nkennedy@mun.ca 
 
The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Interdisciplinary Committee on 
Ethics in Human Research and found to be in compliance with Memorial University’s 
ethics policy.  If you have ethical concerns about the research, such as the way you have 
been treated or your rights as a participant, you may contact the Chairperson of the 
ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by telephone at 709-864-2861. 
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Consent: 
 
Your signature on this form means that: 
 You have read the information about the research. 
 You have been able to ask questions about this study. 
 You are satisfied with the answers to all your questions. 
 You understand what the study is about and what you will be doing. 
 You understand that you are free to withdraw from the study without having to 
give a reason and that doing so will not affect you now or in the future.   
 You understand that any data collected from you up to the point of your 
withdrawal will be returned to you  
 
If you sign this form, you do not give up your legal rights and do not release the 
researchers from their professional responsibilities. 
 
Your signature:  
 
       I have read what this study is about and understood the risks and benefits. I have 
had adequate time to think about this and had the opportunity to ask questions and 
my questions have been answered. 
 
  I agree to participate in the research project understanding the risks and 
contributions of my participation, that my participation is voluntary, and that I 
may end my participation. 
 
I agree to be audio-recorded during an interview.      Yes    No 
I agree to be video-recorded during an interview.      Yes    No 
I agree to the use of quotations.           Yes    No 
I allow my name to be identified in any publications resulting  
   from this study.            Yes    No 
 
A copy of this Informed Consent Form has been given to me for my records. 
 
 
 _____________________________ _____________________________ 
Signature of participant     Date 
 
Note:  Electronic signatures are acceptable for this form. 
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Researcher’s Signature: 
 
I have explained this study to the best of my ability. I invited questions and gave answers.  
I believe that the participant fully understands what is involved in being in the study, any 
potential risks of the study and that he or she has freely chosen to be in the study. 
 
 
 
______________________________  _____________________________ 
Signature of Principal Investigator    Date 
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 “Merchant Ship Technology and the Development of the British Atlantic Empire, 1600-
1800” 
Working replica study recruitment e-mail 
 
Dear _____________: 
 
My name is Phillip Reid and I am a doctoral student in maritime history at Memorial 
University of Newfoundland.  I have begun research for a thesis whose working title is 
“Merchant Ship Technology and the Development of the British Atlantic Empire, 1600-
1800.”  My purpose is to understand both change and continuity in the typical merchant 
ships of transatlantic and coastal service in the Atlantic and Caribbean.   
In addition to archival sources and the analysis of plans and wreck evidence using 
modern engineering applications, I want to take advantage of whatever information I can 
gather from the experiences of those involved with working replicas of relevant vessels.  
I believe there is much to be learned about the design, construction, and operational 
characteristics of the original vessels by drawing on the experience of working replicas—
providing the analysis and interpretation are done carefully.   
I am hoping you will be interested in participating in this aspect of the project.  If you 
may be, I can send you the questionnaire I have prepared for your review, and if you are 
still interested, I will forward you the required Informed Consent Form.  Once I have a 
signed copy of that, we can proceed.  
If you can think of others who may be good candidates for participation in this study, 
please advise me of that and I will contact them promptly.   
Thank you for your time. 
The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Interdisciplinary Committee on 
Ethics in Human Research and found to be in compliance with Memorial University’s 
ethics policy.  If you have ethical concerns about the research, such as the way you have 
been treated or your rights as a participant, you may contact the Chairperson of the 
ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by telephone at 709-864-2861. 
Regards, 
 
Phillip Reid 
PhD student 
Department of History 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
St. John’s NL Canada  
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preid@ec.rr.com 
(910) 352-3171 
 
Physical address: 
305 N 23
rd
 St 
Wilmington NC 28405 
USA 
 
(I am no longer in residence at Memorial.) 
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Working replica questionnaire, 
"Merchant Ship Technology and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1600-1800,"  
a doctoral thesis in maritime history in progress for the Department of History, Memorial 
University of Newfoundland 
by Phillip Reid; Neil Kennedy, PhD, supervisor 
Contact information: 
Phillip Reid 
305 N 23
rd
 St 
Wilmington NC 28405 
USA  
 
(910) 352-3171 
pfr615@mun.ca 
preid@ec.rr.com 
 
Departmental contact information: 
Department of History 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
Arts & Administration Building, 
General Office: Room A4019 
St. John's, NL A1C 5S7 
Canada 
 
Telephone: 709-864-8420 
Fax: 709-864-2164 
nkennedy@mun.ca 
Please feel free to use this questionnaire however is most convenient for you.  We can 
use it as a template for an oral interview, or you can type answers to the questions in the 
document and send it back.  If you are answering the questions in writing and aren’t sure 
about something or have a question, feel free to either note that here or contact me at your 
convenience.  If we are conducting an oral interview, I will send you a transcript of that 
interview for your approval before using any of the answers you provide. 
(questionnaire begins on next page) 
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I.  Authenticity of the reconstruction 
 
1. Upon what historical evidence was the reconstruction based? 
 
2. To what extent did the reconstruction adhere to known period building and 
rigging practices? 
 
3. To what extent did the reconstruction consciously deviate from those practices? 
 
4. To what extent did the reconstruction utilize "best-guess" practices due to lack of 
knowledge about actual historical building and rigging practices? 
 
5. Has information come to light since the reconstruction was completed that would 
likely have changed the reconstruction had the information been available at the 
time?  If so, please explain. 
 
6. How would you expect the reconstruction's performance to be different from the 
original vessel's, due to deviations from historical building and rigging practices? 
 
a. If the vessel has synthetic rigging, do you believe that she can carry more 
sail in certain conditions than if her rigging were natural-fiber?  Do you 
believe that she is more vulnerable to capsize if suddenly overpowered? 
 
b. If the vessel has synthetic sails, do you believe this would make her more 
vulnerable to being overpowered before a sail blow-out? 
 
c. If the vessel has auxiliary power, how do you believe this affects her 
performance when not under power?   
 
7. How would you expect the reconstruction's performance to be different from the 
original vessel's, due to deviations in burden from what we would expect the 
original vessel's to have been under normal operating conditions? 
 
II.  Operational Characteristics 
 
1. How many crew does it take to safely and effectively man the vessel, exclusive of 
armament?  How many more does it take if serving the guns is included?  Is there 
any reason to think that these requirements would have been different originally?  
If so, why?   
 
2. What performance data might be available from your experience with the vessel, 
such as speeds in various wind and sea conditions under different points of sail 
and with different sail plans deployed?  (I will be happy to take this information 
in whatever format is convenient.  If the information hasn’t been extracted from 
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the ship’s logs, it might be possible for me to do that; we can discuss. If you or 
your crew has experience comparing the results of speed measurements by 
traditional chip log to those obtained by GPS or other modern methods, that 
information would be very valuable to me.) 
 
3. From a modern sailor’s perspective, are there any historically accurate aspects of 
the vessel’s design and/or rigging that seem superior or inferior to workable 
alternatives in terms of performance?   
 
4. This study aims to compare typical vessel types from a period of two centuries.  
For example, one of the specific questions we’re interested in is how a two-
masted vessel compares to a three-masted vessel of similar size and capacity, as 
we know that two-masted vessels of medium tonnage became more popular after 
the midpoint of the 18
th
 century.  If you have any experience from which you 
would feel comfortable making comparative judgments –for example, with other 
working replica vessels relevant to the Atlantic and Caribbean in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries—please feel free to share those.  Your opinions, if incorporated into the 
study, will be acknowledged as such and properly attributed to you, along with 
the evidence or experience upon which they are based. 
 
Thank you for this valuable assistance.  I will apprise you of the progress of the study and 
of the inclusion of any of the information you have provided.  Of course any further 
information you wish to contribute later is most welcome.   
 
Please provide your contact information below so that I can keep accurate records of 
what information comes from whom.  If more than one person contributed to your 
answers, please make it clear who contributed what as much as possible, so that I can 
properly attribute the information in the study. 
 
 
 
 
Name(s): 
Vessel(s) name(s): 
Full mailing address where you can be reached: 
Best telephone number(s): 
Fax (if you have one and use it): 
Best e-mail address(es): 
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Appendix 2 
List of vessels discussed in the text 
Part 1: Archaeological remains 
     
Name Type Nature of 
remains 
Location of 
site 
Date of site 
Concorde/Queen 
Anne’s Revenge 
English 
frigate 
Partial bottom, 
submerged 
Beaufort Inlet, 
North 
Carolina, USA 
1718 
Henrietta Marie French-
British ship 
Partial bottom, 
submerged 
Marquesas 
Keys 
1701 
Princess Carolina British 
American 
ship 
Partial hull, 
buried 
New York, 
New York, 
USA 
c. 1735-1740 
San Juan de Pasajes Basque 
whaler 
Partial hull, 
submerged 
Red Bay, 
Labrador, 
Canada 
1565 
Sea Venture English 
galleon 
Partial bottom, 
submerged 
Bermuda 1609 
Sparrow-Hawk English 
pinnace 
Partial hull, 
excavated and 
reconstructed 
Cape Cod, 
Massachusetts, 
USA 
c. 1626 
 
Part 2: Replicas and reconstructions 
      
Name Type Status of 
rep./rec. 
Location of 
rep./rec. 
Date of 
original 
Date of 
rep./rec. 
Armed Sloop 
Welcome 
British 
American 
sloop 
Retired, 
ashore; 
future 
operation 
unknown 
Mackinaw 
City, 
Michigan, 
USA 
1774 1976 
Discovery English fly-
boat 
Operational Jamestown, 
Virginia, USA 
1602 2006 
Duyfken Dutch jacht Operational Fremantle, 
Western 
Australia 
1595 1996 
Elizabeth II English 
galleon 
Operational Manteo, North 
Carolina, USA 
c. 1585 1983 
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Godspeed English 
ship 
Operational Jamestown, 
Virginia, USA 
c. 1605 2006 
Golden Hind English 
galleon 
Retired, 
dockside 
London, UK 1577 1973 
Half Moon 
(Halve Maen) 
Dutch 
vlieboot 
Operational Hoorn, The 
Netherlands 
1608 1989 
Kalmar Nyckel Dutch 
pinas 
Operational Wilmington, 
Delaware, 
USA 
c. 1625 1997 
Maryland Dove English 
merchant 
ship 
Restricted 
operational, 
dockside 
St. Mary’s 
City, 
Maryland, 
USA 
1634 1978 
Mayflower II English 
galleon 
Restricted 
operational, 
dockside; 
under 
restoration 
2016-2019 
Plimouth 
Plantation, 
Massachusetts, 
USA 
c. 1600-
1609 
1957 
Nonsuch English 
ketch 
Retired, 
museum 
Winnipeg, 
Manitoba, 
Canada 
1650 1968 
Pride of 
Baltimore 
American 
topsail 
schooner 
(“Baltimore 
clipper”) 
Sunk, 1986 Baltimore, 
Maryland, 
USA until lost 
c.1812 1977 
Sultana British 
American 
schooner 
Operational Chestertown, 
Maryland, 
USA 
1767 2001 
Susan Constant English 
galleon 
Operational Jamestown, 
Virginia, USA 
1605 1991 
check 
Swedish Ship 
Götheborg 
Swedish 
East 
Indiaman 
Operational Göteborg, 
Sweden 
1738 2003 
US Brig 
Niagara 
American 
snow-brig 
Operational Erie, 
Pennsylvania, 
USA 
1813  1990 
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Part 3: Vessels from the documentary record only
*
 
 
Name Type Where built Date Source 
Advice Prize Ship France before 1704 Moore, 
“Anatomy,” 
115, citing 
Chapelle, 
Search for 
Speed, 38, 42. 
America ship USA, prob. 
New England 
before 1796  Crowninshield 
Family 
Papers, MH 
15, Box 1, 
Folder 1; Box 
4, Folder 8, 
PEM-Phillips. 
Andrago sloop British 
America(?) 
before 1758 Orne Family 
Papers, MSS 
41, Box 1 
Folder 3, 
PEM-Phillips. 
Ann & Hope ship New England 1798 Brown Family 
Business 
Records, Box 
475, Folder 9, 
JCB. 
Astrea ship USA, prob. 
New England 
before 1784 Derby Family 
Papers, MSS 
37, Box 1, 
Folders 5 and 
8, PEM-
Phillips. 
  
                                   
*
 To avoid redundancy, I have chosen not to reproduce Table 1 here, and not to include vessels discussed 
only in reference to that table in Chapter 3, pp. 102-106. I have also omitted vessels only mentioned in 
passing and not discussed. 
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Bonetta sloop British 
America 
c. 1766 Brown Family 
Business 
Records, Box 
682, Folder 5, 
JCB. 
Friendship brig USA, prob. 
New England 
before 1794 Brown Family 
Business 
Records, Box 
733, Folder 1, 
JCB. 
George snow USA; prob. 
Philadelphia 
before 1805 George (ship) 
logbook, 
1805-1806, 
Am. 6823, 
HSP. 
George & Mary ship USA (?) before 1807 Brown Family 
Business 
Records, Box 
306, Folders 
3-5, JCB.  
Harmony brig British 
America, 
prob. New 
England 
before 1774 Brown Family 
Business 
Records, Box 
682, Folder 3, 
JCB. 
Maria brigantine unknown 1793 Brown Family 
Business 
Records, Box 
682, Folder 4, 
JCB. 
Mayflower ship England 1676 Barlow, 
Barlow's 
journal, 281, 
plate 283. 
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HMS Prince 100-gun first-
rate ship of 
the line 
Deptford, 
England 
1670 Anderson, ed., 
Journals and 
Narratives of 
the Third 
Dutch War, 
71. 
Roebuck 6
th
-rate 
warship 
Harwich, 
England 
1666 Moore, 
“Anatomy,” 
115-117, 
citing Lavery, 
ed., Deane’s 
Doctrine, 112. 
Success sloop British 
America (?) 
1770 Brown Family 
Business 
Records, Box 
682, Folder 4, 
JCB. 
Two Catharines ship unknown before 1813 Brown Family 
Business 
Records, Box 
306, Folder 7, 
JCB. 
USS Ranger sloop-of-war Maine 1777 Langdon 
Family 
Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 7, 
NHHS.  
Vasa warship Stockholm 1627 see Rose, 
“The Naval 
Architecture 
of Vasa, …” 
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Appendix 3 
 
List of vessel type names and alternate type names 
 
barque longue  
bateau plat, gondolo 
Bermuda sloop sloop 
bilander brig 
boat-canoe canoe, punt 
brigantine brig, hermaphrodite brig 
canoe kunner, cannow, boat-canoe 
catch  
Chebacco boat  
cutter  
felucca  
flat punt, scow 
fluit fluyt, flyboat 
galleon  
galley ship, brigantine, galley-brigantine 
galley-ship runner 
jacht pinas 
ketch catch, hooker, galliot 
lugger  
maître grand canot 
moses double moses 
periauger periauga 
pink shallop 
pinnace rambargo, ram-barge, galley-ship 
plat  
runner ship, galley, galley-brigantine 
schooner  
scow punt, periauga, flat, radeau, gondalow, gondolo 
shallop sloep, chaloup, slup, longboat, launch, two-mast boat 
ship  
skiff  
sloop Bermuda sloop, Jamaica sloop 
snow brig 
whaleboat  
wherry  
xebec  
yawl longboat 
 
